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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies important evolutions in three areas in labour economics: the flow 
approach, the efficiency wage hypothesis and unions. In part one I discuss gross job 
flows in the U.K., while part II is concerned with wage determination and firm 
performance. I give an introduction in chapter I where I motivate the study of gross 
job flows and I highlight the importance of spillovers from the product market to the 
labour market and vice versa. In chapter II I analyze a pattern of gross job creation 
and destruction in the U.K. during the 70’s and early 80’s. At any point in time and 
even within narrowly defined sectors simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs is 
observed, the latter being more variable over the cycle. Gross job reallocation, defined 
as the sum of gross job creation and destruction, is counter cyclical. Chapter EQ 
explores the relationship between firm size and job creation and destruction. The 
largest firms create and destroy most jobs. However, in percentage terms the gross job 
creation rate is largest in small firms, while the gross job destruction rate is lowest. 
I further investigate the size distribution dynamics and find that in the long run firms 
converge towards their average size, while plants do not. The final chapter of part I 
compares gross job flows across countries and shows the difficulties involved in 
making a consistent comparison. In part III analyze vertical spillovers from the labour 
market to the product market and vice versa. I show that there exists a positive 
relationship between the wage paid in the firm and its market share performance, only 
under the hypothesis of efficiency wages. The theory is supported by evidence from 
firm level panel data. I show that important new insights may be obtained if the 
product market is explicitly taken into account when analyzing labour problems. 
Finally, in chapter V II investigate the impact of unions on employment growth in the
2
U.K. and find that unions have a negative effect on employment growth, but a positive 
effect on employment levels, although this effect is not robust with respect to time. 
Moreover, the union effect is weaker the more competitors the firm faces.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In this thesis I study three areas in labour economics which received a lot of 
attention in the literature in the past couple of decades or so:
1. The matching or flow approach (e.g. Pissarides, 1985, 1986, 1990)
2. The efficiency wage hypothesis (e.g. Akerlof, 1984; Solow, 1979; Yellen, 1984)
3. The role of unions on economic performance (e.g. Clark, 1984; Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1986; Oswald, 1985).
These three approaches attempt to provide an economic rational, different than the 
typical competitive framework, for unemployment. This thesis makes a substantial 
contribution in each of these three broad fields in labour economics. Part I of the 
thesis can be situated in the flow approach and is concerned with the analysis of gross 
job creation and destruction in the U.K.. This is the first study on gross job flows in 
the U.K. which reveals a number of new and interesting facts and could therefore be 
used for further empirical and theoretical work in this area. In the second part of the 
thesis I investigate the wage determination process, in particular I develop a test which 
discriminates between the efficiency wage hypothesis and other forms of wage 
determination, like union bargaining.
In this introductory chapter I will motivate the current research and give a brief 
overview of the issues and the results reported in this volume. In section 1.1. I start 
with explaining in a non-technical way what I mean with gross job flows and continue 
to motivate why it matters and it is interesting to study them. In section 1.2 I discuss
spillovers between the labour market and the product market. These two sections 
reflect part I and II respectively of the thesis. In section 1.3 I give an overview of the 
thesis.
1.1. Gross Job Flows: What and Why?
Gross job creation and gross job destruction can be contrasted with net 
job creation and destruction. I mean with gross job creation the sum of all firms which 
expand their labour force in a particular year. With gross job destruction I mean the 
sum of all firms which contract their labour force in a particular year, expressed as 
a positive number. These figures can be expressed as rates in which case the amount 
of job creation and destruction in a particular year is divided by aggregate or sectoral 
employment. The difference between the gross job creation and gross job destruction 
rate gives the net employment growth rate. If it is positive there is net job creation, 
if this difference is negative there is net job destruction. The process of job turnover 
is described in figure 1.1.
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Product Market Labour Market
Firm Entry
- .....  ► Gross Job Gains( 1)tFirm Expansion I Gross Job Reallocation (1+2)
Unemployment
Firm Contraction I Net Employment Change (1-2)
■ *
Gross Job Lossesf2) — ■ I
Firm Exit
Figure 1.1
As can be seen in figure 1.1 the process of job creation and destruction reflects 
an interaction between the product market, via industry evolution, and the labour 
market, employment change and its effect on unemployment. These interactions 
between product markets and labour markets will be important and occasionally be 
made explicit throughout the thesis. Job destruction has a direct impact on 
unemployment, as well as job creation. Of course, the job loss rate does not reflect the 
inflow rate into unemployment since workers might quit their jobs voluntarily. 
Similarly, the outflow rate is not the same as gross job creation since a new job might 
be filled by an employed person or an inactive one.
It is with the emergence of large micro-level panel datasets, that the research
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on gross job flows received a major impulse. The analysis of gross job flows may be 
regarded as a more detailed way of analyzing labour demand. Labour demand for any 
aggregate, like sector, must then be viewed as the result of firms creating jobs in that 
sector on the one hand and destroying jobs on the other. The study of the process of 
gross job creation and gross job destruction is interesting and important for a number 
of reasons. A small net job creation rate might involve large gross job creation and 
large gross job destruction. In other words, underlying the net employment flows there 
exists a process which captures the sources of the shocks leading to different net 
employment flows. For instance, 2% net employment growth could be the result of 
4% gross job creation and 2% gross job destruction, or of 30% gross job creation and 
28% gross job destruction. Thus gross job flows provide information on the underlying 
turbulence leading to net employment growth and hence on the underlying dynamics, 
this is information which is not available if only net flows are taken into account. 
Moreover, the sources of the shocks leading to different net employment growth can 
be easier identified: the process of gross job creation and destruction reflects a process 
of firm expansion and contraction on the one hand and of firm entry and exit on the 
other. Thus the analysis of gross job flows is ultimately linked to the analysis of firm 
growth and hence is related to the evolution of the size distribution of firms. In this 
respect there is a general belief that small plants and firms are the major job creators 
and hence are the engine of the economy.
It has often been argued that the European unemployment problem is the result 
of too low job creation and many countries have implemented job creation schemes 
and policies. It is the gross job creation rate which reflects the real number of new
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jobs in an economy. The analyses of gross job creation and destruction leads to 
assessing the durability of a newly created job. By the micro-economic nature of the 
analysis it is possible to track a newly created job in one firm over a number of years 
and it is therefore possible to infer the length of a job opportunity in an economy. 
This could be important for policy reasons.
Finally, in labour economics there exists a substantial literature on worker 
flows and its relation to the Beveridge Curve (Pissarides, 1990). Obviously, gross job 
flows will account for a substantial fraction of the amount of worker flows in an 
economy. As such the research on gross job flows can be viewed as complementary 
to the research on worker flows.
1.2. Spillovers between the Product Market and the Labour Market
The process of industry evolution, i.e. firm expansion and contraction, leads 
to job creation and destruction and thus to a pattern of labour demand. Factors like the 
intensity of price competition, technological innovation, efficiency differences, etc. 
most likely affect the evolution of industries and firm sizes, hence job turnover. 
Interactions between the product market and the labour market have recently received 
an impulse due to the development of theories in industrial organisation (Tirole, 1989; 
Sutton, 1991). The focus of the second part of the thesis will be on these spillovers 
and their importance in analyzing labour problems.
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In the Keynesian literature product demand changes are transmitted to the 
labour market via the effect prices have on the real wage. If prices are more 
responsive than nominal wages to product demand changes , then a rise in demand 
reduces the real wage, hence raising employment. In contrast, if prices are sluggish, 
a change in product demand will have a direct effect on labour demand, without 
requiring a change in the real wage. Lindbeck and Snower (1994) analyze the long run 
effects of such product demand changes on the labour market. I focus on how the 
"toughness of price competition" affects these interactions between the labour market 
and the product market, in particular when wages are determined endogenously. I take 
up the literature on the efficiency wage hypothesis and on union bargaining in the 
framework of a general oligopoly model. Strategic interactions between firms 
influence the outcome of the wage paid in the firm. A number of new insights can be 
obtained by incorporating recent game theoretic models of competition in models of 
the labour market
1.3. Overview
Part I of the thesis has three chapters, chapters II, III and IV. In chapter I I I  
analyze a pattern of gross job creation and gross job destruction in the U.K. 
manufacturing sector during the 70’s and 80’s. To do this I make use of a panel of 
large manufacturing firms and of three occasional surveys with plant level data. At 
any point in time and even within narrowly defined sectors gross job creation and 
gross job destruction coexist. Job creation and destruction are inversely related and
gross job reallocation, the sum of the two, is counter-cyclic. Gross job destruction is 
more variable than gross job creation over the cycle. The idiosyncratic component is 
substantial. However, it is predominantly aggregate and sectoral shocks which explain 
the main fraction of the total time variation of the gross job reallocation rate. I 
compare the reported findings with those of the U.S. manufacturing sector and 
conclude that although the magnitude of gross job flows is lower in the U.K., the 
cyclical properties are very similar. Finally, in the light of the reported results, I 
discuss a number of anomalies of existing theory and point out new theories 
explaining the observed pattern of job creation and job destruction.
In chapter III I investigate whether there exists a relationship between firm 
size and job creation. I start with decomposing net job creation into gross job creation 
and gross job destruction, by plant or firm size. I find that there exists a monotonic 
relationship between size and gross job creation, the smallest plants (firms) have the 
highest gross job creation rate. This relationship is reversed for the gross job 
destruction rate. In absolute terms, however, the largest firms and plants create and 
destroy most jobs. This is not surprising since they also provide most jobs in the 
economy. I go on with studying the dynamic evolution of the cross-section distribution 
of firm and plant size. To do this I compute Markov transition matrices and compute 
the ergodic or steady state distribution of firm and plant size. I find that in the long 
run plants do not converge, while firms do converge towards their mean employment 
in the sample.
In chapter IV I compare the U.K. results with those of other studies for
19
different countries. I give an overview of the existing studies to date and show that 
there are international differences between gross job flows, with the U.S. having the 
highest gross job reallocation rate. I explore the hypothesis that the institutional 
arrangements, industrial policy and employment protection legislation cause 
differences in gross job flows and find preliminary evidence they do. Throughout 
chapter IV I highlight the difficulties at this stage with the limited availability of 
international data to make consistent comparisons.
Part II of the thesis consists of two chapters, chapter V and chapter VI. In 
chapter V I explore the efficiency wage hypothesis and develop a new approach to 
analyzing the problem. Efficiency wage theories have been put forward as attractive 
ways of explaining different aspects of the labour market. To find direct evidence of 
efficiency wage payments has proven to be quite difficult. I model various vertical 
spillovers from wage determination in an upstream labour market to market share 
performance in a downstream product market and vice versa. I do this within Sutton’s 
(1991) general oligopoly model under alternative theories of the labour market. Rent 
sharing due to efficiency wages is shown to create only a downstream vertical 
spillover. While rent sharing due to wage bargaining creates a two way vertical 
spillover. The spillovers due to efficiency wage payments are shown to be the only 
downstream spillover that drives a positive relationship between a firm’s wage growth 
and product market performance. Using U.K. firm level panel data I constrain the data 
with the theory to pinpoint the downstream spillover due to efficiency wage payments. 
The spillover turns out to be significant and this can be taken as the first direct and 
general empirical evidence for efficiency wage payments.
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In the final chapter, chapter VI, I take up the literature on unions and firm 
performance. In particular, I investigate the effect trade unions have on employment 
behaviour in the U.K. during the 1980’s. The approach I follow is empirical. I allow 
the union to have an effect on employment which is over and above the union-wage 
effect on employment. I find that unionised firms have lower net employment growth 
rates, although this effect is not robust over time and is weaker if firms face many 
competitors. Moreover, this effect is only present in the manufacturing sector, not in 
the non-manufacturing sector. I also find that firms which de-recognised unions have 
on average lower employment growth rates than firms which did not de-recognise 
unions. This suggests that unions affect employment levels positively.
All chapters in the thesis are self-containing in the sense that they can be read 
on their own. I highlighted and reported new facts and approaches in three areas in 
labour economics. I view the results reported in this thesis as a beginning of a longer 
research agenda. The literature on gross job flows is still very young and new. The 
facts reported in part I of the thesis should be compared with the results in different 
countries when more data become available. Also, the data quality in the U.K. is still 
poor. A search for new and better data should eventually lead to more detailed facts 
on gross job flows in the U.K., which might give correspondingly sharper insights. 
The empirical regularities on gross job flows should lead to a rethinking of a number 
of theories not only in labour economics, but also in industrial economics, the latter 
being concerned with the process of expansion and contraction of firms. The general 
approach I follow to analyze the efficiency wage hypothesis is an approach which 
could be applied to other problems in labour economics as well: It is concerned with
integrating industrial economics into labour economics and vice versa. Spillovers from 
the labour market to the product market and vice versa do matter. This is the start of 
an evolution in labour economics (e.g. Do wrick, 1989, 1990, Lindbeck and Snower, 
1994 among others). In the conclusion of the thesis I give a research agenda which 
is along these lines.
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PARTI 
GROSS JOB FLOWS
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CHAPTER H: GROSS JOB CREATION, DESTRUCTION 
AND REALLOCATION IN THE U.K. MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR
II.1. Introduction
The study of employment shocks and the flow of jobs received a new impulse 
from the recent empirical research of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990,1992), 
investigating the process of gross job creation and gross job destruction in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector using a detailed plant level panel dataset covering the period 
1972-86. One of the advantages of using micro economic datasets is that this allows 
the researcher to decompose employment shocks into several components: employment 
shocks stemming from the birth or death of plants or firms (B and D) and employment 
shocks emerging from the expansion or contraction of establishments or firms (G and 
C). Hence the net change in employment for a given aggregate is defined as
(II.l) A E s B  + G - C - D
It is the terms on the right hand side in (II.l) which represent gross employment 
flows. For the U.S. manufacturing sector, Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992) find 
that on average plants created 9.2% new jobs and destroyed 11.3% existing ones 
during the 70’s and early 80’s. Similar results are found for other countries like 
Germany, Italy and other European countries (Boeri and Cramer, 1992, Contini and
24
Revelli, 1993). This chapter is concerned with gross job creation and gross destruction 
in the U.K. manufacturing sector in the 70’s and early 80’s. This is a particularly 
interesting period to analyze since there were two major recessions, the first and 
second oil shocks. Moreover, I analyze the same time period as in Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992), so that I will be able to compare the U.S. findings with those of 
the U.K..
The results that emerge are striking and open a new dimension for research on 
job flows in the U.K.. Using a sample of large manufacturing firms I report an annual 
average gross job creation rate of 1.6% and an annual average gross job destruction 
rate of 5.6% over the sample period, 1972-86. Moreover, I also find that even within 
narrowly defined sectors there exists simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs 
indicating that firms behave in a very heterogeneous way regarding their employment 
decisions.
The methodology I pursue in this chapter is very similar to the one followed 
by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992) and Boeri and Cramer (1992). In the second 
section I introduce the working definitions and the data I work with. Section II.3 
reports some basic facts on job creation and job destruction rates in the U.K. 
manufacturing sector over the period 1972-86. I will report the yearly gross job flow 
rates and discuss their cyclical properties. Gross job reallocation, the sum of gross job 
creation and destruction, turns out to be counter-cyclic. Fluctuations in the job 
destruction rate are far more pronounced than fluctuations in the job creation rate. I 
also report gross job flows within narrowly defined sectors and analyze the extent of
shifts of jobs both within and between sectors. This is done in section H.4. I further 
look at inter-industry gross job flow differentials and discusses the importance of 
idiosyncratic shocks viz. aggregate and sectoral shocks in explaining the time variation 
in gross job creation and destruction. In section II.5,1 test the robustness of the results 
by comparing them with gross job creation and destruction measured from the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, these cover three occasional surveys of plant 
level U.K. data in the 80’s. Finally in section 0.6 I highlight some anomalies of the 
traditional theory in labour economics due to the reported results on gross job flows. 
I give as an illustration a Cournot model which generates simultaneous job creation 
and destruction in one sector and continue to mention some new lines of theoretical 
research. Section n.7 summarises and concludes the chapter.
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II.2. Definitions and Data
II.2.1. Defining Gross Job Flows
Let Xit denote the size of firm i at time t, which is measured as the average 
employment (n) in firm i at time t and t-1. The growth rate of firm i at time t, git is 
then defined as
This measure is similar to that used by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990,1992). It is 
symmetric about zero and lies in the closed interval [-2,2] with deaths (births) 
corresponding to the left (right) endpoint. (11.2) Is monotonically related to the 
conventional growth rate measure and the two are approximately equal for small 
growth rates. Let the conventional growth rate measure be defined as
(11*2) git = [««- n,M]/xit
(II.3)
then
(H.4) gcit = 2gi/(2-g il)
An economic reason to use (11.2) rather than (II.3) is that size of the firm is defined 
over the interval of two years, as an average, rather than on one particular date a year
27
before.
The gross job creation rate and destruction rate are related to the size weighted 
frequency distributions of firm growth rates in the following way. Let job creation in 
sector j at time t be defined as
(11.5) poSjt = I i €igit(xit/Xjt), for all git>0
where Xjt stands for sector size j at time t and I stands for the set of all firms in sector 
j at time t. The gross job destruction rate in sector j at time t is then defined as
(11.6) negjt = I i 6ilgitl(xit/Xjt), for all git<0
Gross job reallocation in sector j at time t is then simply the sum of the gross job 
creation and gross job destruction rate or
(11*7) grossjt = posjt + negjt
To compare gross job flows with net flows we define net employment growth in 
sector j at time t as the difference between the job creation and job destruction rate 
or
(II-8) netjt = poSjt - negjt
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The creation and destruction of jobs will involve some worker reallocation. 
Gross job reallocation represents an upper bound on the worker reallocation rate 
required to accommodate job reallocation. A lower bound on the worker reallocation 
rate is given by (13.9),
(II.9) maxjt = max {posjt,negjt}.
Of course worker reallocation will not be driven entirely by job reallocation. Other 
aspects will influence worker reallocation as well, like job satisfaction, employer 
satisfaction, etc.. It is however interesting to investigate how important job reallocation 
is in the process of worker reallocation. It would give an indication of ’involuntary’ 
worker reallocation.
11.2.2. Data for the U.K.
The principle dataset I use consists of an unbalanced panel of 993 large U.K. 
manufacturing companies over the period 1972-86, drawn from the EXSTAT data tape 
and DATASTREAM on-line service. Average employment in the sample is 4530 in 
1978 and the median is 1111 employees. In 1978, the total number of employees in 
the sample amounts to 4,231,552. This compares with 7,176,000 employees in the 
manufacturing population. Thus the sample covers about 60% of total manufacturing 
in 1978. While the sample contains the majority of manufacturing workers, it contains 
only a minority of firms in total manufacturing, namely only the large firms. The 
majority of these firms are multi-plant firms and the dataset undersamples small firms.
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After 1982 the sample size drops significantly due to the Companies Act of 1982: 
firms were no longer required to report the number of domestic employees, although 
some continued to do so. I do not observe entry and exit, so our dataset consists of 
large continuing firms only. Figure II.l shows the sample employment growth and the
employment growth for the entire manufacturing population. It is clear that the
\
correlation between sample employment growth and the one for the entire 
manufacturing population is very high until 1982 after which it drops significantly 
probably due to the Companies Act o f 1982.
Figure II.l: Net employment growth of the sample vs. net employment growth in 
U.K. manufacturing population
net a empl growth in manufacturing
.01609 -
1986
year
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Each firm in the dataset is assigned to a particular industrial group, classified 
according to an EXSTAT classification scheme. In order to use external industry level 
data, this classification scheme is matched with the Standard Industrial Classification 
scheme, which is reported in table II.l. This matching scheme was kindly provided 
by S. Machin and J. Vanreenen.
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Table II.l:INDUSTRIAL MATCHING 
DESCRIPTION SIC (1980)
Brick and Roof tiles 241,245,248
Building Materials 243,244
Cement and Concrete 242,243
Paint 255
Timber 461,463
Electricals (Excluding 34
radio and TV)
Cold formed fastening 316
Founders and Stampers 311,312
Industrial Plant 328
Mechanical Handling 325
Pumps and Valves 328
Steel and Chemical Plant 241,245,248
Wires and Rope 341
Misc.Mechanical Engin. 32
Machine Tools 322
Misc. engineering 328
Contractors
Heating and Ventilation 346
Instruments 224
Metallurgy 224
Special Steels 221
Misc.Metal Forming 222,223
Electronics 34
Radio and T.V. 342,246
Floor Covering 438
Furniture and Bedding 467
Household Appliances 346
Cutlery 31
Motor Components 351-3
Motor Distributors 351-3
Motor Vehicles 351-3
Security and Alarm Serv. 34
Breweries 424,426-9
Wines and Spirits 424,426-9
General Food Mnfg. 411-23,428
Milling and Flour 416,419
Newspaper and Periodical475
Publishing and Printing 475
Packaging and Paper 471-72
Clothing 453
Cotton and Synthetic 43
Wool 43
Miscellaneous Textiles 43
Tobacco 429
Footwear 451
Toys and Games 494
Plastics and Rubbers 483
Pharmaceuticals 257
General Chemicals 251,256
Office Equipment 330
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Crucial in our analysis is the employment variable. In section U..2 I have 
defined the growth rate for firm i. Figure n.2a depicts this unweighted growth rate 
distribution for the 14 year sample. Figure II.2b depicts the size-weighted growth rate 
distribution. In both case a normal distribution is fitted over it. Both figures clearly 
show the asymmetric nature of the growth rates, with central peaks in the interval [- 
0.2,0]. This reflects the decline in the U.K. manufacturing sector during the 70’s and 
the early 80’s. As can be seen, the growth rate distribution does not lie in the interval 
[-2,2], this is because in the dataset I do not observe entry nor exit of firms.
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Figure II.2a
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In the EXSTAT/DATASTREAM dataset I do not observe employment in 
individual plants belonging to the same firm. If I measure job creation and job 
destruction at the firm level, I do not take into account the reshuffling of jobs between 
plants within the same firm. Thus job creation and destruction rates computed from 
plant level data will most likely be higher. Furthermore, many studies use plant level 
instead of firm level data to compute gross job flows. To investigate how large the 
difference between the gross job flows computed from firm level data vs. plant level 
data is I use three alternative datasets, the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of
1980.1984 and 1990 (WIRS1,2,3 hereafter), in which there is plant level data on 
employment as well as detailed information on localisation, industry affiliation and 
other plant level variables1. To be included in the survey a plant had to employ at 
least 25 workers, large establishments were over-sampled and hence may be compared 
with "large" firms from the EXSTAT datatape. Since WIRS 1,2,3 are occasional 
surveys I can only compute the job creation and destruction rates for the years
1980.1984 and 1990.
^ o r e  details on the sampling procedures and basic characteristics of this dataset 
can be found in Mill ward and Stevens (1986) and Mill ward et al. (1993).
A few critical remarks are appropriate at this stage. Whether establishments or 
firms should be the underlying units of observation depends on a number of factors, 
like the extent of intrafirm mobility of workers and the nature of investment (firm -or 
plant-specific). Thus far choices to use firms or establishments as unit of measurement 
have been constrained by the availability of data and the current study is no exception 
to this rule2. In both the datasets I do not observe entry nor exit of firms 
(establishments), so that the computed measures of job creation and job destruction 
are likely too low. However, Hamermesh (1991) estimates the relative importance of 
the various flows of jobs and concludes that the contribution to net employment 
change of continuing firms accounts for roughly two-thirds of the gross flows of jobs. 
In other words, the major source of net employment fluctuations in the aggregate can 
be explained by expansion and contraction of existing firms.
II.3. G ross Job Flows in the U.K. Manufacturing Sector 
in.3.1. Basic Facts
Table II.2 reports gross and net flows of employment per year for the U.K. 
manufacturing sector. The average job creation rate is 1.6% with a standard deviation 
of 0.008, while the average job destruction rate is 5.6% and a corresponding standard 
deviation of 0.035. The average gross job reallocation rate is 7.2% (standard deviation 
=0.029), while the average lower bound on gross job reallocation is 5.8% (standard
2An overview of studies on gross job flows is given chapter IV.
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deviation=0.032). Figure II.3 plots the gross job flows over time. What is immediately 
clear from figure II.3 is that gross job reallocation is counter-cyclic, driven almost 
entirely by the job destruction rate. On the given scale the job creation rate seems 
relatively constant over time. Table II.3 illustrates this further. It shows the correlation 
matrix of job creation, destruction, reallocation and net employment growth. Job 
creation and job destruction are negatively correlated and job reallocation is counter- 
cyclic. From figure 0.3 and from comparing the standard deviation of the job creation 
rate, 0.008, with the standard deviation of the job destruction rate, 0.035, I conclude 
that there is a strong asymmetry between the gross job creation and gross job 
destruction rate, in which the latter is more variable than the job creation rate over the 
business cycle.
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Note 1: Chapter 11, p  39
The gross job reallocation rate reflects partly the net employment growth rate. I 
therefore construct the excess job reallocation rate, i.e. the difference between the 
gross job reallocation rate and the minimum necessary for observed employment
i
growth or xs =  gross - |n e tj, as in Blanchflower and Burgess (1993). Table II.2b j 
shows the excess job reallocation rate in each year, as well as the ratio xs/gross. j
From the second column it is clear that the excess job reallocation rate is a substantial ,|
fraction of the actual gross job reallocation rate, except in the early 80’s where the I 
ratio drops to 12%, which might be caused by the drop in the sample after 1982. On 
average 50% of the gross job reallocation rate is due to movements in net 
employment growth. The correlation coefficient between the excess job reallocation 
rate and net employment growth is 0.61. This positive correlation remains if the 
sample is restricted up to 1982. This indicates that the excess job reallocation rate is j 
pro-cyclical. Thus, controlling for the minimum necessary job reallocation to | 
accommodate the observed net employment growth, the job reallocation rate looses 
its counter-cyclical property. This indicates that the counter-cyclicallity in the gross j 
job reallocation rate is driven by the net employment growth rate. Table n.6b j 
(compare with table II.6, p46) shows gross job flows within narrowly defined sectors. 
Also if the excess job reallocation measure is used there seem to be differences 
between the different industries. The fraction xs in gross varies substantially between 
industries. Both measures, xs and gross show heterogeneous firm behaviour even
Table EL2: Gross Job Flows, 1973-1986
year pos neg net gross max
1973 0.031 0.015 0.015 0.047 0.031
1974 0.026 0.010 0.015 0.037 0.026
1975 0.010 0.044 -0.033 0.054 0.044
1976 0.013 0.035 -0.022 0.049 0.035
1977 0.025 0.026 -0.001 0.051 0.026
1978 0.021 0.026 -0.005 0.047 0.026
1979 0.022 0.030 -0.007 0.053 0.030
1980 0.009 0.078 -0.068 0.088 0.078
1981 0.009 0.121 -0.112 0.130 0.121
1982 0.007 0.113 -0.105 0.121 0.113
1983 0.004 0.073 -0.068 0.078 0.073
1984 0.011 0.060 -0.049 0.071 0.060
1985 0.011 0.086 -0.075 0.098 0.086
1986 0.021 0.060 -0.038 0.082 0.060
average 0.016 0.056 -0.039 0.072 0.058
std. 0.008 0.035 0.041 0.029 0.032
Table IL3: Correlation matrix
pos neg net gross
pos 1
neg -0.77 1
net 0.85 -0.99 1
gross -0.65 0.98 -0.95 1
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within narrowly defined industries.
If one is interested in the reallocation of jobs in excess of the one necessary to 
accommodate net employment growth, then the XS measure is appropriate. However, 
if one views the literature on gross job flows as an alternative approach to studying 
employment dynamics than the "gross" measure is sufficient to use. This is the point 
of view of the current work.
Table II.2b: Excess Job Reallocation
year xs xs/gross
1973 0.031 0.66
1974 0.021 0.58
1975 0.020 0.37
1976 0.027 0.55
1977 0.050 0.98
1978 0.042 0.88
1979 0.045 0.85
1980 0.019 0.22
1981 0.018 0.14
1982 0.015 0.12
1983 0.009 0.12
1984 0.022 0.30
1985 0.022 0.23
1986 0.043 0.53
average 0.027 0.47
std. 0.012 0.29
o job reallocation rate * job creation rate
□ job destruction rate net employment growth
.15-
.05-
1973 1976 1979 1962
year
gross job flows over time
Figure II.3
The cyclical properties reported here are strikingly similar to those reported by 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) for the U.S. manufacturing sector. They also find that 
the gross job reallocation rate moves counter-cyclical and that it is the gross job 
destruction rate which is the more variable component. However, the magnitude of the 
gross job reallocation rates reported here is smaller than those for the U.S.. Most 
likely, this is due to the fact that the U.S. data consists of the population of plants, 
including entry and exit, while in the current U.K. dataset mainly contains large firms,
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Table II.6b: Gross job flows for 2-digit industries
2-digit name pos neg gross xs
Brick and Rooftiles 0.024 0.039 0.064 0.010
Building Materials 0.021 0.041 0.063 0.028
Cement and Concrete 0.019 0.027 0.047 0.016
Paint 0.022 0.045 0.067 0.025
Electricals 0.013 0.038 0.051 0.021
Cold formed
fastening 0.062 0.045 0.107 0.008
Founders & Stampers 0.022 0.051 0.073 0.021
Industrial Plant 0.025 0.039 0.065 0.038 !
Mechanical Handling 0.029 0.040 0.069 0.030
Pumps and Valves 0.019 0.043 0.062 0.022
Steel and Chemical
Plant 0.043 0.046 0.089 0.034
Wires and Rope 0.011 0.063 0.074 0.014
Misc. Mechanical
Engineering 0.016 0.054 0.070 0.026
Machine Tools 0.025 0.053 0.079 0.022
Misc. Engineering
Contractors 0.027 0.067 0.095 0.014 I
Instruments 0.012 0.045 0.057 0.015
Metallurgy 0.028 0.041 0.070 0.027 i
Special Steels 0.003 0.080 0.083 0.006
Misc. Metal Forming 0.011 0.046 0.058 0.004 !
Radio and T.V. 0.044 0.027 0.071 0.022 1
Floor Covering 0.013 0.054 0.068 0.017
Furniture and Bedding 0.060 0.035 0.096 0.031
Household appliances 0.033 0.067 0.101 0.031
Cutlery 0.034 0.044 0.078 0.024
Motor Components 0.016 0.052 0.068 0.015
Motor Distributors 0.008 0.079 0.088 0.005
Breweries 0.028 0.014 0.043 0.019
Wines and Spirits 0.027 0.034 0.062 0.009
General Food Mnfg. 0.013 0.039 0.052 • 0.021
Milling and Flour 0.056 0.031 0.087 0.003
Newspapers &
Periodicals 0.015 0.048 0.063 0.022
Publishing &
Printing 0.020 0.050 0.070 0.024
Packaging and Paper 0.024 0.040 0.065 0.022
Clothing 0.036 .0420 0.078 0.041
Cotton and Synthetic 0.001 0.066 0.067 0.002
Wool 0.028 0.059 0.087 0.038
Misc. Textiles 0.011 0.071 0.083 0.018
excluding entry and exit. Restricting the comparison to U.S. plants with more than 
1000 employees, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) compute an annual average gross job 
creation rate of 6% and destruction rate of 7.8%, hence an annual average gross job 
reallocation rate of 13.8%.
Table II.4 shows the frequency of firms creating/destroying jobs per growth 
rate interval. The majority of firms creating/destroying jobs are those with modest 
growth rates; 43% of existing firms destroying jobs have a growth rate in the interval 
[-0.05,0], 49% of existing firms creating jobs have a growth rate in the interval 
[0,0.05]. Thus firms having modest growth rates account for a large proportion of job 
creation and job destruction.
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Footwear 0.028 0.024 0.052 0.017
Toys and Games 0.065 0.088 0.150 0.022
Plastics and Rubbers 0.032 0.052 0.085 0.034
Pharmaceuticals 0.015 0.034 0.049 0.023
General Chemicals 0.010 0.053 0.063 0.018
Note: The figures refer to 14-year size weighted averages.
Table n.4: Frequency of firms creating/destroying jobs 
per growth rate interval
growth rate interval frequency of firms
< -0.75 0.0006
-0.75 - -0.50 0.008
-0.50 - -0.25 0.056
-0.25 - -0.10 0.256
uoooiioo1 0.244
-0.05 - 0.00 0.433
0.00- 0.05 0.493
0.05- 0.10 0.248
0.10- 0.25 0.197
0.25- 0.50 0.047
0.50- 0.75 0.010
>0.75 0.003
II.3.2. Persistence in job creation and destruction
Given substantial and frequent job creation and job destruction, it is important 
to investigate whether the new jobs persist or whether they are transitory in nature. 
This might be important for policy reasons. If economic policy focuses on encouraging 
firms to create jobs, it is important that these newly created jobs are not of short 
duration, but that the effect is long term. Table II.5 reports the one-year and two-year 
persistence rates of job creation (fposl, fpos2) and job destruction (fnegl, fneg2). The 
one-year (two-year) persistence rate of job creation is simply the number of jobs 
created in year t, which still exist at time t+1 (t+2), expressed as a fraction of the
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number of jobs created at time t. The one-year (two-year) persistence rate of job 
destruction is computed in a similar way. It is important to view this persistence 
measure as indicators of the persistence of job opportunities, irrespective of who 
occupies it. A high persistency in job creation for instance does not necessarily imply 
low worker turnover. Imagine an expanding firm. In one year it hires 10 people, the 
next year it fires them all and hires 11 more. The following year it fires 11 and hires 
12 more, and so on. The measure of persistence we use will indicate that the job 
opportunities are highly persistent in this firm, whereas the people occupying these 
jobs are highly transient. The average one-year persistence rate in job creation is 62%, 
while in job destruction this is 81%. This indicates that the majority of new jobs last 
for more than one year, but also the majority of destroyed jobs will not be re-created 
after one year. Thus the reallocation process is long-term in nature. It is also clear that 
the persistence in job destruction is higher than the persistence in job creation. This 
again indicates the asymmetric nature of gross job flows. These results are very 
similar to those reported by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). They compute an annual 
average one-year persistence rate in job creation of 67% and in job destruction of 
81%.
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Table II.5: Persistence in job creation and job destruction
year fposl fpos2 fnegl fneg2
1974 0.87 - 0.78 -
1975 0.59 0.27 0.90 0.45
1976 0.63 0.19 0.86 0.83
1977 0.83 0.35 0.78 0.53
1978 0.80 0.50 0.79 0.45
1979 0.81 0.48 0.88 0.62
1980 0.63 0.49 0.92 0.54
1981 0.44 0.12 0.83 0.81
1982 0.24 0.16 0.50 0.46
1983 - - - -
1984 0.57 - 0.87 -
1985 0.38 0.33 0.86 0.74
1986 0.63 0.20 0.71 0.63
average 0.62 0.31 0.81 0.61
std. 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.14
Note: The missing variables reler to the year 1983 , in which there was a significant
fall in the number of observations, due to the companies account act of 1982.
The above analysis suggests that firm level employment changes must be 
associated with long-term joblessness or worker reallocation across firms. The job 
destruction rate can give an indication of the length of a job opportunity. This does 
not mean that the same job is always engaged by the same worker. Several workers 
could have done the same job, but at different time periods. Assuming stationarity, the 
average duration of a job opportunity is the inverse of the destruction rate. Since the 
average job destruction rate of 5.6%, the average job duration is 18 years. This is 
consistent with other studies, using labour force surveys. Compared with the U.S.,
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Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) find that the average job destruction rate for large 
plants (more than 1000 employees) is 7.8%. This implies an average job duration of 
13 years. The average job destruction rate for their entire sample is 9.98 % which 
implies an average job duration of 10 years.
II.4. Inter Industry Gross Job Flow Differentials
The above analysis focuses on the entire manufacturing sector and 
demonstrates firm heterogeneity within the manufacturing sector. Table D.6 shows that 
this firm heterogeneity still holds within narrowly defined sectors, the gross job 
creation, destruction and reallocation rate refer to size weighted averages, based on 
annual values. The average gross job reallocation rate varies between 4.3% in 
’Breweries’ to 15% in ’Toys and Games’. Thus there is considerable cross-industry 
variation in the gross job reallocation rate. Even within narrowly defined sectors, there 
exists a substantial amount of job creation and job destruction, showing the 
heterogeneity of incumbent firms.
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Table 0.6: Gross job flows for 2-digit industries
2-digit name pos. neg gross max
Brick and Rooftiles 0.024 0.039 0.064 0.039
Building Materials 0.021 0.041 0.063 0.041
Cement and Concrete 0.019 0.027 0.047 0.027
Paint 0.022 0.045 0.067 0.045
Electricals 0.013 0.038 0.051 0.038
Cold formed
fastening 0.062 0.045 0.107 0.062
Founders & Stampers 0.022 0.051 0.073 0.051
Industrial Plant 0.025 0.039 0.065 0.039
Mechanical Handling 0.029 0.040 0.069 0.040
Pumps and Valves 0.019 0.043 0.062 0.043
Steel and Chemical
Plant 0.043 0.046 0.089 0.046
Wires and Rope 0.011 0.063 0.074 0.063
Misc. Mechanical
Engineering 0.016 0.054 0.070 0.054
Machine Tools 0.025 0.053 0.079 0.053
Misc.Engineering
Contractors 0.027 0.067 0.095 0.067
Instruments 0.012 0.045 0.057 0.045
Metallurgy 0.028 0.041 0.070 0.041
Special Steels 0.003 0.080 0.083 0.080
Misc. Metal Forming 0.011 0.046 0.058 0.046
Radio and T.V. 0.044 0.027 0.071 0.044
Floor Covering 0.013 0.054 0.068 0.054
Furniture and Bedding 0.060 0.035 0.096 0.060
Household appliances 0.033 0.067 0.101 0.067
Cutlery 0.034 0.044 0.078 0.044
Motor Components 0.016 0.052 0.068 0.052
Motor Distributors 0.008 0.079 0.088 0.079
Breweries 0.028 0.014 0.043 0.028
Wines and Spirits 0.027 0.034 0.062 0.034
General Food Mnfg. 0.013 0.039 0.052 0.039
Milling and Flour 0.056 0.031 0.087 0.056
Newspapers &
Periodicals 0.015 0.048 0.063 0.048
Publishing &
Printing 0.020 0.050 0.070 0.050
Packaging and Paper 0.024 0.040 0.065 0.040
Clothing 0.036 .0420 0.078 0.042
46
Table D.6 contd.
Cotton and Synthetic 0.001 0.066 0.067 0.066
Wool 0.028 0.059 0.087 0.059
Misc. Textiles 0.011 0.071 0.083 0.071
Tobacco 0.066 0.058 0.125 0.066
Footwear 0.028 0.024 0.052 0.028
Toys and Games 0.065 0.088 0.150 0.088
Plastics and Rubbers 0.032 0.052 0.085 0.052
Pharmaceuticals 0.015 0.034 0.049 0.034
General Chemicals 0.010 0.053 0.063 0.053
Note: The figures refer to 14-year size weighted averages.
This immediately begs the question whether this job reallocation process 
reflects shifts of jobs across different industries or job reallocations within any 
industry. I therefore construct the following index of intra-industry job reallocation in 
period t (cfr. Boeri, 1988),
(11.10) indext = 1 - Zjlnetjtl/Z jg ro ssjt
If (II. 10) equals 0, then job flows reflect shifts occurring entirely across sectors, while 
a value of 1 reflects shifts of jobs occurring entirely within sectors. Table II.7 reports 
the yearly values of this index. The 14-year average is 30%. Figure 4 shows how this 
index varies over the business cycle and demonstrates how the index moves pro- 
cyclically. The correlation coefficient between the index and net employment growth 
is 0.90. This suggests that in good times jobs are reallocated more within one sector, 
while in bad times jobs are reallocated more across sectors. In bad times firms within 
one sector are more homogeneous in their behaviour than in good times. In good times 
firms within the same sector both expand and contract. This is consistent with 
Wadsworth (1989) using Labour Force Survey data. He finds that inter-firm mobility
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of workers is procyclical. The increased job reallocation within sectors in good times 
suggests that it is during booms that restructuring of firms within the same sector 
occurs, possibly caused by an increase in the toughness of price competition: The 
potential gain in market share by undercutting the market price is larger than in bad 
times (cfr. Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). The increased job reallocation across 
sectors during recessions indicates a restructuring of the economy as a whole, which 
suggests a shift of jobs from ’declining’ sectors to ’growing’ and ’new’ sectors.
Table n.7: Index of intra-industry job turnover
year index
1973 0.538
1974 0.424
1975 0.309
1976 0.404
1977 0.455
1978 0.549
1979 0.497
1980 0.214
1981 0.106
1982 0.071
1983 0.086
1984 0.099
1985 0.158
1986 0.347
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Figure 0 .4
The above analysis suggests that there are several sources of shocks at work 
leading to the process of gross job creation and job destruction. I therefore decompose 
the gross job flow measures into separate components which can be associated with 
different types of shocks. I shall distinguish the part of gross job creation, destruction 
and reallocation which is due to aggregate and sectoral shocks on the one hand and 
idiosyncratic or firm specific shocks on the other.
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Let the idiosyncratic growth rate in firm i at time t, gitdev be defined as
(11.11) gitdev = git - gjt - gt,
where gjt refers to growth rate in sector j at time t and gt refers to aggregate growth 
rate. Equation (II. 11) allows us to capture several existing views of the business cycle. 
For instance, the hypothesis that it is aggregate disturbances which are the driving 
forces of business cycle fluctuations. In this case, all the time variation in the gross 
job flow measures is driven by the time variation in the aggregate component. A less 
simplistic view of the business cycle would be one in which there are cross-sectoral 
differences in the responses to aggregate disturbances (see Abraham and Katz, 1986). 
In (11.11) I allow for completely unrestricted sectoral responses to aggregate 
disturbances. With our current set up we are able to go one step further. In particular, 
we will investigate the importance of idiosyncratic disturbances versus aggregate and 
sectoral disturbances in explaining the time variation in our gross job flow measures 
and thus in explaining business cycle fluctuations.
I define the idiosyncratic job creation, job destruction and job reallocation rate in a 
similar way as in section H.2.1 or
(11.12) postdev = I isIglldCT(xi,/Xjt), for all g * v>0
(H. 13) neg,*” = I lsIlg„d‘, l(x1/Xjt), for all g “ <0
(11.14) gross,*” = S,.,lgltd"'l(x1/Xjl)
Figures II.5 a,b and c plot the idiosyncratic job creation, destruction and reallocation 
rate viz. the overall job creation, destruction and reallocation rate over time. The 
idiosyncratic component is in all three cases substantial. The three figures also indicate 
a cyclicallity in the idiosyncratic component of the gross job flow measures.
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Figure II.5a
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Figure II.5b
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Figure II.5c
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The fact that the idiosyncratic component is substantial does not mean that 
such idiosyncratic effects account for most of the time variation of the gross job flow 
rates. For instance, figure n.5b shows a relatively stable idiosyncratic component in 
the job destruction rate. I address this issue more rigorously by using a variance 
decomposition due to Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
Consider the following identity,
(11.15) yt = ytdev + (yt - ytdev)
Where y stands for pos,neg and gross respectively. Taking the variance of (11.15) 
yields
(11.16) var(yt) = var(ytdev) + var(yt-y dev) + 2cov(ydev,yt-ydev).
Dividing (11.16) by var(y^ left and right gives
(11.17) 1 = var(ydev)/var(yt) + var(yt-ytdev)/var(yt) + 2cov(ydev,yt-ydev)/var(yt).
If the idiosyncratic component is time invariant, then var(ytdev)/var(yt) collapses to zero 
and the time variation is yt can be entirely explained by aggregate and sectoral shocks. 
The covariance term in (11.17) indicates whether the idiosyncratic effects reinforce or 
counteract the impact of aggregate and sectoral effects on yt. A positive sign means 
a reinforcing of the aggregate and sectoral effects, while a negative sign indicates the
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opposite. The covariance term in (11.17) is the part of the variance of yt which cannot 
be unambiguously explained by idiosyncratic effects or sectoral and aggregate effects.
Table n.8 shows this variance decomposition for gross job reallocation, 
creation and destruction. In all three cases the variance of aggregate and sectoral 
effects explains the majority of the total time variation in job reallocation, creation and 
destruction. The idiosyncratic effect in job creation counteracts the impact of aggregate 
and sectoral effects as indicated by the negative covariance term, while the 
idiosyncratic effect in job destruction reinforces weakly the aggregate and sectoral 
effects as indicated by the low positive covariance term. Thus while job creation falls 
and job destruction rises during recessions, idiosyncratic effects counteract the fall in 
gross job creation, while they reinforce the rise in gross job destruction. The latter 
observation is also true for the U.S., however, the covariance terms are much larger. 
Moreover, in the U.S. it is the variance in the idiosyncratic component of gross job 
reallocation which explains most of the total time variation, unlike the results here. 
This is what we could expect given our low values of the covariance terms. In sum, 
while the time variation of gross job reallocation in the U.K. is predominantly driven 
by aggregate and sectoral disturbances, in the U.S. this is predominantly driven by 
idiosyncratic shocks. This suggests that the sources of turbulence are different in the 
U.K. than in the U.S.. These results, however, might have been caused by the nature 
of our dataset, large firms who are ’big players’ in each sector. In other words 
movements in these large firms reflect movements in their sector.
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Table n.8: Variance decomposition
gross pos neg
var(ydev)/var(y) 0.14 0.42 0.024
var(y-ydev)/var(y) 0.61 1.55 0.834
2cov(y,y-ydev)/var(y) 0.24 -1.0 0.070
Note: y refers resp. gross,pos, neg.
II.5. Comparison With An Alternative Establishment Based Dataset
The entire analysis so far has been based on the principal dataset of large U.K. 
manufacturing firms, the EXSTAT/DATASTREAM company accounts data. In this 
section I will use the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys to compute gross job 
flow measures based on plant level rather than firm level data. This will allow me to 
infer how much gross job flow rates computed from firm level data are lower than the 
ones computed from plant level data. Moreover, by using the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys it is possible to identify certain relationships between plant 
characteristics such as age, type of plant, etc. and the magnitude of gross job flows.
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Note 2: Chapter II, p  58
The WIRS dataset is a random stratified sample, over-sampling large plants. To 
control for this weights have been provided. However, the main results refer to the 
non-weighted data. One reason is that the correlation coefficient between the weights 
and size is very low, in 1990 for instance this was 0.3. Moreover, the weights push 
the size distribution towards a more symmetric one, while in reality the size 
distribution of plants is highly skewed. In this note, I report the job creation and 
destruction rates computed from the weighted data for 1984 and 1990 since I did not 
have the weights of 1980 at my disposal. Blanchflower and Burgess (1993) make use 
of the weighted data throughout, so I refer to them for a complementary comparison. 
Table II.9b shows the results for the manufacturing sector, while table II. 10b shows 
them for the non-manufacturing sector.
Table II.9b: Gross Job Flows from Weighted WIRS, Manufacturing Only
year pos neg net gross
1984 0.039 0.080 -0.04 0.119
1990 0.050 0.054 -0.004 0.104
Table II. 10b: Gross Job Flows from Weighted WIRS, Non-Manufacturing Only
year pos neg net gross
1984 0.036 0.039 -0.003 0.075
1990 0.053 0.051 0.002 0.105
Comparing table II.9b with II.9 and table II. 10b with 11.10 the results are very 
similar. Thus weighting did not seem to matter a lot. Table I I . l ib  reports the
II.5.1. Basic Facts on U.K. Gross Job Flows Using WIRS3
Table II.9 shows the gross job creation, destruction and reallocation rate
X
computed from WIRS 1,2,3 for 1980, 1984 and 1990. These refer to gross job flows 
in U.K. manufacturing plants, rather than firms. Based on three time observations, the 
average gross job reallocation is about 10%.
Since in the main data set observations are up to 1986,1 can only compare the 
years 1980 and 1984, not 1990. The average gross job reallocation rate in the main 
sample is 8% for 1980 and 1984. This compares with 10% in the WIRS sample. In 
other words, the gross job reallocation rate based on firm  level data rather than plant 
level data is, on average, about 25% (10/8 - 1) lower. Assuming that this difference 
is, on average, the same over the sample period, the corresponding gross job 
reallocation rate if plant level data were used, would be equal to 9%. This is still 
lower than the one reported for the U.S., 16%4.
Table II.9: Gross job flows from WIRS, Manufacturing Only
year pos neg net gross max
1980 0.022 0.074 -0.052 0.096 0.074
1984 0.022 0.081 -0.058 0.100 0.081
1990 0.048 0.049 -0.001 0.098 0.049
3See also Blanchflower and Burgess (1993).
4This corresponds to U.S. manufacturing plants, excluding entry and exit.
weighted counterpart of table II. 11 and table II. 12b for table II. 12. From table II. 1 lb 
it cart be seen that by and large a similar relationship between plant age and gross job 
flows emerges. Looking at the extremes, the oldest plants have a lower gross job 
reallocation rate than the youngest. From table II. 12b it seems that the weighting 
implies a disappearance of the fact that gross job turnover is higher in multi-plant 
firms.
Table I I .lib : Gross Job Flows and Age, Weighted
1984 < 3 3-5 5-10 10-25 >25
pos 0.099 0.059 0.050 0.044 0.030
neg 0.081 0.023 0.065 0.040 0.056
gross 0.18 0.083 0.116 0.085 0.086
1990 < 5 5-10 10-15 15-20 >20
pos 0.078 0.077 0.064 0.042 0.042
neg 0.072 0.085 0.039 0.055 0.044
gross 0.15 0.16 0.103 0.098 0.086
Table II. 12b: Gross Job Flows and Multi-Plant Firms, Weighted
single independent group
1984
pos 0.042 0.036
neg 0.036 0.054
gross 0.079 0.091
1990
pos 0.062 0.051
neg 0.045 0.054
gross 0.107 0.106
Table 11.10 reports the gross job flow rates for the non-manufacturing sector. In 1980 
and 1984 gross job turnover is lower in the non-manufacturing sector than in the 
manufacturing sector. This pattern reverses in 1990. Remarkable, though, is the 
apparent symmetry between job creation and job destruction in the non-manufacturing 
sector. This could indicate that the non-manufacturing sector was in equilibrium, i.e. 
job creation is equal to job destruction, whereas this was not the case with the 
manufacturing sector.
Table 11.10: Gross job flows from WIRS, Non-Manufacturing Only
year pos neg net gross max
1980 0.039 0.045 -0.005 0.085 0.045
1984 0.031 0.033 -0.002 0.064 0.033
1990 0.061 0.060 0.006 0.122 0.061
II.5.2. Gross Job Flows and Establishment Characteristics using WIRS
In this section I look at plant level characteristics and gross job flows. In 
particular, I look at the relationship between gross job flows on the one hand and age 
of the plant and the multi-plant character of the firm on the other hand. This type of 
analysis was not possible with the EXSTAT/DATASTREAM dataset since I did not 
have access to such information. In the next chapter I shall explore in detail the 
relationship between plant size and gross job creation and destruction, so here I focus 
on other plant characteristics like age and multi-plant firms.
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In table II. 11, gross job flow rates for different age categories are reported. The 
youngest plants have the highest gross job reallocation rate, while the oldest have the 
lowest, especially since the youngest have the highest gross job creation rate, 16% in 
1980, 4.1% in 1984 and 24% in 1990 compared to the oldest resp., 2.6%, 2.5% and 
3.3%, however the youngest seem to have the lowest job destruction rate, except in 
1984, 1.6% in 1980, 19% in 1984 and 4.4% in 1990 while the oldest have a job 
destruction rate of resp. 6.1%, 5.4% and 5.9%. It should be noted here that I do not 
observe entry nor exit in the dataset. A well-known fact is that young plants are more 
likely to fail than old ones and therefore if I observe plants in the youngest age 
category with the highest growth rates this could simply mean that it is exactly the 
most efficient ones who remain, while the least efficient ones already have left the 
market. This also points in the direction of recent theories of passive learning 
(Jovanovic, 1982): Plants are endowed with a certain efficiency level which is a 
random draw of a known distribution. By Baysian updating plants find out about their 
underlying efficiency level. Since the least efficient ones are more likely to drop out 
in the early phases of their existence a negative correlation between plant age and 
growth is to be expected.
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Table n. 11: Gross Job Flows and Age of the Plant
<3 3 - 5 5 - 10 10 - 25 >25
1980
pos 0.16 0.062 0.041 0.037 0.026
neg 0.016 0.062 0.049 0.056 0.061
gross 0.18 0.12 0.091 0.093 0.088
1984
pos 0.041 0.061 0.039 0.029 0.025
neg 0.19 0.023 0.096 0.042 0.054
gross 0.24 0.084 0.13 0.071 0.080
1990 <5 5 - 10 10 - 15 15 - 20 >20
pos 0.24 0.058 0.10 0.052 0.033
neg 0.044 0.034 0.028 0.069 0.059
gross 0.28 0.093 0.13 0.12 0.093
A final hypothesis I shall investigate is whether multi-plant firms have higher 
gross job reallocation than single plant firms. Intuitively, one might expect higher 
gross job flows in plants belonging to a group, than in independent plants. The reason 
for this is that in multi-plant firms there can occur more reshuffling of jobs between 
several plants of the same firm. Table n.12 reports the results and confirms that plants 
which are part of a group have higher gross job flows than independent plants. In 
single independent plants is the gross job reallocation rate 8.8% in 1980, 6.3% in 1984 
and 9.9% in 1990, while plants belonging to a multi-plant firm have resp. job 
reallocation rates of 10.9%, 8.4% and 11.3%.
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Table n. 12: Gross Job Flows and Multi-Plant Firms
single independent group
1980
pos 0.030 0.046
neg 0.058 0.063
gross 0.088 0.109
1984
pos 0.021 0.027
neg 0.041 0.056
gross 0.063 0.084
1990
pos 0.068 0.054
neg 0.031 0.058
gross 0.099 0.113
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II.6. G ross Job Flows and Existing Theory
II.6.1. Some anomalies of existing theory
In this paragraph I briefly look at some of the existing theories and its 
problems in the light of the reported material in this chapter. The observed pattern of 
job creation and job destruction cannot be predicted by conventional theory in labour 
or macro economics. Of course, since the facts on gross job flows are new, traditional 
theory could not take these into account and it is therefore easy to criticize the theory. 
Nevertheless it is worth mentioning a few theories which should be reviewed in the 
light of the new evidence on gross job flows.
Firstly, a large class of models assumes homogeneous behaviour of firms 
within the same sector. Lilien (1982) for instance describes a model in which sectoral 
disturbances drive aggregate fluctuations. Table II.6 shows that even within narrowly 
defined sectors, there exists a substantial amount of job creation and job destruction, 
so assuming homogeneous firm behaviour within one sector seems to be unreasonable. 
Furthermore, it is clear from figures II.5a,b and c and table II.8 that idiosyncratic 
shocks cannot be neglected, albeit they are not the most important factor in explaining 
the time variation in gross job reallocation. Thus models treating the idiosyncratic 
component of firm-level employment behaviour as orthogonal to the business cycle 
are clearly incorrect.
Traditional studies on labour demand assume a "representative firm" and
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estimate corresponding labour demand elasticities. However, the firm’s response to 
exogenous wage shocks might be different depending on whether the shock is an 
adverse or a favourable one, as suggested by the asymmetry between job creation and 
job destruction. This asymmetric nature of gross job flows suggests that firms might 
have different adjustment costs when expanding viz. contracting. The majority of the 
literature, however, assumes symmetric adjustment costs. Over the past decade a 
number of new theories have been proposed to explain persistent unemployment in 
Europe. Perhaps one of the most influencing is the ’insider-outsider’ theory proposed 
by Lindbeck and Snower (1989). The incumbent workers (insiders), represented by 
trade unions face a trade off between choosing for higher real wages and more jobs. 
The insider approach assumes that the union is only concerned with the employment 
of their members. Given the employment level in the firm the union chooses the 
maximum wage possible. The firm will not replace the insiders by cheaper outsiders 
because of the insider power predominantly stemming from high hiring/firing costs. 
The insider-outsider model can easily explain asymmetric behaviour between job 
creation and job destruction. A negative shock leads to a number of insiders losing 
their jobs and hence their insider power. When the economy picks up again the 
remaining insiders will simply bargain for higher wages, without hiring new workers. 
However, the theory cannot explain the simultaneous job creation and destruction at 
all phases of the business cycle and within narrowly defined sectors. This is because 
the model assumes homogeneous firm behaviour and therefore does not incorporate 
idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, one should not observe substantial job creation in the 
framework of the Insider-Outsider theory, especially not in recessions. The evidence 
reported here poses a serious problem to the theory.
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It should be clear that it is easy to go on with the list and criticize existing 
theories in the light of the reported evidence on gross job flows. Such an exercise is 
in itself uninteresting since it avoids to explain the observed phenomena. I go on with 
giving some tentative explanations and discussing some of the promising new theories.
II.6.2. Some Explanations
Abstracting from the cyclical properties of gross job creation and destruction 
any interpretation must first answer why there is both job creation and destruction 
even within narrowly defined sectors. Varying efficiencies over time and across firms 
are the obvious source of turnover. I will give a simple example which illustrates that 
the introduction of imperfect competition and strategic interactions between firms in 
modelling employment can easily generate simultaneous job creation and destruction 
in one sector. Consider for simplicity a duopoly where both firms produce the same 
homogeneous product with one factor of production, labour (L) at constant unit cost 
w for firm 1 and w* for firm 25. Firm 1 produces X and earns a payoff 7t, while firm 
2 produces Y and earns a payoff n .  Both firms have the same technology, with 
diminishing marginal productivity of labour and face a conventional inverse demand 
function for their product. I write the payoff functions for firm 1 and 2 respectively 
as the following:
(11.18) n = P(X,Y)X - wL
(11.19) k = P(X,Y)Y - w*L*
5This modelling strategy will be pursued in detail in chapter V.
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Both firms move simultaneously and unilaterally. Firm 1 chooses L to maximise 7t, 
given w, holding L* constant. Firm 2 chooses L* to maximise 7t\ given w*, holding 
L constant. 1 first analyse employment setting in firm 1 by writing down its first order 
conditions for profit maximisation.
(11.20) nL = P(1 + l/r|)F’ - w = 0
=» L = R(L*)
where T| stands for the price elasticity of demand, R(.) stands for the optimal response 
function of firm 1 and F is firm l ’s production function.
Similarly for firm 2,
(11.21) n L = P(1 + l/Ti*)F*’ - w* = 0
=> L* = R*(L)
Thus in both firms employment is set where the marginal revenue product of labour, 
which is conditional on employment in the other firm, is equal to the per unit wage. 
The conditions are expressed as optimal response functions, R and R \ in equation
(11.20) and (11.21). The following implies uniqueness and stability of the Nash 
equilibrium in employment setting.
(11.22) D =  7tLL-rc l * L *  " L * L  ^  0
Where 7tLL„ = rc*L*L < 0.
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Solving (11.20) and (11.21) simultaneously I obtain the optimal employment in firm 1 
and firm 2 as a function of the exogenous variables, W and W \ or
(11.23) L° = p(W,W')
(11.24) L‘° = p‘(W,W‘)
Note that employment demand not only depends on the firms’ own wage, but also on 
the wage paid in the other firm. This is a very common result for an industrial 
economist, not for a labour economist Taking a total differential of (11.20) and (11.21) 
and by applying Cramer’s rule I obtain the comparative static effects of a change in 
resp. w and w* on the optimal employment levels in firm 1 and 2, yielding the 
expected signs, or
Pi = ft L*L*/ D < 0,
, p2 = 7t l*l/  D > 0,
P 1 = ^LlV D > 0,
p*2 = 7cLIy d  < o.
These comparative statics effects may be interpreted as shocks to the wage. An 
exogenous increase in the wage in firm 1, holding the wage in firm 2 constant and is 
therefore specific to firm 1, leads to a decrease of employment in firm 1 (job 
destruction) and to a lesser extent an increase of employment in firm 2 (job creation). 
Figure n.6 illustrates the effect of a shock to the wage in firm 1. I start from a
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symmetric equilibrium, where w0 = w*0, implying L0 = L*0. Employment is set where 
the conditional marginal revenue product of labour is equal to the firm’s wage level. 
I call this the conditional marginal revenue product, since it depends on a given 
employment level in the other firm. A shock in firm 1, pushing up the wage in firm 
1 from w0 to Wj leads to a fall of employment in firm 1 (job destruction) and to a 
lesser extent to an increase of employment in firm 2 (job creation). Note in figure H.6 
that the conditional demand for labour of firm 2 shifts out in response to a fall in 
employment in firm 1. This results in a shift in the conditional demand function of 
firm 1 further in.The reason for this is because employment demand in one firm is 
conditional on employment in the other firm and hence employment in the other firm 
becomes a shift factor.
Figure H.6
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This simple duopoly example illustrates nicely the effect of introducing 
imperfect competition in the analysis of employment demand. Under oligopoly, even 
with homogeneous products, there is simultaneous creation and destruction o f jobs 
within one sector in response to wage shocks (i.e. differences in efficiency). Moreover, 
under oligopoly, the labour demand curve in firm i will shift in response to (i) a 
change in the wage infirm  i, (ii) a change in the wage in firm j. Thus one source of 
simultaneous job creation and destruction is strategic interactions between firms and 
efficiency differences. I believe this line of thinking might be fruitful in explaining 
observed inter-industry differences in gross job reallocation rates. Blanchflower and 
Burgess (1993) made a start by investigating differences in gross job turnover between 
"monopoly" plants and "oligopoly" plants using the WTRS data. They find that in the 
former gross job turnover is lower than in the latter.
Another source of turnover is technological progress which suggests one 
possible explanation for the asymmetry between job creation and destruction. Imagine 
that the growth process involves the replacement of old production techniques by new, 
more productive ones. Then, new jobs that produce at low marginal cost are largely 
immune to variations in demand, while old high marginal cost jobs are not and 
fluctuations in demand primarily affect job destruction. Firms have the choice when 
to introduce new technologies and close down the obsolete and old ones. Thus, the 
timing of job destruction is endogenous and could be concentrated in recessions. It is 
this intuition which underlies the model of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990). They 
suggest that aggregate fluctuations are the result of transitory productivity shocks. If 
reallocating labour takes time, it is efficient to do so in recessions which are periods
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of transitory low productivity and hence the opportunity cost of closing down a job 
is lower.
The matching approach or ’flow approach’ in labour economics is an 
alternative approach to explain the facts of job creation and job destruction (Pissarides, 
1990). Firms and unemployed job seekers are matched according to a constant returns 
to scale matching technology. In equilibrium, the flow into unemployment equals the 
flow out of unemployment. Persistent unemployment in this framework is explained 
by structural shocks affecting the outflow rate of unemployment, leading to an 
outward shift in the Beveridge curve or ’unemployment-vacancy’ curve. The matching 
approach provides a particularly useful framework to analyze the behaviour of job 
creation and job destruction, since it consists of a specification of demand in terms of 
job creation and destruction, a matching process between workers and firms and a 
wage determination process. A simple specification of job creation and destruction is 
as follows,
(11.25) pos = pos(w,Z‘), posw < 0
(11.26) neg = neg(w,Z2), negw > 0
where Z reflects a vector of shift parameters and w the wage, shifting job creation and 
job destruction. They can reflect factors like aggregate demand, foreign competition, 
changes in technology, etc.. Blanchard and Diamond (1992) use this type of 
specification to describe the "flow approach" to labour markets and discuss its 
implications.
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Mortensen and Pissarides (1993a,b) develop a model of endogenous job 
destruction in response to persistent idiosyncratic shocks and incorporate the model 
into the matching approach to equilibrium job creation and wage determination. They 
start by specifying the matching process which takes place between individual job 
seekers and jobs. The rate at which jobs and workers are matched into productive 
matches is given by the matching function,
(11.27) m=m(u,v)
with u the unemployed, v the number of vacancies and m is assumed to be constant 
returns to scale. There exists a continuum of jobs which are either vacant or filled. 
The value of a filled job in the usual matching model (Pissarides, 1990) is p, common 
to all jobs and represents an aggregate product price. Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1993a,b) change this assumption and allow idiosyncratic shocks. The value of a filled 
job becomes p + aeu, with p and a  common to all jobs, but e is a job specific 
productivity shock and is a drawing from a common distribution F(x) with upper 
support eu and a  measures dispersion of these shocks. Jobs are being created at the 
highest possible productivity or p + ae^ After the job is created productivity follows 
a stochastic process and shocks arrive at rate X leading to a new realization of e, 
drawn from F(x). While in the traditional matching model job destruction is 
exogenous, at rate s, here job destruction is modelled endogenously. It is assumed that 
the cost of closing down a job is zero and hence filled jobs die whenever an 
idiosyncratic shock reduces the value of the job below 0. Let ed denote the reservation 
productivity that determines job destruction. The assumption made here is that low
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values of e imply a negative job value, while a high value implies a positive value. 
Therefore, there exists a unique reservation productivity ed which values the job at 0 
in the absence of firing costs. By evaluating the return of a vacancy and of a filled job 
and by deriving the Beveridge curve, Mortensen and Pissarides show the optimal job 
destruction and job creation policy. A key characteristic of their model is that in good 
times firms are willing to hire low productivity workers since demand is high and 
labour is scarce, whereas in bad times, demand is low and thus firms lay off low 
productivity workers. In other words, recessions are times of ’cleaning up’ obsolete 
or unproductive production techniques because the opportunity cost of closing down 
a job is much lower than in good times, so the pace for reallocation increases. 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1993b) simulates this model and proves to generate the 
observed cyclical pattern of job creation and job destruction. Models in the same spirit 
include Caballero and Hammour (1990) and Davis and Haitiwanger (1990).
II.7. Summary and Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter was to analyze gross job flows in the U.K. 
manufacturing sector for the period 1973-1986. As such, I reported intriguing new 
facts, which lead to some new questions to the existing theory. The analyses of gross 
job flows can be viewed as an alternative approach to the demand for labour, a view 
sympathised by Hamermesh (1993) and others.
The cyclical properties of gross job flows reported in this chapter are strikingly
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similar to those reported for the U.S. manufacturing sector, although the magnitude 
of gross job flows is smaller in the U.K.. At all phases of the business cycle and even 
within narrowly defined sectors there is simultaneous job creation and job destruction. 
Gross job destruction is more variable than gross job creation over the cycle and they 
are negatively correlated. Gross job reallocation, the sum of the two, is counter-cyclic. 
The idiosyncratic component of gross job flows is substantial. The variance of 
idiosyncratic gross job creation and destruction explains the main proportion in the 
total time variation of gross job creation and destruction. However, sectoral and 
aggregate shocks seem to be the main driving force behind the time variation in gross 
job reallocation. While the idiosyncratic effects in job creation counteract the 
procyclical movement in job creation, they reinforce the countercyclical movement, 
albeit very weakly, in job destruction.
Theories explaining the observed pattern of job creation and job destruction so 
far have concentrated on explaining this process in relation to the business cycle. Little 
attention has been paid to explaining inter-industry gross job flow differentials. It 
should, however, be clear that underlying the process of job creation and job 
destruction, there is a process of expansion and contraction of firms within the same 
sectors. This topic is at the core of the research in Industrial Organisation. Labour 
economics should take more into account the theory of Industrial Organisation, in 
which strategic interactions between firms are explicitly modelled. The extent of gross 
job reallocation in a particular sector could then be related to the degree of strategic 
interaction between firms, i.e. the degree of price competition firms face. 
Alternatively, the process of gross job creation and destruction is ultimately linked to
the process of firm growth and its implications for the size distribution of firms. I 
shall take up this issue in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III: FIRM SIZE AND GROSS JOB FLOWS
m .l .  Introduction
The process of job creation and destruction is the result of forces in the 
product market leading to firm expansion and contraction. Factors like the intensity 
of price competition (Sutton, 1991), technological innovation, underlying efficiency 
differences (Jovanovic, 1982), etc. most likely affect the evolution of industries and 
firm sizes, hence job turnover. The key to understanding job turnover is therefore to 
understand the dynamic behaviour of firm size1.
This chapter focuses on the dynamic evolution of the cross-section distribution 
of plants and firms in the U.K. and its implications for gross job creation and 
destruction. I abstract from possible forces influencing the cross-section distribution 
of firm sizes, like efficiency differences between firms, learning effects, differences 
in sunk costs, etc.. Job creation and destruction is a reflection of the dynamic 
behaviour of firm size. I will analyze on the one hand the intra-distribution mobility 
of firms, which reflects where job creation and destruction is concentrated and on the 
other hand I want to infer whether firms in the long run converge towards a common 
size or not.
lln the Industrial Organisation’s literature early contributions in this area and 
the implications for business concentration include Hart and Prais (1956) and Simon 
and Bonini (1958). Recently, Evans (1987a,b) and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 
(1989) took up the issue.
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The data I use are both the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) of 
1980, 84 and 90 of plant level data, including plants with 25 employees are more, and 
the EXSTAT/DATASTREAM firm level data of "large" companies used in the last 
chapter. While the WIRS data are three occasional surveys, the 
EXSTAT/DATASTREAM data is a panel. Because retrospective questions on 
employment were asked in the WIRS data it is possible to analyze job creation and 
destruction rates. Entry and exit is not observed and therefore the samples are 
restricted to continuing and surviving plants and firms only.
In the second section I start with defining size and in the third section I 
provide descriptive statistics showing a relationship between gross job creation, 
destruction and firm size. In this section job creation and destruction occurs within 
size classes. In the fourth section I investigate the dynamic evolution of the cross- 
section distribution of size by computing Markov transition matrices. In other words 
the focus is then on job creation and destruction between size classes. In section five 
I summarize and conclude this chapter.
III.2. Defining Size
In the ’small business’ literature a small firm is usually defined as one 
employing less than 500 workers (Pratten, 1991). This is completely arbitrary and 
often dictated by the law. I follow a different approach, by defining five different size 
classes relative to the average employment in the sample. Using a relative definition
76
for a small firm has several advantages. Firstly, small in this case is defined relative 
to the average, thus as the average declines over time (e.g. a shrinking manufacturing 
sector as it was in the U.K.) also the cut-off employment level for a small firm 
declines. Thus a relative definition takes into account dynamic movements. Secondly, 
as is the case for the EXSTAT/DATASTREAM dataset, if a small firm is defined as 
one employing less than 500 employees, then given the dataset I observe hardly any 
small firm. An absolute definition of a small firm might capture only 1% of the firms, 
meaning there are no small firms.
The five size classes in each period t are defined as firms with less than or 
equal 1/4. between 1/4 and 1/2, between 1/2 and 1, between 1 and 2, and more than 
2 times the average employment in the sample at time t. A small firm is then one 
located in the first size class2. Table ELI.l gives an overview of the cut-off (upper end) 
employment levels in each size class for the EXSTAT/DATASTREAM firm level data 
in each year. In this dataset, a small firm employs between maximum 1505 workers 
in 1973 and minimum 1022 in 1981. Table M.2 gives the cut-offs for the WIRS 
dataset and it shows that the employment levels are much lower in this dataset.
2An alternative approach would be to define a set of quantiles, each size class 
would in this case have an equal number of observations.
Table HI.1
Overview size classes EXSTAT/DATASTREAM
year 1 2 3 4
1972 1476 2950 5889 11498
1973 1505 3010 5942 12012
1974 1489 3013 6029 11903
1975 1419 2807 5668 11238
1976 1136 2251 4515 9074
1977 1142 2276 4520 8923
1978 1129 2254 4522 9014
1979 1134 2250 4492 8998
1980 1073 2147 4245 8632
1981 1022 2042 4081 8174
1982 1257 2450 5062 9766
1983 1319 2677 5046 10519
1984 1261 2530 4844 9430
1985 1234 2409 4592 9915
1986 1088 2186 4389 8612
Note: The tilth size class is not indicated since it includes tirms em
the employment level in the fourth size class.
Dloying more than
Table ffl.2 
Overview size classes WIRS data
1 2 3 4
WIRS 80 52 104 208 416
WIRS84 118 236 470 941
WIRS90 133 269 538 1076
Note: as in table 1JL1.1
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IIL3. Gross Job Flows and Size
In this section I give cross tabulations and describe a relationship between 
gross job creation, destruction and firm or plant size. In other words, I report job 
creation and destruction rates within size classes, while the next section looks at job 
creation and destruction between size classes. I first discuss the results from the 
EXSTAT/DATASTREAM firm level panel data and second I do a similar exercise for 
the WIRS plant level data.
m .3.1. Results from Firm Level Data
Table III.3 shows annual average results for the EXSTAT/DATASTREAM 
data. There is a clear monotonic relationship between the gross job creation rate and 
size. The smallest firms have on average the highest gross job creation rate, 5.1%, and 
this declines as size increases, the largest firms have on average a gross job creation 
rate of only 0.8%. There seems to be a positive correlation between size and the gross 
job destruction rate, although this relationship is less pronounced. The three smallest 
size classes have on average about the same gross job destruction rate, around 4.5%, 
while the largest firms have on average a gross job destruction rate of 5.8%. Finally, 
there is a negative relationship between size and the gross job reallocation rate. The 
smallest firms have a gross job reallocation rate of 9.6%, while the largest one of 
6.7%. This correlation is predominantly driven by the negative correlation between 
size and the gross job creation rate.
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Table 111.3
Annual average gross job flows from firm level data, 1973-86
size category job creation job destruction job reallocation
1 0.051 0.044 0.096
2 0.036 0.043 0.079
3 0.031 0.046 0.077
4 0.026 0.051 0.078
5 0.008 0.058 0.066
The fact that the gross job destruction rate is highest in the largest firms 
suggest that the least stable jobs are provided in the largest firms. An alternative 
approach is to compute the survival probability of a newly created job. Table III.4 
reports the annual average one year persistence rate of new jobs and of destroyed jobs, 
computed in the same way as in chapter II. It represents the fraction of newly created 
jobs which still exist a year later. Similarly for job destruction it represents the 
fraction of destroyed jobs which are still destroyed a year later.
Table ID.4
Annual average one-year persistence rates, 1974-86
size persistence in job 
creation
persistence in job 
destruction
1 0.67 0.69
2 0.66 0.74
3 0.62 0.74
4 0.75 0.78
5 0.60 0.87
There is no clear pattern for the annual average persistence rate in gross job 
creation. It first declines for the three smallest size classes, increases to 75% for the
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fourth size class after which it declines again to 60%. On average, the survival 
probability of a newly created job is highest in the smallest firms and in the second 
but largest In contrast, the average one year persistence rate in job destruction 
increases monotonically with size. This means that on average a job which was 
destroyed in year t has a higher probability of still being destroyed a year later in 
larger firms.
In figures III. 1 a,b,c,d and e I plot the various gross job flows over time for 
the five size classes. For all five size categories, the countercyclicallity in the gross 
job reallocation rate discussed in last chapter is present. However, the asymmetry 
between gross job creation and destruction increases with firm size. This becomes 
clear from comparing figure III. le with figure III.2a. Figure HI.2e is very similar to 
figure II.3. It seems that the time profile of the gross job flows, discussed in chapter 
II, is mirrored by the largest size category.
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The fact that the gross job creation rate is highest in small firms and the gross 
job destruction rate lowest, does not necessarily imply that small firms create most 
jobs in absolute terms. If a small firm creates 100 extra jobs and a large firm also 
creates 100 extra jobs, they both create equally most jobs, but in percentage terms it 
is the small firm which creates most jobs. I therefore computed the job creation share 
of small firms in total, as well as their share of job destruction in total. Table III.5 
reports the annual average results.
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Table HI.5
Share of job creation and destruction in total, firm level data
size pos share (1) neg share (2) employment 
share (3)
(l)/(3) 
ratio 1
(2)/(3) 
ratio 2
1 0.21 0.057 0.060 3.5 0.94
2 0.15 0.062 0.066 2.51 0.89
3 0.15 0.075 0.084 1.8 0.85
4 0.15 0.091 0.093 1.63 0.93
5 0.32 0.712 0.694 0.47 1.01
The smallest firms have a job creation share of 21% and a job destruction 
share of 5.7%. Clearly in absolute numbers the smallest firms create least jobs, but 
they also destroy least jobs. This is not surprising since their employment share is only 
6%. Thus proportionally, they contribute more to job creation and less to job 
destruction. Of course, table m.5 reflects an average over a 14-year sample period. 
Whether there have been shifts in this pattern over time is shown in figure III.2a 
through e. It shows the ratio of the job creation share over the employment share 
(ratio 1) and the ratio of the job destruction share over the employment share (ratio 
2) for each size class.
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From these graphs it seems that the job destruction share, relative to the 
employment share and the job creation share, relative to the employment share, 
remained relatively constant for the largest firms. For the other size classes the job 
destruction share, relative to the employment share, remained relatively constant over 
time for all size classes, except for the period 73-74, the ratio increased for the two 
smallest size classes. The job creation share, relative to employment share, fluctuates 
much more,in particular from the late 70’s, early 80’s onwards. There seems to have 
occurred a lot of structural change for the four smallest size classes during the early 
80’s. There is no clear pattern emerging, all what can be said is that the job creation 
share has been fluctuating a lot in the early 80’s, except for the largest firms3.
m.3.2. Gross Job Flows and Size: Plant Level Data
In this sub-section I repeat the description of section III.3.1, but now I use the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 1980, 1984 and 1990. Since these are three 
occasional surveys and not panel data, I am not able to compute the persistence rates 
in job creation and destruction, nor am I able to infer any cyclical properties. The 
main results remain by and large the same.
In table HI.6, I show the annual average gross job creation, destruction and 
reallocation rate for the five size categories. Again there exists a monotonic 
relationship between plant size and the gross job creation rate. Small plants create on
3The increased variation in the job creation share after 1982 could be the result 
of a fall in the number of observations in the sample, though.
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average most of the new jobs in percentage terms, 7.4% compared to 2.4% for the top 
size category. For gross job destruction, this relationship is reversed. The largest plants 
destroy on average 6.4% existing jobs, while the smallest destroy on average 3.6% 
existing jobs. Table III.7 summarizes the annual averages of the job creation, 
destruction and employment shares, as well as their ratios.
Table m.6
Average gross job flows from plant level data
size category job creation job destruction job reallocation
1 0.074 0.036 0.111
2 0.049 0.040 0.089
3 0.047 0.050 0.098
4 0.030 0.051 0.082
5 0.024 0.064 0.089
Table 01.7
Share of job creation and destruction in total, plant level data
size pos share (1) neg share (2) employment 
share (3)
(D/(3) (2)/(3)
1 0.109 0.030 0.046 2.4 0.66
2 0.11 0.050 0.074 1.57 0.72
3 0.16 0.101 0.11 1.46 0.89
4 0.178 0.173 0.191 0.93 0.90
5 0.43 0.64 0.57 0.74 1.11
Again a very similar pattern as described in last section emerges. The smallest 
plants account only for 10.9% of total job creation and 3% of total job destruction, but 
proportionally they contribute much more to job creation and much less to job
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destruction as can be seen from the last two columns.
In table III.8, the evolution of the job creation, destruction and employment 
shares over time is summarized. In 1980 the smallest plants accounted for 9.5% of 
total job creation, this increased in 1984 to 12.3% and dropped in 1990 to 10.8%. The 
largest plants provided 35% of the new jobs in 1980 and this increased to 51% in 
1990. Whether proportionally they became more or less important can be seen from 
the last two columns. The ratio of the job creation share to the employment share of 
the smallest plants dropped from 2.74 in 1980 to 2.42 in 1984 and to 2.06 in 1990, 
in contrast, this ratio increased for the largest plants from 0.7 in 1980 to 0.8 in 1990. 
Whether this reflects a general trend cannot be said on the basis of only three 
observations. Irrespective of the evolution small plants keep a ratio larger than 1, 
while large plants smaller than 1.
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Table m.8
The evolution of the job creation, destruction and employment share
year size job creation 
share
job destruction 
share
employment
share
(l)/(3) 
ratio 1
(2)/(3) 
ratio 2
80 1 0.095 0.022 0.034 2.74 0.64
84 1 0.123 0.29 0.051 2.42 0.57
90 1 0.108 0.04 0.052 2.06 0.77
80 2 0.154 0.051 0.105 1.46 0.48
84 2 0.12 0.052 0.062 1.93 0.84
90 2 0.073 0.046 0.055 1.32 0.83
80 3 0.226 0.159 0.16 1.39 0.98
84 3 0.121 0.082 0.085 1.42 0.97
90 3 0.133 0.062 0.084 1.57 0.73
80 4 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.86 0.91
84 4 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.96 0.89
90 4 0.17 0.16 0.17 1.00 0.94
80 5 0.35 0.58 0.50 0.70 1.16
84 5 0.44 0.65 0.60 0.73 1.09
90 5 0.51 0.68 0.63 0.81 1.09
96
To a certain extent the results reported here are similar to those found by 
Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1993) in the U.S.. They also report that the job creation 
share and the job destruction share is highest in the largest firms. This contrasts with 
Birch (1979) in the U.S. and Gallagher et al. (1990) in the U.K. reporting that most 
jobs are created in small firms. Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1993) also find a 
negative monotonic relationship between the gross job creation rate and size, however, 
they find a negative relationship between the gross job destruction rate and size, while 
the results here show a positive relationship between the gross job destruction rate and 
size.
From the results reported in this section some regularities seem to emerge. 
Irrespective of using plant level or firm level data, on average, there is a negative 
relationship between size and the gross job creation rate and a positive correlation 
between size and the gross job destruction rate. In absolute terms, however, it is the 
largest firms or plants which create most jobs, but also destroy most. This is not 
surprising since they also have the largest employment share. Relative to their 
employment share, though, it is the small firms or plants which create most jobs and 
destroy least. Finally, the job destruction share remained relatively stable over time, 
while the job creation share fluctuated a lot in the early 80’s. From these cross­
tabulations it is, however, difficult to tell whether firms will converge and if there is 
convergence to which size will they tend. Moreover, these cross-tabulations do not 
give any information on the mobility of firms between size classes, they just reflect 
job creation and destruction within size classes. This theme will be analyzed in detail 
in the next section.
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III.4. Cross-Section Dynamics of Firm Size
In this section I study the process of job creation and destruction in relation 
to the evolution of the cross-section distribution of firm sizes. The literature has 
mainly focused on the relationship between firm level net growth rates and initial size 
(Evans, 1987a,b; Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson,1989), by regression analysis, giving 
a significant negative coefficient on initial size. This could be interpreted as 
convergence and hence a collapsing cross-section distribution of firm size, although 
a negative coefficient on initial size could be a result of Galton’s fallacy (Quah, 
1993a,b; Leonard, 1986). If the dependent variable is the growth rate measured as the 
difference between current size and initial size and if the regressor is initial size (all 
in natural logarithms), then firms that have a transitory low initial size, due to 
measurement error, will on average seem to grow faster than those with transitory a 
high size. The cross-section distribution dynamics involves changes in the shape of the 
distribution and intra-distribution mobility, which can only be captured imperfectly by 
a summary statistic, like a regression coefficient. Moreover, the traditional regression 
analysis concentrates on net employment growthy while the focus here is on gross job 
creation and gross job destruction. It is therefore useful to turn to an alternative 
econometric strategy. I will consider the dynamic behaviour and the cross-section 
variation of the entire size distribution of firms and plants.
A convenient way of summarizing gross job turnover between different size 
classes is to structure the data in Markov transition matrices, which describes 
movements of firms across states, i.e. size classes. Let Sj(t) denote the number of
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firms in size class or state i at time t and let S(t) stand for the vector summarizing all 
possible states. Then the evolution of S(t) is described by a law of motion:
(ID.l) S(t+1) = M S(t),
where M maps one distribution into another and is called a Markov transition matrix 
and contains information on intra-distribution movements of firms. If there are n states 
then there are n2 entries in an nXn transition matrix M indicating the probability of 
transition of state i to state j. Of course, there is no a priori reason why S(t) should 
be first order or why the relation should be time invariant, nevertheless it is a first 
step in analyzing the dynamics in the size distribution (Quah, 1993a). Iteration of 
(HI.l) gives a predictor for future cross-section distributions or
(ID.2) S(t+s) = MsS(t),
If s goes to infinity, the long-run or ergodic distribution of firm sizes may be 
characterized. This ergodic distribution can give an indication of convergence or 
divergence. Divergence might occur if {S(t+s)} tends to a bimodal distribution, while 
convergence if it the sequence tends towards a point mass.
To compute M, I defined a discrete space of five size classes as in section m .2 
and normalized employment by average employment This normalization controls for 
a declining or growing market, in other words for aggregate movements. For instance, 
in a declining market it is to be expected that firms become smaller over time and
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thus converge towards a smaller size. The entries in the M matrix are simply the 
relative frequencies or
(III.3) m j/u+ l) = nyCtVn t^),
where n^t) stands for the number or plants or firms moving from state i to state j, 
while nj(t) stands for the number of plants or firms in state i at time t. The coefficient 
m ^tjt+l) is the probability of moving from state i to state j over a one-year period and 
can be interpreted as unrestricted maximum likelihood estimators of transition 
probabilities. These transition probabilities reflect job creation and destruction between 
different size classes, while in last section job creation and destruction within size 
classes was reported.
Table EEI.9 gives the one-year transition matrices for the WIRS data in 1980, 
1984 and 1990, as well as the one-year average transition matrix taken over all three 
samples. The first column gives the total number of transitions which lie in each size 
class and the first row shows the upper end of the grid, 1/4 the average, etc.. For 
instance, in the 1980 survey, 374 plants had employment less than or equal to 1/4 the 
average employment in the sample, of which 90.64 remained in that size class the next 
year, while 9% moved one size class up. Each of these transition matrices shows 
persistence, indicated by the high diagonal elements, with more persistence in the 
smallest and in the largest size class. On average, 95% of the small plants remained 
small the next year, while only 5% moved to a higher size class, indicating low job 
creation, i.e. migration of small plants to larger ones is limited. Most job creation and
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destruction between size classes occurs in the middle, in particular the third category. 
Only 80% of plants employing between a half the average and the average 
employment in the sample stayed in that size class over a one year period. The same 
pattern holds if transitions over a longer period are computed. Table III. 10 shows the 
6-year, 4-year and 5-year transition for the WIRS samples of 1990, 1984 and 1980 
respectively4. Again there is higher persistence in the extremes. Most job creation 
from one size class to another does not occur in the smallest plants, but rather in the 
middle size categories. For instance in 1990, more than 20% of plants employing 
between 1/4 the average employment and 1/2 the average have moved one size class 
up and 12% moved one size class down. From these transition matrices it is clear that 
simultaneous job creation and destruction not only occurs within size classes, but also 
between size classes. In other words there is substantial intra-distribution mobility. 
Table HI. 11 shows the one-year average transition matrix for the firm level data over 
the period 1972-86. A very similar pattern emerges as with the plant level data. Most 
turbulence is in the middle size classes, while there is higher persistence in the 
extreme size classes.
The bottom row in table III.9 panel D shows the ergodic or steady state 
distribution of the average one-year transition matrix of the plant level data. It is found 
by computing the eigenvector associated with an eigenvalue of 1 from this matrix. Of 
course, this is just an indication since I only have three points in time and in principle 
the ergodic distribution should be computed over a much longer time period. From the
4The choice of the step of the transition was imposed by the nature of the 
census in each survey year.
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ergodic distribution it can be seen that 50% of the plants eventually end up in the 
smallest size class (which corresponds to plants with less than 101 employees). This 
indicates that the long run size distribution of plants is skewed. It cannot be said that 
there is convergence, because if there was convergence then all plants should end up 
at the mean, 1. This becomes clear from looking at the ergodic distributions in table
III. 10. There is a bimodal distribution in each sample. Many plants end up in the 
larger size classes, but also many end up in the smaller. Of course these are one-step 
transitions over a limited number of years and the length is different for each sample. 
Thus comparisons are hard to make. Moreover, most likely a lot of idiosyncrasies 
affect the probabilities since they are not averaged out. The ergodic distributions are 
indicative though. The ergodic distribution from firm level data looks very different. 
There is convergence towards the mean, indicated by the probability mass at the third 
size class. Thus in the long run, job creation comes from the smaller size classes, 
moving towards the average, while job destruction comes from the larger ones. The 
ergodic distribution computed from the firm level data makes more sense since it is 
computed over a sufficiently long time period. Whether this is the reason why there 
is a difference in the ergodic distribution of plants versus firms cannot be inferred. 
Alternatively, plants do behave inherently different.
To test the above results on their robustness I experimented with an alternative 
specification of the initial grid and extended the original five state specification to a 
ten state specification. Moreover, the ten states were chosen such that initially each 
firm or plant had the same probability of being in a given size class, in other words 
each state had approximately the same number of observations initially. The results
Note 3: Chapter 111, p  102
The question of existence of the ergodic distribution is straightforward in the case 
shown here. For finite Markov processes the ergodic distribution always exists. A 
finite Markov process is the case where the state space S={s1,.. .,sn} consists of a 
finite number of elements. Such a Markov process is called a Markov chain, as is the 
case here. However, uniqueness is not necessarily guaranteed. The ergodic 
distribution will be unique if and only if for every i e { l,...,n}, there exists s >  1 
such that my* >  0 (Stokey and Lucas, "Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics", 
Theorem 11.1 and 11.2). This latter condition is clearly not satisfied and hence the 
ergodic distributions found need not be unique.
are given in tables III. 12 and ID. 13. As expected, there is a lot of job turnover
between the different size classes especially. On average, 80% of the plants initially
in the smallest size class (0.16 the average) were still there the next year, while for
the firm level data, 87% stayed in the smallest size class the next year (0.08 the
&
average). The ergodic distribution for the plant level data shows no convergence. 
There are several "peaks", one at the fourth size class, one at the sixth and one at the 
eighth, thus confirming the result found earlier. For the firm level data there is a clear 
tendency that firms move towards the right hand side of the size distribution. Given 
the grid here, the mean is located between the 8th and the 9th size class. Firms have 
a probability of 18% to arrive in the 8th size class, 23% in the 9th and 29% in the last 
size class. Convergence here is not well pronounced, but this might be due to the fact 
that the mean is located so far to the right. In any case, there is a probability piling 
up in the area of the mean, which is consistent with the ergodic distribution from the 
five-state specification.
Table 01.9
One-year Markov transition matrices, plant level data
A/1980
1/4 1/2 1 2 6.81
374 0.906 0.0909 0.002 0.00 0.00
506 0.025 0.926 0.047 0.00 0.00
449 0.004 0.222 0.723 0.046 0.002
263 0.000 0.003 0.068 0.897 0.030
294 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.064 0.928
*- aq  ti&fc $
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B/1984
1/4 1/2 1 2 33.3
745 0.977 0.021 0.001 0.000 0.000
323 0.089 0.860 0.049 0.000 0.000
222 0.009 0.099 0.855 0.036 0.000
255 0.003 0.000 0.066 0.917 0.011
269 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.059 0.929
C/1990
1/4 1/2 1 2 22.9
509 0.974 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000
161 0.099 0.857 0.043 0.000 0.000
129 0.007 0.093 0.845 0.046 0.007
134 0.000 0.022 0.067 0.880 0.029
184 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.054 0.934
D/Average one-year transition matrix
1/4 1/2 1 2 21
1628 0.952 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000
990 0.071 0.881 0.046 0.000 0.000
800 0.007 0.138 0.808 0.043 0.003
652 0.001 0.008 0.067 0.898 0.024
747 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.059 0.930
ergodic 0.50 0.31 0.099 0.056 0.024
104
Table ffl.10
A/1980: One step 5-year transition
1/4 1/2 1 2 10.8
353 0.747 0.229 0.017 0.002 0.002
427 0.053 0.782 0.154 0.009 0.000
347 0.000 0.259 0.579 0.158 0.002
211 0.004 0.023 0.099 0.729 0.142
239 0.004 0.000 0.012 0.092 0.891
ergodic 0.069 0.294 0.165 0.200 0.27
B/1984: One step 4-year transition
1/4 1/2 1 2 17.5
705 0.903 0.090 0.005 0.000 0.000
249 0.120 0.702 0.176 0.000 0.000
208 0.014 0.139 0.653 0.187 0.004
204 0.000 0.009 0.088 0.818 0.083
255 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.145 0.839
ergodic 0.239 0.161 0.151 0.28 0.158
C/1990: One step 6-year transition
1/4 Ml 1 2 19.7
509 0.886 0.102 0.009 0.003 0.000
157 0.121 0.656 0.203 0.012 0.006
110 0.009 0.109 0.600 0.263 0.018
138 0.000 0.000 0.152 0.587 0.260
165 0.000 0.024 0.012 0.121 0.842
ergodic 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.37
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Table HI.11
Average one-year Markov transition matrix for firm level data, 1972-86
1/4 1/2 1 2 45.9
4195 0.958 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000
1596 0.062 0.869 0.068 0.000 0.000
1050 0.000 0.070 0.870 0.059 0.000
591 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.859 0.054
827 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.035 0.963
ergodic 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.14 0.14
Table 111.12
Average one-year Markov transition matrix, plant level 
10-state specification
0.16 0.25 0.35 0.47 0.52 0.66 0.97 1.55 2.74 33.3
471 0.80 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.00
476 0.11 0.78 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
463 0.00 0.09 0.77 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
487 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.66 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
475 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.81 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
471 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.68 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
472 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.80 0.08 0.00 0.00
486 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.88 0.05 0.00
490 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.84 0.06
483 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.90
ergodic 0.049 0.084 0.093 0.11 0.022 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.03
Note: The first row gives the upper end of the grid
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Table 01.13
Average one-year Markov transition matrix, firm level 1972-86 
10-state specification
0.08 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.28 0.38 0.54 0.9 2.4 45
852 0.87 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
848 0.10 0.69 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
824 0.00 0.14 0.63 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
828 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.65 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
829 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.66 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
813 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.69 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
828 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.72 0.14 0.00 0.00
821 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.81 0.10 0.00
835 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.87 0.05
863 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.96
ergodic 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.029 0.046 0.072 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.29
Note: The first row gives the upper end of the grid
From the above transition matrices a number of interesting lessons can be 
learned. The first is that there exists substantial intra-distribution mobility of firms and 
plants in all size classes. This intra-distribution mobility cannot be observed in a 
traditional regression analysis. Moreover, from the ergodic distribution it can be 
inferred whether firms and plants converge in size or not and to which size, in the 
traditional regression a negative coefficient on initial size was subject to Galton’s 
fallacy. This is not the case here since the dynamic evolution of the entire size 
distribution is taken into account. From the ergodic distribution it seems there is no 
convergence of plant sizes, while firms seem to converge towards the average
The above results should be checked using data over longer time horizons, but
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at this stage the data used here are the best available. If such data are available 
extensions are possible. For instance, one could argue that the size distribution in 
narrowly defined sectors might be different from sector to sector. Several sectors have 
different levels of sunk costs, different levels of minimum efficient scale and different 
degrees of price competition. These factors could influence the evolution of the size 
distribution of firms. Again, a substantial amount of data at a detailed level of 
disaggregation is needed to explore these issues.
m .5. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has looked at a relationship between gross job flows and firm 
size. I started with producing cross-tabulations of gross job flows for five different 
size classes, defined relative to average employment in the sample. Irrespective of 
using firm or plant level data the smaller ones have the highest gross job creation rate 
and the lowest gross job destruction rate. This implies that the least stable jobs are 
located in the largest firms. This latter fact is different than the results for the U.S.. 
In the U.S. the smallest plants have both the highest job creation rate and the highest 
job destruction rate. There is no clear relationship between the persistence of newly 
created jobs and size, while the largest firms have the highest persistence rate in job 
destruction. The largest firms account for the largest share in total job creation as well 
as for the largest share in total job destruction. This is not surprising since they also 
have the largest employment share. Proportionally, small plants and firms seem to be 
more important, although that the bulk of the job creation and destruction happens in
the larger plants and firms.
The process of job creation and destruction is ultimately linked to the process 
of expansion and decline of firms. This has been studied in firm growth models. I 
studied firm size dynamics to take into account the dynamic evolution and the intra- 
distribution mobility of the entire size distribution. To do this I computed Markov 
transition matrices and reported evidence indicating convergence in firm sizes towards 
the average, but no convergence in plant sizes. Knowledge of the evolution of the size 
distribution of firms and factors determining this evolutionary process will most likely 
help to understand the implied process of job creation and destruction.
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CHAPTER IV: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF
GROSS JOB FLOWS
IV. 1. Introduction
In this chapter I give an overview of the existing studies on gross job flows 
and make an attempt to compare the gross job flow rates across different countries. 
As such the results of chapter II for the U.K. are placed in a broader international 
context I will discuss the difficulties arising when comparing gross job flows across 
countries. The labour markets of Europe and the U.S. have been contrasted by the 
difference in low net job creation and persistently high unemployment in Europe. The 
difference in performance across countries has been attributed to predominantly social 
policies and institutional arrangements (Jackman et al.,1990). In particular, the role of 
wage-bargaining arrangements (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) and of unemployment 
benefits (Burda, 1988) have been argued to account for differential unemployment 
rates across countries. Most likely, also these factors contribute to explaining 
differences in gross job creation and destruction rates between countries. However, as 
discussed in chapter II, the idiosyncratic component of gross job creation and 
destruction is substantial, suggesting that firm specific characteristics and shocks are 
also important to explain differences in gross job creation and destruction rates.
110
There are only two studies investigating differences in gross job reallocation 
rates across countries, both focus on differences in economic policy. Leonard and 
Schettkat (1991) compare job stability between Germany and the U.S.. They regress 
job reallocation, creation and destruction rates on six industry groups in Germany and 
the U.S. from 1978-81. Conditional on industry and year they find that the job 
reallocation rate is 3.9 percentage points higher in the U.S. than in Germany and 
contribute this difference to the difference in institutions and regulations in both 
countries. Moreover, they also report differences in gross job flows across different 
sectors which are similar in both countries. If technology matters in explaining 
different job reallocation rates across industries, then these differences should persist 
across countries. However, even after controlling for technology via industry dummies 
they still found a difference in job reallocation rates. They take this as indirect 
evidence for the impact of different institutions and regulations on gross job creation 
and destruction rates. More direct evidence that policy matters is given in Leonard and 
Van Audenrode (1993) comparing the U.S. with Belgium. They show that differences 
in job creation and destruction rates can be contributed to differences in industrial 
policy. Subsidization of failing companies has imposed a tax on growing firms which 
contributed to lower job creation in Belgium. Both firm level and industry level data 
on subsidization have been used to prove their hypothesis. These two studies, 
however, are only based on comparing two countries so that these results should be 
seen as suggestive rather than conclusive.
In section IV.2 I give an overview of the existing studies on gross job flows 
and report gross job reallocation rates across different countries. I then argue why it
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is so hard to compare gross job reallocation rates on a consistent basis across different 
countries. Despite the reported caveats I go on with an attempt to compare a few 
countries. This is done in section IV.3. It should be noted that it is not clear a priori 
that a high gross job reallocation rate is good or bad. If a high gross job reallocation 
rate is driven by a high gross job destruction rate, then higher unemployment will 
result. If on the other hand a high gross job reallocation rate is driven by a high gross 
job creation rate, unemployment will reduce. If jobs involve a lot of on-the-job 
training and human capital then lower job and worker turnover is desirable. 
Furthermore, high gross job turnover implies high transaction costs. In contrast, if 
there is a lot of structural change then a flexible labour market is desirable, implying 
flexible job policies in firms. In section IV.4 I discuss briefly cyclical similarities in 
gross job flow rates between the U.S. and the U.K. and in section IV.5 I summarize 
and conclude this chapter.
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IV.2. Gross Job Flows across Countries: Overview and Problems
It is only recently that labour economists have started to use detailed firm and 
plant level panel data. It is then not surprising that the number of studies on gross job 
flows is limited and that the nature of each study is often quite different. Table IV. 1 
gives an overview of these studies for nine countries. The gross job creation and 
destruction rates refer to annual averages computed over the relevant sample period. 
These figures are computed from different data sources, they refer to different industry 
affiliation and sample periods, moreover some of them are calculated on the basis of 
firm level panel data, like the Belgian and the U.K. study, while the others on the 
basis of establishment level panel data.
There are a number of caveats when one wants to compare these results. 
Firstly, some of the studies are based on firm level data while others are based on 
plant level data. Which measure the most appropriate one is, is open to debate. 
Usually, the choice is dictated by the availability of the data. Plants within the same 
firm can expand or contract, die or be bom, implying job flows, while at the same 
time there may be no measured change in the numbers of jobs at the level of the firm. 
Thus the reshuffling of jobs between plants is not observed at the firm level. This is 
not necessarily bad since what matters are the net job opportunities provided by each 
firm and the number of plants is a mere reflection of the organisation of the firm. 
Hamermesh (1993) argues that it depends on where the specificity of investment lies 
and on the possibility of intrafirm mobility of workers. To the extent that investment 
is plant- but not firm specific, or that workers do not move among plants within the
same firm, the plant is the more appropriate unit of observation.
The industrial coverage of the data is a second problem when one wants to 
compare gross job flow rates between different countries. A large number of papers 
focus only on the manufacturing sector. Economy wide judgements inferred from these 
studies are in fact very specific to the manufacturing sector. It is of course interesting 
to compare job flows in the manufacturing sector versus those in the non- 
manufacturing sector, however, when international comparisons are made only similar 
sectors should be compared, because they most likely reflect the same underlying 
technology and competition, potentially causing the gross job flows within one sector. 
Even restricting attention to the manufacturing sector, it could well be the case that 
some sectors in country A are in full expansion and are still relatively young, 
converging towards a "steady state", while in country B these sectors reached already 
their "steady state" and in country C these sectors are in decline. This is in fact the 
reason why it is exceptional in the Industrial Organisation’s literature to find cross­
country comparisons.
A similar argument can be used for the sample period covered in the different 
studies. As shown in chapter n, the gross job reallocation rate for the U.K. is counter­
cyclical, the gross job creation rate is pro-cyclical, while the gross job destruction rate 
is counter-cyclical. Also for the U.S. manufacturing sector this is the case as shown 
in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992). This cyclicallity in gross job flows implies 
that it matters to compare job flows which refer to a similar phase in the business 
cycle. The evidence of chapter II suggests that the gross job reallocation rate in a
boom will be different than the one in a recession. Furthermore, it is not always the 
case that the timing of the business cycle is the same in different countries.
Finally, as can be seen from table IV. 1, some studies only include continuing 
firms or establishments, while others also include job flows emerging from entry and 
exit o f firms or establishments. It is clear that one should only compare figures 
referring to either both entry and exit and expansion and contraction of firms or 
alternatively one should only focus on gross job flows computed from continuing 
firms, excluding entry and exit.
All the above remarks are applicable to the results reported in table 1. Ideally, 
one should have comparable firm or plant level data, referring to the same sample 
period for say all the OECD countries. In this case, consistent gross job creation and 
destruction series may be computed and a pooled cross-section time series study may 
be performed, taking into account the above criticisms. At this stage such rich 
information is not yet available. Moreover, a lot of these criticisms, albeit to a lesser 
extent, are also true for other cross-country studies. For instance the comparability of 
unemployment rates across countries is often questionable. Each country has often 
their specific way of collecting macro data without following a general code. Bearing 
these facts in mind, I will make some statements by "comparing" gross job 
reallocation rates across countries. These statements should therefore be viewed as 
suggestions, rather than real "truths".
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Table IV. 1
Overview Studies on Gross Job Flows
country source period pos1 neg1 gross1 pos neg gross
Germany Cramer & Roller 
(1988)
1978-84 5.6 6.1 11.7 8.3 8.2 16.5
Cramer & Roller 
(1988)*
1978-84 4.1 5.6 9.7 5.7 7.0 12.7
Germany Boeri & Cramer 
(1992)
1977-89 6.2 5.8 12 8.5 7.5 16
United States Davis and 
Haltiwanger( 1990)*
1973-86 7.3 8.5 15.8 9.2 11.3 20.5
United Kingdom chapter II*, firms 
chapter n \  plants
1973-86
1980,84,90
1.6
3.5
5.6
6.5
7.2
10
N.A. N.A. N.A.
Belgium Mulhay & Van 
Audenrode (1993)*
1979-84 2.3 3.4 5.7 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Mulhay & Van 
Audenrode (1993)
1985-89 3.8 5.1 8.9
Italy Contini & Revelli 
(1992)
1978-83 10.3 10.7 21 11.9 12.2 24.1
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France OECD (1987) 1978-84 5.7 6.2 11.9 11.4 12.0 23.4
OECD (1987)* 1978-84 3.9 5.7 9.6 8.1 9.0 17.1
Canada OECD (1987) 1979-84 8.8 7.5 16.3 11.1 9.6 20.7
OECD (1987)* 1979-84 7.5 7.5 15 8.9 9.1 18
Japan OECD (1987) 1982-84 4.1 3.6 7.7 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Sweden OECD (1987) 1982-84 8.8 8.7 17.5 11.4 12.1 23.5
OECD (1987)* 1982-84 6.3 7.2 13.5 7.8 9.5 17.3
Notes: (1) indicates that the gross job flows are computed excluding the contribution of entry and exit of businesses.
(*) indicates that the figures refer to the manufacturing sector only
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IV.3. An Attempt to Compare Gross Job Flows across Countries
There are a number of interesting facts emerging from table IV. 1. First, in all 
countries there is simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs, second the gross job 
reallocation rate seems to differ across countries, ranging from 21% in Italy to 7.7% 
in Japan (excluding the contribution of entry and exit to the gross job creation and 
destruction process). Third, comparing the gross job creation and destruction rate when 
entry and exit of businesses is excluded with the ones when they are included in the 
calculation it turns out that on average about 30% of total job creation and destruction 
is accounted for by entry and exit of establishments, with the outliers being France 
and Italy. It is therefore possible to estimate the corresponding figures for the U.K. 
under the assumption that also in the U.K. the contribution of entry and exit to the job 
generation process is on average 30%. This would yield an average gross job 
reallocation rate of 10.3% if the firm level data are used and of 14.3% if the plant 
level data are used. These results suggest that there are shocks which affect both 
expansion and contraction of existing firms or plants, as well as the entry and exit 
process of firms or plants. The major source of job turnover within an aggregate 
however is the expansion and contraction of existing firms or plants. There is only one 
study which investigates the role of entry and exit in the job creation and destruction 
process in more detail. Boeri and Cramer (1992) find for the German economy that 
over the period 1977-89 cyclical employment fluctuations are mainly associated with 
contractions and expansions of continuing plants, while the entry of establishments is 
the driving force of trend employment growth. They find no evidence of significant 
adjustment costs of labour and suggest that the role of entry in employment growth
has to do with differences in product specialisation of new firms and incumbents.
I next attempt to compare the gross job creation, destruction and reallocation 
rates for a number of countries, based on the results of table IV. 1. I will restrict the 
comparison to the manufacturing sector and to data obtained from existing and 
continuing business units only. Furthermore, the sample period to which the rates refer 
will be restricted to 1978-84 since most studies have this period in common1. This 
period is also characterised by a supply shock which has affected all countries in some 
way or another, the second oil shock. In table IV.2 I give the annual average gross job 
creation, destruction and reallocation rate for the selected countries. I have transformed 
the gross job flow rates based on firm level data for the U.K. and Belgium into plant 
level data based on the (rough) approximation discussed in chapter II that rates 
computed from firm level data are on average about 25% lower than those computed 
on the basis of plant level data. This transformation is necessary to make a 
"consistent" comparison.
4 have also included Belgium and Canada, although the sample starts only in 1979.
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Table IV.2
country job creation job destruction job reallocation
Germany 0.041 0.056 0.097
United States 0.067 0.085 0.152
United Kingdom1 0.011 0.071 0.082
0.014 0.088 0.102
Belgium1 0.023 0.034 0.057
0.029 0.042 0.071
France 0.039 0.057 0.096
Canada 0.075 0.075 0.15
Note: (1) The lirm level data tor the U.K.. have been transformed to plant level data 
on the basis of the approximation (in italic) made in chapter II that the difference in 
gross job flow rates is on average about 25%.
From table IV.2 it is immediately clear that in all countries firms on average 
were shedding labour in the manufacturing sector, implying negative net employment 
growth over the period 1978-84. However, there was still some gross job creation 
going on, with the highest rates in the U.S. and Canada, 8.5% and 7.5%, and the 
lowest in Belgium and the U.K., 2.9% and 1.4%. In contrast, the average gross job 
destruction rate is highest in the U.S. and the U.K., 11.3% and 8.8%, and lowest in 
Belgium and Germany, 4.2% and 5.6%. Finally, the average gross job reallocation rate 
is highest in the U.S. and Canada, 19.9% and 15%, while in the European countries 
the average gross job reallocation rate is always around 10%. It has often been argued
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that the European unemployment problem is due to the lack of job creation in Europe. 
To a certain extent, this might be true for the U.K. and Belgium where job creation 
is very low. Also, job creation is in general lower in Europe than in North America, 
nevertheless, there is still substantial gross job creation in Germany and France. 
Taking into account that in general the gross job destruction rate is also lower in 
Europe, the Eurosclerosis problem is not necessarily linked to the fact of too low job 
creation. What is clear from table IV.2 is that especially job destruction is a very 
important component of the net job generation problem, especially in the U.K., where 
the difference between gross job creation and destruction is largest.
There are most likely two main causes leading to different gross job creation 
and destruction rates. One is linked to the way in which firms operate and markets are 
organised. Firm specific investment, technology and competition between firms will 
have effects on the expansion and contraction of firms and hence on job creation and 
destruction. The other cause is related to economic policy and institutional 
arrangements. Since the late 70’s there has been a marked upswing in world labour 
market policies aimed at reducing unemployment (see Jackman et al. 1990). These 
policies may be classified in two broad categories: one is concerned with increasing 
the outflow rate from unemployment, the other with giving incentives to firms to 
hoard on labour and to hire new workers. It is the latter which potentially influences 
gross job creation and destruction. I will focus on three possible sources affecting 
gross job flows across countries: the employment protection legislation (EPL), the 
degree of centralisation and finally the amount of subsidies firms get. Table IV.3 gives 
an overview of each of these indicators for the selected countries.
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Table IV.3
Overview Policy Indicators
country EPL Centralization subsidies
U.S. 1 3 0
Canada 2 1 N.A.
U.K. 3 5 0.038
Germany 4 2 0.030
France 5 6 0.049
Belgium 6 4 0.064
Notes: EPL is taken trom bertola (lyyu), t le adjusted degree ot centralization is taken
from Calmfors and Driffill (1988), adjusted to test for hump-shape and subsidies are 
subsidies to the manufacturing sector as a percentage of value added and is taken from 
Leonard and Van Audenrode (1993).
I start by looking at the employment protection legislation across countries. 
Emerson (1988) documents the importance of employment protection laws for Europe 
and it has been claimed that these laws are the cause of the poor employment 
performance in Europe. Blanchard et al. (1986) among others have argued that 
especially in unstable environments employment protection legislation makes labour 
unattractive to firms as a factor of production and therefore firms will substitute to 
more capital intensive production techniques. Furthermore, as argued by Lindbeck and 
Snower (1989) firing restrictions lead incumbent workers to bargain for higher wages, 
disregarding unemployment among outsiders. Recently, Burgess (1992) finds that the 
employment protection legislation affects negatively the capability of an economy to 
reallocate labour to more productive ones. Theoretically, the role of employment 
protection legislation has been illustrated by Millard (1993) in a matching model with 
endogenous job separations due to Mortensen and Pissarides (1993a,b). Employment 
protection legislation lowers both job creation and destruction because on the one hand
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an employer becomes more reluctant to open up a new job, given the increased cost 
of closing it down when a negative shock arrives, on the other hand an employer will 
only close down a job when the expected return of a filled job falls below the cost of 
job destruction, instead of zero. Thus even if the job yields a negative return the 
employer will not destroy it as long as the cost of job destruction is higher. Millard 
(1993) calibrates his model for the U.S. and the U.K. and finds that the higher 
employment protection legislation in the U.K. can only explain about 4% in the 
difference in job creation and destruction between the U.K. and the U.S.. I use 
Bertola’s (1990) ordinal ranking of countries according to their restrictiveness in the 
employment protection legislation2. This ranking is based on a wide range of factors, 
discussed in detail in Emerson (1988) and is also used by others investigating the 
effect of employment protection legislation, like Burgess (1992). Figure IV. 1 shows 
the relationship between the average gross job reallocation rate for the countries listed 
in table IV.2 and the employment protection legislation ranking in these countries. Not 
surprisingly, there is a clear negative correlation between employment protection 
legislation and gross job reallocation.
Figure IV.2 plots the average gross job reallocation rate against the degree of 
centralisation. Calmfors and Driffil (1988) show that there is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between unemployment and the degree of centralisation of bargaining: 
unemployment will be lowest when bargaining is either completely decentralised or 
completely centralised. The index used here is adjusted to test for such an inverted U-
2Bertola (1990) does not include Canada in his ranking, but it is reasonable to 
assume that it is located close to the U.S..
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shape by ranking first the most de-centralised and most centralised country, followed 
by the second most de-centralised and most centralised country and so on. Thus 
deviations from a linear relationship indicate deviations from the inverted U-shape. 
Figure IV.2 shows a weak. • linear relationship between gross job reallocation and the 
index. Thus it seems that the institutional arrangements do matter for gross job 
reallocation.
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Figure IV. 1
Gross Job Reallocation vs. Employment Protection Legislation
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Figure IV.2
Gross Job Reallocation vs. Degree of Centralisation, adjusted to test for hump-shape
Finally, Leonard and Van Audenrode (1993) argue that the difference in 
employment performance is due to governments subsidizing failing companies, which 
would act as a tax on growing companies, thereby reducing both job creation and 
destruction. Data were only available for a few countries, nevertheless, figure IV.3 
seems to support their hypothesis.
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Figure IV.3
Gross Job Reallocation vs. Subsidies to Manufacturing
The results of this section seem to suggest that differences in gross job 
reallocation rates across countries are related to differences in the institutional settings 
and industrial policy. Of course, nothing conclusive should be inferred at this stage 
since the observations cover only six countries. Nevertheless, I believe it is a first step 
in the right direction to go about explaining differences across countries. It is clear 
that it is crucial to collect comparable data in order to make consistent international 
comparisons, this will be possible as data are collected on a systematic basis over a
long enough period.
IV.4. Cyclical Properties: A Comparison between the U.S. and the U.K..
So far, the focus was on differences in magnitudes of gross job flows. Another 
dimension is the similarity in the cyclical properties of gross job creation, destruction 
and reallocation. What matters then is the access to a long time span to infer some 
cyclical properties. There are only three countries which cover a relatively long sample 
period the U.K., the U.S. and Germany. The U.S. and the U.K. both cover the period 
1973-86 for the manufacturing sector, while Germany refers to 1977-89 and covers 
both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector. The comparison will therefore 
refer to the U.K. and the U.S. only. The main points have already been raised in 
chapter II, so this section stresses the most important ones.
In figure IV.4a I show the gross job creation, destruction and reallocation rate 
for the U.S. manufacturing sector, while in figure IV.4b the corresponding U.K. rates 
are plotted.
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Figure IV.4a
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Figure IV.4b
In both the U.S. and the U.K. there is an asymmetry between the job creation 
and destruction rate, with the job destruction rate being the more variable component 
over the cycle. The job destruction rates show large spikes in recessions. This 
asymmetry is, however, more pronounced in the U.K. than in the U.S., especially with 
the second oil shock. In the U.K. there was an appreciation of the pound which could 
have contributed to increased job destruction. It is especially after the second oil shock 
that manufacturing suffered more in the U.K. than in the U.S. and that job shedding 
was relative to job creation much higher in the U.K.. It was also in this period that
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manufacturing production was discouraged by the Thatcher Government.
In chapter n, section n.4, I have performed a variance decomposition which 
allowed me to infer the importance of aggregate and sectoral shocks on the one hand 
and idiosyncratic shocks on the other in explaining the time variation in the gross job 
flow rates. Here I compare this variance decomposition for the U.S. with the U.K.. 
Equation (11.17) of chapter II is reproduced in table IV.4.
Table IV.4
U.S.
pos
U.S.
neg
U.S.
gross
U.K.
pos
U.K.
neg
U.K.
gross
var(y-ydeY)/var(y) 1.44 0.63 0.03 1.55 0.83 0.61
var(ydev)/var(y) 0.16 0.079 1.026 0.42 0.024 0.14
2cov(y,y-ydev)/var(y) -0.60 0.287 -0.056 -1.0 0.07 0.24
Source: Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), chapter ll
The first row shows the contribution of aggregate and sectoral effects in explaining 
the total time variation in gross job flows, while the second row shows the 
idiosyncratic effects. The covariance term in the final row indicates whether the 
idiosyncratic shocks counteract or reinforce the aggregate and sectoral effects. A 
positive sign indicates a reinforcement, while a negative sign indicates a counteraction. 
For both the U.S. and the U.K. the aggregate and sectoral effects explain most of the 
time variation in job creation and job destruction. The idiosyncratic effect strongly 
counteracts the procyclical movements in job creation, while it reinforces the 
countercyclical movement in job destruction, although the latter is very weak for the 
U.K.. It is exactly this weak effect which causes the difference between the U.S. and
the U.K. in explaining the time variation in the gross job reallocation rate. In the U.S. 
it is predominantly the idiosyncratic effects which explain most of the time variation, 
while in the U.K. it is the aggregate and sectoral effects. The reason is that in the 
U.K. the reinforcement of the countercyclical movement in job destruction is weak, 
as indicated by the low covariance term in the second column, while this is not so in 
the U.S..
Whether the cyclical properties reported here are stylized facts has to be 
investigated when more comparable data over long time spans become available. 
Perhaps, the asymmetry between job creation and destruction observed in both the 
U.S. and the U.K. are very typical for that time period, including two oil shocks. 
Perhaps, they are typical for the manufacturing sector.
IV.5. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter I gave an overview of the existing empirical literature on gross 
job flows. Consistent cross-country comparisons of gross job creation, destruction and 
reallocation rates are difficult for a number of reasons, including differences in sample 
periods, industrial coverage, the nature of the data, etc.. Despite the shortages of the 
available data, I attempted to make a comparison of manufacturing gross job flow 
rates across nine countries. There are clear differences between countries, in particular 
between the U.S. and European countries, the latter look more similar.
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There could be several reasons why there exist differences in gross job flow 
rates across countries. I reported preliminary evidence that the institutional 
arrangements on bargaining, industrial policy and employment protection legislation 
affect gross job reallocation rates. I concluded this chapter with stressing the cyclical 
similarities between the U.S. and the U.K.. A consistent comparison across many 
countries such that statistical inferences are possible is the obvious next step on the 
research agenda. However, this will only be possible if better and more plant or firm 
level data become available.
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PART n
WAGE DETERMINATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
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In the second part of the thesis I address the more traditional problems in 
labour economics. In part I, the emphasis was on the flows of jobs and thus the 
analysis can be classified under the flow approach in labour economics. Over the past 
couple of decades or so, there have been two other approaches in the literature in 
labour economics which received substantial attention,in particular the efficiency wage 
literature and the union literature. The remainder of the thesis will be devoted to these 
two approaches.
In chapter V I analyze the process of wage determination under the assumption 
of efficiency wage determination on the one hand and union wage bargaining on the 
other. The approach I pursue is very alternative. I explicitly model spillovers from the 
product market to the labour market and vice versa, which allows me to obtain a 
number of unique predictions and as such I am able to develop a direct test of the 
efficiency wage hypothesis. In chapter VI I focus exclusively on unions and in 
particular I investigate how unions affect employment growth at the firm level, over 
and above the union-wage effect on growth.
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CHAPTER V: ENDOGENOUS WAGE DETERMINATION
AND PERFORMANCE1
V.l. Introduction
In this chapter I consider a duopoly in which wages are determined 
endogenously. I consider two widely discussed forms of wage determination, the 
efficiency wage hypothesis on the one hand and union wage bargaining on the other. 
Efficiency wage theories in recent years have been put forward as attractive ways of 
explaining involuntary unemployment and other aspects of the labour market. To find 
direct evidence of efficiency wage payments has proven to be quite difficult Studies 
in the U.S. have documented large and persistent inter-industry and firm wage 
differentials (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Blackburn and Neumark, 1988; Katz and 
Summers, 1989; Groshen, 1991 and Gibbons and Katz, 1992). These studies used 
wage equations to examine and reject the hypothesis that competitive and bargaining 
theories can explain a hundred percent of the wage differentials that exist in U.S. 
industry. Indirectly they see this proof by contradiction as evidence for the existence 
of efficiency wage payments. There is no general proxy in empirical work for the 
presence of efficiency wage payments. A union dummy is usually considered to be a
!This chapter is joint work with Paul Walsh and is published in The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 104, pp. 542-555.
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good proxy for the effect bargaining has on wage determination, but the best general 
evidence for efficiency wage payments is seen to be the above proof by contradiction 
approach. This is very indirect evidence. Different control variables and estimation 
techniques can reduce the size of the unexplained wage differentials. This certainly 
casts a doubt on whether the unexplained differentials are really only due to efficiency 
wage payments. It also leaves it open to debate whether efficiency wage payments can 
really explain any of the estimated unexplained wage differentials.
Yellen’s (1984) efficiency wage model captures the essence of the efficiency wage 
argument which is present in all models of efficiency wage payments. Its results can 
be generalised to be true of all efficiency wage models1. The key feature of all these 
models is that the wage has a dual function. One is to hire labour and the other is to 
create incentives that reduce efficiency costs. Our key insight is to note that the wage 
premium is only a fraction of the product market rent it creates. This is quite a 
different type of rent sharing to that under wage bargaining. This is a share in 
additional rent created by the wage premium itself rather than a share in the absolute 
rent created by the firm. The argument pursued here is simple. Wage growth due to 
efficiency wage payments induces better product market performance. The firm will 
only commit to paying wage premium incentives i f  and only i f  there is some net gain 
in product market performance from doing so or else the firm would not undertake the 
efficiency wage payment.
1 There are five important efficiency wage models that explain why firms find it 
profitable to pay wages above the opportunity cost of labour. The Shirking Model 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), The Labour Turnover Model (Salop, 1979), The Adverse 
Selection Model (Weiss, 1980), The Sociological Models (Akerlof, 1984) and The 
Union Threat Model (Dickens, 1986).
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The theory I develop tracks vertical spillovers from an upstream labour market 
to a downstream product market and vice versa. Specifically, I track vertical spillovers 
within Sutton’s (1991) general oligopoly framework under three alternative theories 
of wage determination. Figure V.l shows three vertical spillovers that flow 
downstream into the product market.
UPSTREAM LABOUR MARKET
W
/ \
competitive forces wage bargaining
wage bargaining /efficiency wages\
DOWNSTREAM PRODUCT MARKET
Figure V.l
One is due to variations in the opportunity cost of labour. This is a proxy in 
a partial equilibrium model for all competitive explanations of wage growth. Another 
is due to variations in efficiency wage payments. This is shown to be only a 
downstream vertical spillover. There is no upstream spillover in the presence of 
efficiency wage payments. The presence of wage bargaining drives a two way vertical 
spillover. I show that an upstream vertical spillover can only exist under rent sharing 
due to wage bargaining. I conclude from the theory that a positive relationship 
between a firm’s market share performance and wage growth in the downstream 
market can only be explained by a downstream spillover created by efficiency wage 
payments.
To find evidence of efficiency wage payments in firms I take a very different 
road to the one taken by the proof by contradiction approach. Using U.K. panel data, 
I set out to pinpoint the downstream spillover due to efficiency wage payments by 
constraining the data with the theory. I wish to show that this spillover drives a 
positive relationship between the firm’s wage and performance in the product market 
and can be taken as direct evidence of efficiency wage payments. The approach is in 
the same spirit of the more direct tests of efficiency wage theories which test the 
prediction of a well know efficiency wage model. Most efficiency wage theories 
predict a positive relationship between wage premium incentives and performance. Up 
to now performance was measured in a very specific way which related to a particular 
model of efficiency wage theory2. In Figure V.2 I demonstrate the more general
2 Performance has been measured in terms of self-reported effort, worker and pay 
satisfaction, training costs, absences, turnover, job queues and productivity (Levine, 
1986 & 1992, Bielby and Bielby, 1988, Akerlof et al., 1988, Holzer et al. 1988, Allen, 
1984, Holzer, 1990, Wadhwani and Wall, 1991 and Machin and Manning, 1992).
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approach followed here. Wage premiums are paid to create incentives that are cost 
reducing or productivity enhancing. This can be done in many ways as put forward 
by the existing theories of efficiency wages. The feature that is common to all theories 
is that the wage premium incentives will lead to better product market performance 
or else the firm would not undertake the efficiency wage payment. Exactly how the 
wage premium incentive reduces efficiency costs I treat as a black box but the net 
outcome will always result in better product market performance. The problem of this 
approach is clear. If the door is open to alternative theories this approach still can only 
be seen as indirect evidence for efficiency wage payments. The finger print o f a thief 
has to match exactly your suspect if you wish to use it as evidence for a conviction.
WAGE PREMIUM INCENTIVES
LOWER COSTS OF SHIRKING
LOWER COSTS OF TRAINING
HIGHER PRODUCTIVITY
AVOIDS UNIONISATION
INDUCES BETTER PRODUCT MARKET PERFORMANCE
Figure V.2
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Section V.2 develops the generalised efficiency wage oligopoly model. In this 
section I examine the downstream vertical spillovers due to variations in efficiency 
wage payments and in the outside option available to workers. Section V.3 develops 
the generalised wage bargaining oligopoly model. In this section I examine the two 
way vertical spillovers due to the presence of wage bargaining. Section V.4 generalises 
what I wish to carry from the theory on vertical spillovers to the empirical work. In 
section V.5 I constrain the data with my theory to pinpoint the vertical spillover due 
to efficiency wage payments and I conclude with the empirical evidence.
V.2. The Generalised Efficiency Wage Oligopoly Model
In this section I will determine the relationship between the wage paid in a 
firm and market share performance within a generalised efficiency wage oligopoly 
model. I work with two vertical spillovers. One is induced by changes in the outside 
option of labour and the other by changes in efficiency wage payments. I model the 
product market within a general oligopoly model. The generalised oligopoly model 
originates from Sutton (1991). Under oligopoly, the equilibrium price a firm faces can 
be modelled to vary from the monopoly price to the competitive price level, as 
summarised by the function P(N) in Figure V.3. Where N stands for the number of 
firms and P is price. This function summarises the different equilibrium price 
outcomes I can model under oligopoly for a given historically determined level of 
concentration. By changing the type of strategic competition and the degree of product 
differentiation in the model, it is possible to generate any price which lies in between
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the two extremes3.1 will model price competition to be either very weak or extremely 
strong which will lead me to state the general oligopoly result. I work with 
homogeneous Cournot competition as a building block to model weak price 
competition and homogeneous Bertrand competition as a building block to model the 
limit of strong price competition. I obtain the general oligopoly result by assuming 
that if a relationship between two variables holds at the two extremes, it will also hold 
for any intensity of price competition that you wish to model in between these two 
extremes. Furthermore, if there are changes as I move from the one extreme to the 
other, I make the assumption that these changes will occur gradually and continuously 
as I strengthen the toughness o f price competition in the general oligopoly model.
3 You will always get a unique equilibrium price outcome if you impose product 
differentiation exogenously on the demand conditions you work with.
JOINT MAXIMISATION
COURNOT
BERTRAND
Note 4: Chapter V, p  143
In the production function (V.2) effort enters multiplicative with employment. This 
is a quite common modelling procedure in the efficiency wage literature (see Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman, 1991). However, it is possible to think of a more general form 
of the production function (V.2). An alternative would be specified as the following: 
(V.2’) X =  F(e,L), Fe >  0, F*. <  0 and FL >  0, F ^  <  0. |
In this case the separation principle (discussed on p 145) will no longer hold. In the | 
current framework this would imply that next to the downward spillover from the i
i
product market to the labour market there will also be an upstream spillover from the
i
product market to the labour market. For instance, if conditions in the product market jI
are such that there is an exogenous increase in the marginal product of labour, there
i
will be a positive upstream spillover (a positive wage effect). The way to control for j
i
this possibility in the empirical implementation is the same as in the case of
bargaining. By instrumenting the wage appropriately, it is possible to exclude the j
|
i
upstream spillover, i.e. the causality from the downstream product market to the 5 
upstream labour market. By instrumenting the wage, it is only the downstream 
spillover from the labour market to the product market which is picked up. In this 
case, there will still be a positive relationship between the wage paid and market i 
share performance, only under the hypothesis of efficiency wage payments, as long !' 
as the increase in effort is bigger, than the increase in the wage, thereby reducing 
efficiency wage costs. If however, the increase in effort is smaller than the increase 
in wages, there will also be a negative relationship between the wage paid and market 
share performance.
I model the labour market by embedding an efficiency wage model into the 
general oligopoly model. I can see this as a version of Yellen’s (1984) general 
efficiency wage model. As I outlined in the introduction, Yellen used this model to 
capture the essence of the efficiency wage argument The results can be generalised 
to be true of all efficiency wage models. Two firms produce a homogeneous product 
with one factor of production, labour. Firm 1 produces X and earns a payoff 7 t, while 
firm 2 produces Y and earns a payoff 7 t \  The inverse demand curve is written as the 
following:
(V.l) P = P(X + Y) : P’( - )< 0  P ” ( * ) = 0
Where P is the industry price. The firms have access to the following technologies. 
I write the technology to firm 1 as the following:
(V.2) X = F(e.L) : e(W - A) = 1 + 8 (W - A)“ , 8>0, 0<a<l
Output in firm 1 is a function of efficiency units of labour. L is employment and e are 
units of worker effort in firm 1 . 1  assume the production function exhibits diminishing 
marginal productivity in efficiency units of labour (F’(*) > 0 F” (*) < 0). A is the 
outside option for workers in firm 1  and is a proxy in partial equilibrium for all 
competitive explanations of wage growth. 8  is a parameter that proxies for exogenous 
conditions in firm 1 that facilitate efficiency wage payments. When 8  is equal to zero 
e is equal to one and firm 1  will go back to having a conventional production 
function. The effort function also exhibits diminishing marginal effort by workers in
143
Aep Voh f
response to wages above the opportunity cost of labour ( e’(*) > 0 e” ( ‘) < 0 ). I 
write the technology to firm 2  as the following:
(V.3) Y = FV -L")
I assume firm 2 works with a conventional production function and I set e* = 1. In 
other words, wages are considered to be set exogenously. This is done for expositional 
simplicity. Where L* is employment in firm 2. I also assume the production function 
exhibits diminishing marginal productivity of labour (F*’(*) > 0  F*” (') < 0 ). Finally, 
I write the payoff functions for firm 1 and 2 respectively as the following:
(V.4) n = P(X + Y).X - W.L
(V.5) 7t* = P(X + Y).Y - W*.L*
Where W is the per unit wage cost of workers in firm 1 and W* is the per unit cost 
of workers in firm 2 .
The Vertical Spillovers Under Weak Price Competition: Both firms move 
simultaneously and unilaterally. Firm 1 chooses L and W to maximise n holding L* 
constant Firm 2 chooses L* to maximise 7 t*, given W*, holding L constant. I first 
analyze employment and wage setting in firm 1  by writing down its first order 
conditions for profit maximisation.
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(V.6) nL = P(1+1/ti).F -W /e = 0
(V.7) TCw = P(1+1/ti) .F  - 1/e’ = 0
The employment and the wage level are set to equate the marginal revenue product 
of labour (T| = price elasticity of industry demand), which is conditional on L \ to the 
respective per unit cost. The second order conditions D0  = kll < 0 and Dt = -
^lw-^wl > 0  must be satisfied for a maximisation.
The efficiency wage that is set in firm 1 turns out to be independent of how 
I model the product market To see this I look at the first order conditions for firm 1 
and see what they imply for wage setting. Using (V.6 ) and (V.7), the wage in firm 1 
is set where the percentage change in effort due to a percentage change in the wage 
is unity. This is a well known Solow Condition.
(V.8 ) W/e = 1/e’ => e = (de/dW).(W/e) = 1
The optimal wage and hence effort level is set where e = 1. This is an important 
separation principle that held under perfect competition in Yellen (1984), but also 
holds under imperfect competition in the product market. Using (V.8 ) and (V.2) I can 
express the optimal efficiency wage and its partial derivatives with respect to 8  and 
A as the following:
(V.9) (W/e)°( A , 8 , a  ) : (W/e)°s < 0 , (W/e)°A > 0
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The optimal efficiency wage is increasing in A holding 8  and a  constant and 
decreasing in 5 holding A and a  constant Both an increase in the opportunity cost of 
labour and an improvement in the conditions that facilitate efficiency wages will cause 
a rise in the equilibrium wage level but the latter leads to a fall in efficiency wage 
costs and the former leads to an increase. Wage growth due to efficiency wage 
payments reduces efficiency costs and acts like a subsidy and will be shown to lead 
to better product market performance. Wage growth due to external conditions that 
drive up the opportunity cost of labour will increase efficiency costs and act like a tax 
on product market performance. Note that from (V.9) the optimal efficiency wage is 
set independent of product market factors and hence there are no upstream vertical 
spillovers from the product market to wage determination in the labour market. I can 
re-express (V.6 ) as the following, assuming that the efficiency wage level set by firm 
1, satisfies the Solow Condition. This will give the condition for optimal employment 
setting in firm 1 .
(V.10) 7tL = P(1+1/ti).F’- (W/e)° = 0
=> L = R(L*)
Employment in firm 1 is set at a level where the marginal revenue product of labour 
is equal to the per unit efficiency wage cost. This is conditional on L* and (W/e)°. It 
is also expressed as the optimal response function of firm 1. Optimal employment 
setting in firm 2  is based on the following first order condition.
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(V.l 1) 7C*l * = P(1+1Ai*).F*’ - W* = 0
=>V = R*(L)
Employment is set at a level where the marginal revenue product of labour, which is 
conditional on L, is equal to the per unit wage. The wage is exogenously given. The 
second order condition D* 0  = 7 t*L*L* < 0 must be satisfied. I can also express (V. 11) 
as the optimal response function of firm 2. The following implies uniqueness and 
stability of the Nash equilibrium in employment setting.
(V .l2) D = 7ULL.7C l*l* - K^.IZ l*l > 0
Where 7 tLL* = 7 C * l * l  < 0. The solution functions for the employment levels can be 
solved from the first order conditions (V.10) and (V.l 1). Taking a total differential of 
(V.10) and (V.l 1) while holding W* constant, then by applying Cramer’s rule I find 
the comparative static effects of changes in (W/e)° on the employment levels. I 
express them as the following:
(V .l3) L° = <M W \ (W /e)°) : dL/d(W/e)° = < 0
L*° = <f2( W \ (W /e)°) : dL7d(W/e)° = l / D > 0
A fall in the optimal efficiency wage (a rise 5) will increase the employment level in 
firm 1. To a lesser extent it will lead to a fall in employment in firm 2. A rise in the 
optimal efficiency wage (a rise in A) has the opposite effect on the employment
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levels. Using (V.2),(V.3) and (V.13) I solve for the solution function for market share 
(<D) and I can get the partial derivatives of the function with respect to (W/e)° as the 
following:
(V. 14) = $ (  \\T, (W/e)° ) : ^ w 0  < 0, < * > < * , >  0
Market share is negative and increasing in the optimal efficiency wage that is set. In 
particular, market share increases as 8  rises ((W/e)° decreases), at an increasing rate 
and decreases with increases in A ((W/e)° increases) at an increasing rate. I have two 
downstream vertical spillovers in this model. When conditions external to the firm 
change the opportunity cost of its workers, this drives a negative and increasing 
relationship between a firm’s wage and its market share performance. When conditions 
change that increase the responsiveness of workers to wage premium incentives this 
drives a positive and increasing relationship between a firm’s wage and its market 
share performance.
In Figures V.4a,b and V.5 I give a diagrammatic illustration of the effect of 
a change in the wage driven by efficiency wage payments and its result on market 
share performance. I start from a symmetric equilibrium where Xo=Y0. Figure V.4a 
illustrates the technologies for the two firms and the equilibrium output levels as a 
function of the efficiency units of labour hired. Figure V.4b shows us the conditions 
for optimal employment setting. Employment in both firms is set where the 
conditional marginal revenue product of labour is equal to a firm’s efficiency wage 
level. The efficiency wage in firm 2 is set exogenously by assuming that e*=l. The
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efficiency wage in firm 1 is set where the Solow Condition is satisfied. This is shown 
in Figure V.5 where e=l at W0  and e0. In the symmetric equilibrium (W/e)° = W* and 
employment is also set at the same level L0 =L*0.
I wish to demonstrate the effect a change in 8  has on the market share and 
the wage set by firm 1, holding A and W* constant. A rise in 8  from 8 0  to 8 , leads 
to a rise in W0  to W, and to a greater extent a rise in e0  to e, as shown in Figure 5 
where again e=l. This leads to a fall in the optimal efficiency wage level to (W/e),. 
This causes a rise in employment (output) in firm 1 and to a lesser extent a fall in 
employment (output) in firm 2 as summarised in Figure V.4. In firm 1 the workers get 
some share of the extra rent they create from being more productive. The firm uses 
the wage for a dual function. One is to hire labour, the other is to improve worker 
productivity. The efficiency wage is lower and the firm becomes more cost 
competitive in efficiency terms relative to its rival. The firm 1 gains market share 
even though it seems to have a higher unit wage cost One might expect market share 
to decline at a diminishing rate as 8  rises as I have assumed diminishing marginal 
productivity in both firm’s production functions. One should note from Figure 4b that 
the conditional demand for labour under Cournot competition shifts up in response to 
8  as employment in firm 2 falls. To a greater extent the conditional demand for labour 
for firm 2 shifts down under Cournot competition in response to a rise in 8 . This 
process leads to market share to rise at an increasing rate for firm 1. The comparative 
static effects of a change in A can be shown to have the opposite effects of a change 
in 8  starting from the symmetric equilibrium in Figures V.4 and V.5.
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The Vertical Spillovers Under Strong Price Competition: I now examine 
whether the downstream vertical spillovers drive the same relationship under the limit 
of strong price competition. The firms produce a homogenous product. Firm 1 is 
assumed to set the optimal efficiency wage level (W/e)°, where the Solow condition 
is satisfied (e = 1). Firm 2 takes its wage as given or alternatively where e* is fixed 
at one. They unilaterally and simultaneously set their respective price levels under the 
common strategy used. Firm 1 chooses P to maximise 7 t, given (W/e)°, holding P* 
constant. Firm 2 chooses P* to maximise K , given W*, holding P constant. In the case 
of symmetric efficiency wage costs, it is easy to show, with a proof by contradiction, 
that the price that induces a Nash equilibrium is a price Pe = (W/e)° = W*. This 
implies that both earn a zero economic profit and share the market. This is the 
symmetric equilibrium of the game.
I next look at the comparative static effect of a change in 8 , holding W* and 
A constant. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium, a rise in 8  by the smallest amount 
in firm 1  will ensure firm 1  enjoys all the market, while firm 2  will choose not to 
enter. In particular, a rise in 8  implies a lower optimal efficiency unit wage cost in 
firm 1, so that the equilibrium price P6  if both firms entered the market would be 
(W/e)° < P* < W \ leading firm 2 not to enter the market. Note however that W > W*. 
So although firm 1 is paying a higher wage, in efficiency cost terms firm 1 is the low 
cost producer. Market share under weak price competition is positive and increasing 
in 8 , holding W* and A constant. This relationship still holds under the limit of strong 
price competition. Market share increases with a rise in 8  but at the fastest rate 
possible. It causes market share to rise to one.
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I next look at the comparative static effect of a change in A, holding W* and 
8  constant. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium, a rise in A by the smallest amount 
in firm 1  will ensure firm 2  enjoys all the market, while firm 1  will choose not to 
enter. In particular, a rise in A implies a higher optimal efficiency unit wage cost in 
firm 1, so that if firm 1 was to enter the market the equilibrium price would be set W* 
< P* < (W/e)°, leading firm 1 not to enter the market. Market share under weak price 
competition is negative and increasing in A, holding W* and 8  constant. This 
relationship still holds under the limit of strong price competition. Market share 
decreases with a rise in A but at the fastest rate possible. It causes market share to fall 
to zero.
Vertical Spillovers Within The General Oligopoly Model: I looked at the
downstream vertical spillovers under the assumption of either extremely strong or 
weak price competition. I could model the different intensities of price competition 
in between these two extremes as summarised by the P(N) function in Figure V.3. As 
I outlined, if a result holds at the two extremes, I assume it will hold for any degree 
of intensity of price competition I could model in between these extremes. The 
predictions regarding the above vertical spillovers hold at the two extremes of the 
P(N) function and Proposition 1 summarizes the general result I take from the 
efficiency wage oligopoly model.
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Note 5: Chapter V, p  154 
Rewording of the Propositions
Proposition 1: p  154
ft) The downstream vertical spillover due to efficiency wage payments (changes in 8) 
leads to a positive relationship between a firm ’s market share performance and the 
wage paid in the firm, independently o f how the toughness o f  price competition in the j 
product market is modelled.
(ii) The downstream vertical spillover due to changes in the outside option (A) fo r  
workers leads to a negative relationship between a firm ’s market share performance j
I
and the wage paid in the firm, independently o f  how the toughness o f  price 
competition in the product market is modelled.
Proposition 5: p  165 ;
To find  a positive relationship between a firm ’s market share performance and the I
I
wage paid in the firm  in a market share equation, when controlling fo r  rent sharing 
due to wage bargaining, can be seen as evidence fo r  the presence o f efficiency wage
payments.
%
Proposition 1: (i) The downstream vertical spillover due to efficiency wage payments 
drives a positive and increasing relationship between a firm 's market share 
performance and its unit wage cost, independently o f how the toughness o f price 
competition in the product market is modelled.
(ii) The downstream vertical spillover due changes in the outside option 
fo r  workers drives a negative and increasing relationship between a firm ’s market 
share performance and its wage paid, independently o f how the toughness o f price 
competition in the product market is modelled.
There is another general result that emerges from looking at the two extremes of 
price competition in the general oligopoly model. I stated that I would assume that if 
any change occurred by moving from weak to the limit of strong price competition 
that this change is assumed to be gradual and continuous for the different degrees of 
the toughness of price competition I could model in between. The downstream 
spillovers in the limit of strong price competition causes market share to change at the 
fastest rate possible. The general result I take from this is summarised in Proposition 
2 .
Proposition 2: The downstream spillovers from wage determination into the product 
market due to efficiency wage payments and changes in the outside option that 
workers face, have stronger effects on market share determination, the more intensive 
price competition is modelled in the product market.
%r n£&k /fa  $
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V.3.The Generalised Wage Bargaining Oligopoly Model
In this section I look for predictions about the relationship between wage 
growth and market share performance in the presence of wage bargaining. I focus only 
on the two way vertical spillovers generated by the presence of wage bargaining. The 
analysis of the downstream spillover due to A is the same as outlined in Section I and 
will not be repeated. There is empirical evidence to suggest that price cost mark-ups 
in product markets are very much influenced by the presence of unions. This is a 
result of a downstream spillover in the presence of wage bargaining . 4  There is also 
empirical evidence on the influence a price cost mark-up has on the wage mark-up 
created by union activity. This is a result of an upstream spillover in the presence of 
wage bargaining. 5  As in Dowrick (1989) I want an analysis that allows us to look at 
the interaction of the labour and product market to determine the division of the 
absolute product market rent I set out to demonstrate the downstream and upstream 
spillovers that operate in the presence of wage bargaining. I model the product market 
as in Section V.2 and the labour market within a generalised bargaining framework. 
I model wage bargaining in the presence of a union. Obviously wage bargaining and 
the two way spillovers that result can take place in the absence of union
4  Freeman (1983), Voos and Mishel (1986) and Domowitz et al. (1988) all report 
that unionisation in US manufacturing reduced price over marginal cost mark-ups for 
all industry groups. Evidence from the UK by Karier (1985) and Dowrick (1990) also 
show that unions reduce price cost margins in oligopolistic industries.
5  Stewart (1990) in the U.K. finds that unions establish bigger mark-ups in firms 
with greater market power and market share. There is also evidence from Belgian 
Manufacturing Sectors (Bughin, 1991a,b) that unions are able to extract a significant 
amount of rent from the highest market share firms.
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representation. The set-up for firms in this section is exactly the same as in Section 
V.2 when I set e=l. I work with equations (V.l) to (V.5) when e=l. I introduce a 
union into firm 1 only. The union is risk neutral and maximises the following function 
in which the union only gets utility from a wage above the outside option for its 
workers.
(V .l5) U( W ) = (W -A )
The Vertical Spillovers Under Weak Price Competition: Firm 1 bargains with the 
union over the wage level, while holding L and L* constant. Bargaining is over the 
wage only and firm 1 maintains the Right To Manage. Given (V .l5), efficient 
contracts will lie on the labour demand curve6. The wage level of firm 2 is set 
exogenously for expositional simplicity. Simultaneously to the wage bargain, firm 1 
(firm 2) unilaterally chooses L (L*) to maximise k(k*), holding W (W*) and L* (L) 
constant.
To model wage setting in firm 1 I use the (generalised) asymmetric Nash 
bargaining solution for (two player) non-cooperative bargaining environments which 
approximates the unique perfect equilibrium outcome of a strategic time preference
6  There exists no consensus over the empirical "truth" of alternative union 
bargaining models. Evidence is found in both the US and UK for the assumption made 
in (V .l5), Farber (1986), Oswald (1987), Clark and Oswald (1989) and Layard et al. 
(1991). If employment does enter into the utility function of the union U(W,L), the 
employment that is set on the labour demand curve will not be an efficient outcome 
for the firm or the union. Both can do better by moving off the demand curve and 
setting wages and employment on the contract curve. This efficiency argument is 
made by MacDonald and Solow (1981).
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model7. The Nash bargaining solution is obtained by maximising the Nash product 
of the payoff functions for the two parties net of opportunity costs (threat points). I 
express the generalised Nash product as the following:
(V .l 6 ) Q, = (U - U-)p.(7t - if)1_p
Where IF is the opportunity cost of the union and iC is the opportunity cost of the 
domestic firm. The threat points in this model are (0 ,0 ) = (U\7t*)8. P is the relative 
bargaining power of the union, which goes up as p approaches one9.1 rewrite (V .l 6 ) 
using the above and (V .l5) as the following.
(V .l7) Q = ( W - A )p. 7t 1_p
To get the Nash bargaining solution I maximise (V.17) with respect to W holding L 
and L* constant, and I express the first order condition as the following:
7  As the delay between offers approaches zero, the limit of the subgame perfect 
equilibria of the bargaining game can be calculated using the asymmetric Nash 
Solution (Binmore et al., 1986 and Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).
8  The disagreement or threat points are (0,0). A treat point cannot correspond to 
an outside option (see Sutton, 1986). The inclusion of the outside option affects the 
equilibrium outcome of the strategic models only if one of the parties prefers the 
outside option point to one of the agreement points. Otherwise the threat to leave the 
bargain is not credible.
9  The asymmetry cannot be due to asymmetries in preferences or disagreement 
points in the strategic model that the Nash solution is approximating (as they 
disappear in the limiting equilibrium outcomes) but rather it is in the bargaining 
procedure or in parties beliefs about some determinants of the bargaining environment 
(see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).
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(V .l 8 ) Qw = dLogQ /dW = P/(W-A) + [(l-P)/jt]d7t/dW = 0
=> (W - A).L = P . k /(1-k) > 0
=> W = R*(L,L*)
The wage that is set in the efficient bargain ensures the workers get a share in the 
product market rent. The share depends on the relative bargaining strength of the two 
players. This condition is re-expressed as an optimal response function. The wage that 
is set is conditional on L and L*. The second order condition ^  < 0 must be 
satisfied.
Employment setting in firm 1 is modelled as in Section 2 under weak price 
competition. The first order condition is the same as equation (V.6 ) in Section I 
setting e=l. This leads us to write down the following optimal response function for 
employment setting in firm 1 :
(V .l9) L = R( W, L*)
I do not model wage setting in firm 2. The wage is set exogenously. I model 
employment setting as under weak price competition in Section 2. The first order 
condition is the same equation as (V .ll). The second order condition is expressed as 
D2  = 7t*L*L* < 0. This gives firm 2’s optimal response function in employment setting:
(V.20) L* = R( L)
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The following implies uniqueness and stability of the Nash equilibrium. The principle 
minors of the following determinant must alternate in sign, starting negative,
^ W W  ^ W L  ^ WL*
(V.21) D = ^LW  ^L L  ^LL*
* * *
^  L*W ^  L*L ^  L*L*
< 0.
The solution functions for the endogenous variables can be solved from the 
optimal response functions (V.18),(V.19) and (V.20). Taking a total differential of 
(V .l 8 ), (V.6 ) and (V .ll) I apply Cramer’s rule to find the comparative static effects 
of changes in P holding A and W* constant and changes in W \ holding A and P 
constant.
W° = T, ( A, P, W*) : W„ = - Qwp.D,/D > 0 ,
Ww. = - D /D  > 0 
(V.23) L° = T 2  ( A, p, W*) : Lp = - £2wpJt‘L.L/D  < 0 ,
L*. = - D3/D > 0 
L/° = T 3  ( A, p, W*) : L*p = > 0 ,
L*w* = D4 /D < 0
Where D, > 0 and is the same as expression (V .l2), and D2  = £2 ^ . 7 ^  - £2 ^ . 7 ^ ,  > 
0, Dj ^ww^ll* ■ ^  D4  = £2^yitLL “ £2^71^ ^  0. A rise m p in our model
is a rise in union bargaining power. In general it represents a downstream vertical
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spillover in the presence of wage bargaining. A rise in union bargaining power 
decreases employment and to a lesser extent causes a rise in employment in firm 2 . 
It also causes the wage in firm 1 to rise. In general a rise in W* represents an 
upstream vertical spillover in the presence of wage bargaining. It is an exogenous 
change that improves the market share of firm 1. A rise in W* increases employment 
and the wage level in firm 1  and to a greater extent decreases employment in firm 2 . 
A rise in W* improves the market share of firm 1 and some of the benefits of this gain 
will be shared in the form of higher wages.
Using (V.23) I can express the solution function for the market share of firm 
1 and I can get the partial derivatives of this function with respect to (3 and W \
(V.24) d> = <D( A, P, WO : <Dp < 0, < V  > 0
Market share is negative in P and positive in WT. A change in P represents a 
downstream vertical spillover due to wage bargaining. A rise in P drives wage growth 
that disimproves market share performance in firm 1. A change in W* is an upstream 
vertical spillover due to the presence of wage bargaining. This represents an 
exogenous change in the product market that is in favour of firm 1. It leads to a rise 
in wages induced by better market share performance. In contrast to rent sharing under 
efficiency wages, rent sharing as a result of wage bargaining creates two way vertical 
spillovers.
In Figure V . 6  I give a diagrammatic illustration of the effect a rise in p has on
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the endogenous variables, holding A and W* constant, in firm 1. This is a downstream 
spillover in the presence of wage bargaining. Figure V . 6  shows the efficient bargaining 
solution, where firm l ’s isoprofit and its union’s indifference curve are tangent on the 
conditional demand for labour curve. The optimal condition for employment setting 
is also satisfied. A rise in the bargaining power of the union leads to a fall in the 
employment and output of firm 1  and to a lesser extent a rise in the employment and 
output of firm 2. This shifts out the conditional demand for labour in firm 2 and to 
a lesser extent shifts in the conditional demand for labour in firm 1. The wage level 
rises in the revised bargain in firm 1. The union gets a bigger share of a smaller rent. 
The analysis of the upstream spillover due to wage bargaining is similar to the above. 
It will lead to a rise in the wage level set in the revised bargain in firm 1. In this case 
the union gets the same share of a bigger rent. It has the opposite effect on the 
conditional labour demand curves and market shares for the two firms.
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Figure V.6 : Effect of a rise in P in firm 1.
The Vertical Spillover Under Strong Price Competition: I examine the two way
spillovers under the limit of strong price competition. The firms produce a 
homogenous product. Firm 1 bargains with the union over the wage level while 
holding P and P* constant The wage level of firm 2 is set exogenously for 
expositional simplicity. Simultaneous to the wage bargain, firm 1 (firm 2) unilaterally 
chooses P (P*) to maximise 7 t(7 i*), holding W (W*) and P* (P) constant. In the case 
where the outside option of firm 1 equals unit wage cost of firm 2 (A = W*), it is easy 
to show, with a proof by contradiction, that the P* that induces a Nash equilibrium is 
P6  = A = W*. This implies that in the short run all players earn a zero economic profit 
and the firms share the market. This is the symmetric equilibrium of the game.
I next look at the comparative static effect of a change in p, holding W* and 
A constant This is downstream spillover in the presence of wage bargaining. Rents 
in this model are driven to zero by the degree of price competition. A change in P has 
no effect on market share or the wage level set. Downstream spillovers in the presence 
of wage bargaining are zero under the limit of strong price competition. I next look 
at the comparative static effect of a change in W* holding P and A constant. This is 
an upstream spillover in the presence of wage bargaining. The only Nash equilibrium 
for this game is for firm 2  not to enter the market to leave firm 1  as the monopoly 
firm and its workers to share the monopoly rent. If firm 2 was to enter the market, 
firm 1 could set a price A < W ^  P* < W* that would ensure losses for firm 2 and 
gains for firm 1 that would be shared with workers. Any exogenous change in the 
product market in favour of firm 1 will lead market share to rise to one. Upstream 
spillovers are strongest under the limit strong price competition.
Vertical Spillovers Within the General Oligopoly Model: In the above two sub 
sections there are general results emerging within the general oligopoly model. I 
looked at the two way vertical spillovers in the presence of wage bargaining under the 
assumption of either extremely strong or weak price competition. I formulate the 
general results as outlined in Section 2. The general result I take from the analysis on 
the downstream and upstream vertical spillovers due to wage bargaining are 
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: (i) The downstream vertical spillover, due to wage bargaining, drives 
a negative relationship between the wage and market share performance and becomes 
weaker by increasing the toughness o f price competition in the product market.
(ii) The upstream vertical spillover, due to wage bargaining, leads to 
a positive relationship between the wage and market share performance and becomes 
stronger by increasing the toughness o f price competition in the product market.
V.4. The Generalised Predictions
Before I proceed into the empirical analysis I will generalise some of the key 
results from the theoretical analysis. The key insight is to note that wage growth 
driven by efficiency wage payments is the only downstream vertical spillover that 
improves market share performance in the downstream market. The door must be shut 
tight to other theories of wage determination that predict this outcome. Otherwise I 
will again end up with indirect evidence of efficiency wage payments in firms. The
164
vertical spillovers that flow downstream due to efficiency wage payments and changes 
in the outside option get stronger, as I increase the toughness of price competition in 
the product market. The vertical spillover that flows downstream due to wage 
bargaining is an exception to this rule.
Wage bargaining is the only theory of wage determination that creates a 
vertical spillover that flows upstream into the labour market. This upstream spillover 
becomes stronger as I increase the toughness of price competition in the product 
market. This again drives a positive relationship between wage growth and market 
share performance but the causation is in the opposite direction and it gives rise to the 
endogeneity problem I control for in our empirical section10. Based on the theoretical 
analysis 1  put forward the following proposition which is a testable prediction and may 
lead to the first general direct evidence of efficiency wage payments in firms.
Proposition 5: To find a positive relationship between a firm ’s market share
performance and its unit wage cost in a market share equation, when controlling for  
rent sharing due to wage bargaining, can be seen as direct evidence for the presence 
o f efficiency wage payments.
1 0  Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1991) and Nickell et al (1992) working with firm 
level panel data, look for and find a positive relationship between wage growth and 
market share growth in a wage equation. Both papers suggest that this relationship 
could be consistent with rent sharing due efficiency wage payments and bargaining. 
From our theory, spillovers into wage determination from the upstream market can 
only be due to the presence of explicit or implicit wage bargaining. We take these 
papers as direct evidence for the presence of rent sharing due to wage bargaining.
V.5. The Empirical Evidence
By explicitly modelling the vertical spillovers that result from imperfections 
in both an upstream labour market and downstream product I have a clearcut empirical 
agenda that discriminates between alternative theories of wage determination. I set out 
to find evidence for the presence of the downstream vertical spillover due to efficiency 
wage payments and wage bargaining11. To this end, I use the theory to constrain the 
data. The basic data source is the same data as those used in the previous chapters, 
the EXSTAT/DATASTREAM company accounts.
The theory relates to industries where goods do not have a ’vertical attribute’ 
in the sense of models of vertical product differentiation. For this reason I excluded 
R&D intensive industries and focus on relatively homogenous goods industries. As in 
Sutton (1991), I expect market share to be mainly determined by a competitive 
escalation in R&D expenditures. To discriminate between the downstream vertical 
spillover due to efficiency wages and wage bargaining I split the data into a high 
unionised and a low unionised sample. The criterion I apply is the median union 
density in 1979. Industries with lower than median density are grouped into what I 
call the low unionised sample, whereas the rest are grouped into the high unionised
1 1  Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1991) and Nickell et al (1991), look for and find 
a positive relationship between unit wage cost and (instrumented) market share 
performance in a wage equation. Both papers suggest that this relationship is 
consistent with efficiency wage and bargaining theories of wage determination. From 
our theory, spillovers into wage determination from the upstream market can only be 
due to the presence of explicit or implicit wage bargaining. We take these papers as 
direct evidence of upstream vertical spillovers from market share determination in the 
presence of wage bargaining.
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subsample. This is an attempt to constrain the data so that empirically I can pick up 
the downstream vertical spillover due to union activity in the high unionised sample 
and efficiency wage payments in the low unionised sample. Yet, wage bargaining can 
still take place in the low unionised sample. The upstream spillover due to wage 
bargaining leaves us with an endogeneity problem in the market share equation which 
I control for in the estimation. The downstream spillover due to wage bargaining 
should be weakened by looking at low unionised firms in relatively homogenous 
goods industries.
This is how I constrain the data. I am left with two samples: the low unionised 
sample with 280 companies and the high unionised sample with 290 firms. The 
regressions I performed up to 1982, the reason being that after 1982 there is a 
significant fall in the number of observations due to a change in British legislation 
regarding the reporting of domestic employees. Table V.l gives an overview of the 
number of observations available in each year for each sample.
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Table V.l 
Number of Observations
year low unionised sample high unionised sample
1973 197 193
1974 2 0 1 195
1975 219 213
1976 274 279
1977 280 290
1978 280 290
1979 275 284
1980 269 280
1981 245 255
1982 137 135
The average wage of the low unionised firms over the period 1973-1982 was 
very much in line with the high unionised sample. However, wage dispersion is much 
greater in the low unionised sample and grows over the period analyzed. The variance 
of the wage in the low unionised sample is 0.057 in 1973 and 0.078 in 1982. This 
compares for the high unionised subsample with 0.025 in 1973 and 0.04 in 1982. Over 
the period 1973-1982, I hypothesize that in the low unionised sample, if a firm 
voluntarily paid out higher wages, relative to other firms in the industry, for efficiency 
wage reasons, this would induce a better market share performance. I also hypothesize 
that in the high unionised sample, if a firm involuntarily paid out higher wages 
relative to other firms in the industry, due to union activity, this would have a 
determental effect on its market share performance. These are testable propositions.
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Note 6: Chapter V, p  169
The relationship between equation (V.25), the empirical specification, and the theory 
can best be seen as follows. From (V.14) and (V.24) it can be stated that the market 
share in firm i depends on the wage paid in all other firms, firm specific factors, like 
W /e(a,5,A) the efficiency wage, bargaining parameters, A, /3 and unobservable fixed 
effects. These factors are in general unobservable, but they determine the wage paid 
in the firm. From the theory it was also clear that these effects may be 
stronger/weaker depending on the toughness of price competition in product markets. 
This in turn is affected by demand and supply shocks, product differentiation, R&D, 
sunk costs, etc.. An empirical specification needs to take into account these factors. 
Thus, market share in firm i at time t may be specified as follows:
MS it =  MSit[Wil(Xp,XL),Xp],
where XL stands for a vector including labour market characteristics like A, /?, 5, W* 
while Xp stands for a vector including product market characteristics. Thus in this 
specification I allow the wage paid in the firm Wft to depend on product market 
characteristics, like market share. This will be the case under bargaining, capturing 
an upstream spillover from the product market to the labour market. For this reason 
it is important to instrument the wage appropriately. A testable form of the above is 
given in equation (V.25), where industry sales and the wedge between retail and 
wholesale price are controls for exogenous demand and supply shocks to the product 
market. Table V.2 and V.3 provide the main results. However, it is interesting to 
consider a number of robustness checks.
The basic market share equation that I seek to estimate, is written down in the 
following log-linear form.
(V.25) MSitj = FIX/ + oqW,/ + o^SALEStj + 0 C3  WEDGE/ + TIMEt + u*/
Where superscript j refers to the industry in which firm i belongs. MSitJ is the market 
share of firm i in industry j in period t. FIX/ represents an unobservable firm fixed 
effect. Witj is the average wage in firm i belonging to industry j in period t. The vector 
of product market variables include, SALES/ which are industry j ’s total sales in 
period t. WEDGE/ is the wedge between the retail and wholesale price in industry j 
in period t. Industry sales and the industry wedge control for demand and supply 
shocks at the industry level. TIMEt is an aggregate time effect which controls for 
aggregate shocks. Uj/ is a white noise error term. ^
A common feature of micro data is the presence of unobservable fixed effects 
(FIX/), which are potentially correlated with the other explanatory variables. Ignoring 
them would yield inconsistent estimates. Using panel data allows us to difference these 
fixed effects out and to estimate the coefficient on the wage consistently. By first 
differencing the equation (V.25), the fixed effect FIX/ drops out. Obviously, this 
generates first order serial correlation in the error term. What matters is that the errors 
in the level equation are serially uncorrelated. This implies that second order serial 
correlation must be absent in the first difference form12.
1 2  We shall use a test for serial correlation proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
which is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed.
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What matters is that the wage effects are 
robust. In table V.2b I have included the average industry wage, which could be 
considered as a proxy for the outside option. Under the efficiency wage hypothesis 
an increase in the outside option should lead to a negative effect on market share, 
while under the bargaining hypothesis this should lead to a positive effect. The results 
confirm the predictions. In the low unionised sample the average industry wage enters 
significantly at the 1 0 % critical level and is negative, while in the high unionised 
sample the average industry wage has a positive effect and is significant at the 5 % j 
critical level. I further experimented with excluding industry sales. The results are 
shown in the second and fourth column of table V.2b. One could argue that industry j 
sales should not be included in a market share equation since this is part of the j 
definition of a market share. This might be true if the total population of firms is used ; 
in the analysis, however, the current study only covers a sample of large j 
manufacturing firms. The fact that industry sales enters significantly simply means
i
that as the market grows (demand shocks) certain firms, here the; larger ones, benefit: 
more than others in terms of their market share. In other words, it seems that it is the j
i
largest firms which gain most from changes in the market size, proxied by industry
i
sales. If industry sales is excluded, the basic wage effect still holds and has the same I 
order of magnitude. Also the effect of the industry wage is unaffected by excluding 
industry sales. The conclusion from this is that the results reported in tables V.2 and I
V.3 are quite robust. |
The method of estimation is the generalised method of moments technique 
(GMM), proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), where I shall use instrumental 
variables because the wage is going to be endogenous, resulting from the presence of 
wage bargaining. The advantage of GMM over other commonly used panel data 
estimation techniques, such as those proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981,1982), 
lies in the more efficient use of the available instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
show that in a first difference model, valid instruments for endogenous variables are 
the levels of the endogenous variables dated t-2 and before. In other words, as the 
panel progresses, more instruments can be used. I wish to pick up the market share 
performance induced by unit wage cost i.e. the downstream spillovers from wage 
determination. It is therefore highly important to find valid instruments, thus a Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions is computed.
Table V.2 reports the results for the low unionised sample. For the two samples 
I report regressions for the period 1976-198213. All specifications include time 
dummies to control for aggregate shocks. I started with estimating (V.25), a static 
equation. Specification (1) shows the results for the low unionised sample. I 
instrumented the wage using its lagged levels from t-3 backwards. I also included the 
lagged levels of the market share dated t-3 and before as additional instruments. 
However, the diagnostics indicate that the equation is misspecified, there is significant 
second order serial correlation and the Sargan test of instrument validity rejects. To 
rectify this problem, I include a lagged dependent variable. Economically, this lag
1 3  Since we used instruments dated t-3 and before, the regression starts in 1976 
instead of 1973.
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Table V.2b
Independent
variables
Low Union 
Sample
Low Union 
Sample
High Union 
Sample
High
Union
Sample
MS*., 0.77 (24.0) 0.77 (28)
w H 0.57 0.60 -0.53 -0.52
(2.9) (3.13) (-5.53) (-5.72)
SALESt 0.22 (4.87) 0.32 (2.28)
WEDGE, 0.05 0 . 0 1 0 0.18 0.33
(0.74) (0.13) (0.45) (0.80)
Average Industry -0.27 -0.30 0.42 0.47
Wage, (-1.62) (-1.82) (4.04) (4.66)
Number of Firms 280. 280 290 290
Time Periods 7 7 7 7
Sargan Test 79.5 85.7 74.3 74.5
(df=61) (df=61) (df=62) (df=62)
2nd-Order Serial 
Correlation Test
-0.849 -0.905 -0.392 -0.369
Notes: As in table V.3.
captures a partial adjustment mechanism. Of course, since the model is estimated in 
first differences, the lagged dependent variable becomes endogenous and thus must be 
instrumented. Specification (2) gives the results. I include the same instrument set as 
in specification ( 1 ) and they serve as instruments for the lagged dependent variable 
as well as for the wage. Column (2) shows a strong positive and significant effect of 
unit wage cost on market share performance. Both the second order serial correlation 
test and the Sargan test pass at conventional critical levels. This implies I am testing 
a clear causation between unit wage cost and market share performance. I take the 
positive wage effect as direct evidence that, over the period 1973-1982, in the low 
unionised sample, a subset of firms used high wages to induce a better market share 
performance.
In the high unionised sample, I set out to test whether a firm’s market share 
performance deteriorates as a result of having relatively high wage costs due to union 
activity. Table V.3 reports the results for the high unionised sample. Again I started 
with estimating a static equation. I instrumented the wage using all available moment 
restrictions on the lagged wage and lagged market share. In this case, the static 
equation fits very well. The diagnostics show that there is no second order serial 
correlation and the Sargan test indicates that the instrument set used is a valid one. 
The effect of unit wage cost on market share is negative and significant at 
conventional levels. Over the period 1973-1982, in the high unionised sample, the 
negative relationship between unit wage cost and market share performance implies 
that a subset of firms involuntary paid out high wages, due to union activity, and this 
induced a deterioration in the market share performance of these firms. I see this as
171
direct evidence for the presence union activity in this sample.
Table V.2
Firm Level Market Share Equations, 1976-1982 
Low Unionised Sample 
Dependent variable: market share
independent variables (1) (2 )
MSiM - 0.77 (25.3)
w it 0.84 (8.96) 0.54 (3.34)
SALESt 0.08 (2.23) 0.22 (4.94)
WEDGEt 0.32 (3.45) 0.06 (0 .8 8 )
Number of Firms 280 280
Time periods 7 7
Sargan test 91.51 (df=62) 79.72 (df=61)
2 nd-order serial 
correlation test N(0,1)
2.24 (280) -0.970 (280)
Notes
(i) heteroscedastic robust t ratios in parentheses.
(ii) the equation is estimated using instrumental variables in first differences. All 
variables are in natural logarithm. In other words, all variables represent growth rates. 
The instruments used are valid moment restrictions on market share and on wages 
from t-3 backwards. Time dummies are included.
(iii) The test of 2nd-order serial correlation refers to the differenced equation. This 
checks that there is no correlation between the differenced errors and their second lag. 
This is a necessary condition for the undifferenced errors to be white noise.
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Table V.3
Firm Level Market Share Equation, 1976-1982 
High unionised sample
Dependent variable: market share
Independent Variables static equation
w it -0.61 (-6.34)
SALES, -0.077 (-1.27)
WEDGE, -0.40 (-3.02)
Number of Firms 290
Time periods 7
Sargan test 71.82 (df=62)
2nd-order serial correlation test N(0,1) -0.240 (290)
Notes: As in table 1, except that the instruments used are all available moment 
restrictions on market share from t- 2  backwards and on wages from t-3 backwards.
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V.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter I considered alternative forms of wage determination and 
integrated it in the theory of oligopoly. The focus here was on the new and rich 
predictions one obtains if such an approach is followed. The main aim of this chapter 
was to develop in detail a theory which tracked the vertical spillovers from wage 
determination to market share determination in a downstream product market. The 
theory predicted that efficiency wage payments can only lead to a downstream 
spillover and this is the only downstream spillover from wage determination that 
drives a positive relationship between unit wage cost and performance in the product 
market. The presence of wage bargaining was shown to drive a two-way vertical 
spillover. The downstream spillover due to the presence of wage bargaining leads to 
a negative relationship between unit wage cost and market share performance. 
However, wage bargaining can also drive a positive relationship, however it is a 
spillover that flows in the opposite direction to that created by efficiency wages.
I set out to discriminate between the two downstream vertical spillovers. To 
this end, I use theory to constrain the data. I split the data into a high unionised and 
a low unionised sample of large firms in relatively homogenous good industries. Over 
the period 1973-1982, exploiting the pooled cross sectional and time series dimension 
of the data set, I find evidence, in the low unionised sample, that firms voluntarily 
paid high wages to induce better market share performance. I take this as direct 
evidence that the high wage firms in this sample paid efficiency wages. I also find 
evidence, in the high unionised sample, that firms involuntarily paid high wages, as
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a result of union activity, which had a determental effect on their market share 
performance.
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APPENDIX
The data were obtained by combining the EXSTAT data tape with the 
DATASTREAM on-line service.
Data(l):Firm Specific Variables: Market Share: Firm’s sales divided by industry sales 
(EXSTAT measure, for details see Vainiomaki and Wadhwani, 1991).
Wages: Domestic wage (EXSTAT itemcl6 ) divided by domestic employees (EXSTAT 
item c l5) (for details see Vainiomaki and Wadhwani, 1991).
Data(2):Industry Specific Variables: Industry Sales: Census of Production. This data 
was provided by S. Machin and J. Van Reenen.
Wholesale Prices: Producer indices matched with Exstat industry groups. See Ph.D. 
thesis London School of Economics, Martin Wall. Sources: Trade and Industry until 
1979, thereafter British Business. Wedge=log(Retail Price) - log(Wholesale Price). 
Union Density: Industry specific union density. This data was provided by S. Machin 
and J. Van Reenen.
List(l):Highlv Unionised Industries Sample: Industrial Plant, Steel and Chemical 
Plant, Wires and Rope, Misc. Mechanical Engineering, Machine Tools, Instruments, 
Metallurgy, Special Steels, Misc. Metal Forming, Household Appliances, Cutlery, 
Newspaper and Periodical, Publishing and Printing and Packaging and Paper.
List(2): List of Industries In The Lowly Unionised Subsample: Brick and Roof Tiles,
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Building Materials, Cement and Concrete, Floor Covering, Furniture and Bedding, 
Breweries, Wines and Spirits, General Food Manufacturing, Milling and Flour, 
Clothing, Cotton and Synthetic, Wool, Misc. Textiles, and Footwear.
177
CHAPTER VI: THE EFFECT OF UNIONS ON
EMPLOYMENT BEHAVIOUR IN THE U.K.
VI. 1. Introduction
Over the past decade or so there have been considerable changes in trade union 
organisation and trade union recognition in the U.K.. The purpose of this chapter is 
to investigate empirically how unions affect employment behaviour and in particular 
how union de-recognition affected employment in U.K. firms.
Trade union activity clearly plays a major role in economic decisions firms 
make. Labour Economics has been marked by an increasing literature on the effect 
trade unions have on various aspects of company performance, such as firm 
profitability and productivity (e.g. Freeman and Medoff 1984, Clark 1984, Voos and 
Mishel 1986, Nickel et al. 1992, Gregg et al. 1993). There are however only a few 
papers investigating the effect of unions on firm-level employment behaviour1. The 
literature mainly uses cross-sectional data and focuses predominantly on the 
manufacturing sector. In contrast, this chapter uses a unique panel data set of large 
U.K. manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms to analyse the effect trade unions
’In the U.K. there are only two, Blanchflower, Mill ward and Oswald (1991) and 
Machin and Wadhwani (1991). In the U.S., Leonard (1992) and recently Bronars and 
Deere (1993) and in Canada a recent paper by Long (1993) investigates the issue.
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have on both employment growth and employment levels at the firm. The data are 
again, as in previous chapters, drawn from the EXSTAT datatape. However, this time 
they refer to a different time period and are complemented with a postal survey. The 
use of panel data in investigating the effect trade unions have is important since a 
common criticism to cross-sectional analysis of economic problems is the potential 
bias emerging in cross-section regressions due to unobservable fixed effects which are 
correlated with one of the regressors. Since I use panel data I am able to control for 
these unobservable fixed effects. Moreover, it is exactly in the late 80’s that there has 
occurred substantial changes in union organisation and recognition.
I will report evidence that unionised firms have lower growth rates than non­
unionised firms over the sample period. However, this union effect is not robust with 
respect to the time period, a finding already suggested by Machin and Wadhwani 
(1991). The effect unions have are strongest when firms face only a few rivals, 
suggesting that spillovers from the product market to the labour market and vice versa 
might be important, as in last chapter. Finally, I find that unionised firms have lower 
employment growth only within the manufacturing sector. Within the non- 
manufacturing sector, I find no evidence that unionised firms have significantly 
different growth rates than non-unionised firms. I also find that firms which de­
recognised unions have on average lower growth rates than firms which did not de­
recognise unions. This suggests that unions have a positive effect on employment 
levels.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In the first section I give a theoretical
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and empirical background of the problem under investigation. The third section 
describes the dataset used. I do this because I have not discussed the special features 
of this dataset in chapter n. In the fourth section I discuss the results.
VI. 2. Theoretical and Empirical Background
The two main classes of models of union behaviour are the right to manage 
model vs. the efficient contract model. The former assumes that management retains 
the right to set employment levels, given the wage which is either the result of 
bargaining or is set unilaterally by the ’monopoly’ union. In this kind of models 
employment-wage combinations will be located on the labour demand curve. Given 
that the wage will be higher than in a competitive labour market, employment will be 
reduced. Since the union-wage effect makes employees more costly for union firms 
than for nonunion firms, union firms will substitute labour for capital and hence have 
less employment growth. In the latter class of models, the alternative wage or outside 
option of union members is taken into account while bargaining and the outcome will 
lie, in general, off the labour demand curve. In this case, bargaining is over both 
employment and wages and employment-wage combinations will lie on a contract 
curve, reflecting Pareto efficient outcomes (McDonald and Solow, 1981). In the 
efficient contract models, unions increase employment, provided unions put more 
weighing on employment than on wages. Wage-Employment combinations will then 
lie on an upward sloping contract curve. However, Layard and Nickell (1990) show 
that employment will be the same as in the case where there is bargaining over wages
Note 7: Chapter VI, p i 81
There are also other arguments why unions might affect employment growth. Since 
the union pushes up wages employees are more costly for union firms than for 
nonunion firms and hence union employers will substitute capital for labour thereby 
reducing employment growth in union firms. Another argument is related to the union 
protection of the labour force through job security provisions, severance payment 
agreements, etc.. In this case, job creation will be lower because of the uncertainty j  
of the productivity of the new match. Moreover, the higher union wage makes it 
costly to hire new workers. These factors are absent in nonunion firms. A third [ 
argument for different employment growth in union than in nonunion firms has to do 
with the union capturing of economic rent of intangible capital. In this case, firms
i
I
would have an incentive to switch to more labour intensive production, which would j  
imply higher employment growth in union than in nonunion firms. However, the
j
argument could easily be reversed. Because union firms invest less in new capital ! 
output growth will be hindered and hence in the long run also employment growth, j
only, given a Cobb-Douglas production technology. Moreover, they show that 
compared to the competitive labour market, employment falls. Similarly, if union’s 
indifference curves are flat in wage-employment space, efficient contracts will lie on 
the labour demand curve as shown by Oswald (1987). Thus there is no clear-cut 
prediction as to unions increase or decrease employment levels and growth.
Empirically, there is not much of a consensus either. Blanchflower, Mill ward 
and Oswald (1991), using a large cross-section of U.K. establishments, find that 
employment grows around three percentage points slower in the typical British union 
establishment. Machin and Wadhwani (1991) dispute this, using the same dataset, and 
argue that unionism exerts a negative effect on employment growth only in plants 
which reformed working practices. In other words, those plants which underwent 
organisational change had lower employment growth, but it were also the ones which 
were unionised. A recent paper by Long (1993) finds for Canada, that unionised firms 
grew 3.7% slower than non-unionised firms within the manufacturing sector, while 
within the non-manufacturing sector this was 3.9%. Bronars and Deere (1993) analyse 
the effect of union elections on employment growth in the U.S.. They find that in the 
manufacturing sector firms with a "union win" have lower employment growth than 
firms without a "union win", looking at the raw correlations only. For the non- 
manufacturing sector there is no difference in average growth rates. When, however, 
a proper vector autoregressive analysis is performed this effect turns out to be 
statistically insignificant in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector.
In order to analyse the issue empirically I need to have a testable model of
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Note 8: Chapter VI, p  182
The empirical specification (VI. 1) and (VI.2) needs clarification. In this note, I show 
an alternative approach. The employment equation which will be estimated should 
include some measure of unionisation in order to test the effect unions have on 
employment. The simplest way to proceed is by adding a union term or
lit =  fiXi +  aoqit +  a,w it +  otjunion* +  r/h, ( 1 )
where unionit stands for union density of firm i at time t, q stands for output, w is the 
wage, fix is an unobservable fixed effect, 1  stands for employment and rj is a white 
noise error term. A more sophisticated employment equation would take into account 
that unions could have long lasting effects on employment. One way to model this is 
by allowing a distributed lag on the union term or
lit =  fiXj +  ofoqit +  ajWfc +  E A un ion^  +  k = 0 ,..,oo. (2 )
The impact or short term effect in this case is /30, while the long run effect is EA> 
k = 0 ,..oo.
The main problem with the current study is that union density is not available at the 
firm level for each individual time observation. The only two proxies are two 
dummies. One dummy (union recognition) refers to the fact whether firms recognise 
unions or not over the entire sample period. The other dummy variable (union 
derecognition) takes the value 1  if the firm de-recognised unions over the last four 
years. To control for the unobservable fixed effect in (1) or (2), the model needs to
employment behaviour. The literature on unions and productivity recognises that 
unions may have effects on both the level and the growth of productivity. These 
effects need not be the same (see Addison and Hirsch, 1989). I will specify an 
employment equation which also allows these two effects to come through or
(VI. 1) lit = fixj + c^q* + a 1 wit + o^UNIONjt + OgUNIONjXTIME + rjit, &
where ljt denotes the log of employment in firm i at time t, fix4 represents unobserved 
firm-specific fixed effects (or firm heterogeneity), wit denotes the log of the real wage 
paid in firm i at time t, UNIONjt is a dummy equal to 1 if there is at least one union 
recognised in the firm at time t, UNIONj takes the value 1 if the firm is unionised, 
TIME is a time trend and T|it is a white noise error term. By modelling the union 
effect in this way, I am able to investigate the difference between unionised firms 
versus non-unionised firms, which can be thought of as predetermined or a long term 
issue. This is captured by the time invariant union dummy, UNIONj. By also 
modelling a time varying union term, UNIONit, I am able to investigate the short term 
"impact" effects of changes in union recognition. This term reflects the effect of 
unionised firms which experience some change in unionisation, in our data which 
experience some union de-recognition. An economic intuition for modelling the union 
effects in this way is that if unions affect the level of employment in the firm, the firm 
moves away from its optimal employment level in the absence of unions. If a firm is 
no longer at its most efficient employment level, this could affect future growth. Note 
also that by modelling the union effect as in (VI. 1), I investigate the effect of unions 
over and above the effect of the union-wage effect. Thus I allow the union to have a
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be estimated in first difference form. First differencing (1) yields
Alrt =  aoAqjt +  oqAw* +  a 2 Aunionk +  A7)a, (1*)
Thus in the empirical implementation Aunion,t is proxied by the dummy ’union 
derecognition’. One way to proceed is to estimate (1’). However, since all firms 
which de-recognised unions still recognised some unions after the derecognition the |
I
j
estimated coefficient could reflect the fact that unionised firms have lower j 
employment growth than non-unionised firms as is suggested in the literature cited 
in the introduction of the chapter. To control for this it is advisable to include the [
other union dummy, union recognition, as well. This also fits in nicely with the (
j
existing literature on union-nonunion employment growth differentials. This approach 
is parallel to Machin et al. (1993) investigating the effect unions have on productivity 
in the U.K.. They specify a productivity equation with a union variable which varies 
over time and one which does not, but is interacted with a time trend.
separate effect on firm performance which does not come through the wage.
The fixed effect in (VI. 1) is unobservable and potentially correlated with the 
other explanatory variables. I therefore estimate (VI. 1) in first difference form, which 
cancels the fixed effect or
(VI. 1’) Aljt = (XoAqjt + o^Awjt + o^AUNIONfc + o^UNIONj + Arjit
In (VI. 1 ’), otj gives an indication of how unions affect the level of employment, while 
0 C3  reflects the effect of unions on employment growth. Alternatively, the former 
reflects the impact or short term effects, while the latter reflects the long term effects.
VI.3. Data Description
The basic data source is the EXSTAT company accounts dataset of which I 
discussed the nature in detail in chapter II. The new feature, however, is that the 
dataset is complemented with a postal survey on union presence and changes in 
unionism which was carried out in the summer of 1990 by Paul Gregg(for more 
details of this survey see Gregg and Yates (1991), Gregg and Machin (1992), Gregg 
et. al. (1993)). In terms of employment, sales and industry affiliation the respondents 
formed a representative sub-sample of the EXSTAT population. The survey drew 
usable responses from 558 companies across all industrial sectors. A number of firms 
did not have company accounts reported in EXSTAT for each year or there were 
missing observations on variables of interest in particular years. I therefore required
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that companies had at least 4 continuous data observations between the years 1982 and 
1989. Hence I are left with an unbalanced panel of 361 companies. I did not include 
companies, prior to 1982, since in 1982 there was a definitial change in the reporting 
of employees (due to the Companies Act in 1982). In order to have a consistent 
employment series I therefore started in 1982. Table VI. 1 gives an overview of the 
structure of the panel. It gives the number of companies which have respectively 
4,5,6 ,7 and 8  continuous time observations available.
Table VI. 1: Structure of the EXSTAT Panel
number of continuous years number of firms
4 32
5 28
6 53
7 146
8 1 0 2
The two main variables of interest are union recognition and changes in union 
status. The survey asked managers whether their company recognises trade unions for 
the purposes of bargaining over wages and conditions in any of the establishments2. 
Over the sample period around 42% of firms did not recognise unions while around
2The questions asked were formulated as follows: ’Does your company recognize 
trade unions for the purposes of bargaining over wages and conditions in any of your 
establishments?’ Over the years 1980-4(1985-9), was there a net change in the number 
of your company’s establishments that recognized trade unions for the purposes of 
bargaining over wages and conditions other than as a result of the opening and closure 
of establishments?(more details can be found in Gregg and Yates (1991) and Gregg 
and Machin (1991).
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58% did recognise trade unions in one or more of their establishments. The change 
in unionism is captured by a trade union de-recognition variable. This is a dummy 
equal to 1  if there are less unions recognised or if there was a net decrease in closed 
shop arrangements over the period 1980-84 and 1985-89. However, the estimation 
technique used, implies that the sample over which estimation takes place is from 
1985 onwards (see below), hence the union de-recognition variable refers to the period 
1985-9. Moreover, it was only in the period 1985-89 that there were ’substantial’ 
changes in unionism. Ideally, one would like to have information on year to year 
changes in unionism. So the ’union change’ variable is merely a rough proxy for 
changed unionism. Table VI.2 gives an overview by year of firms which de-recognised 
unions. Around 15% of firms which recognised unions did also de-recognise unions 
in one or more of their establishments during the sample period.
Table VI.2: Number of unionised firms which de-recognised unions
year union de-reconition no union de-recognition
1984 7 178
1985 26 173
1986 26 181
1987 26 181
1988 24 174
1989 17 116
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V IA  Results
Table VI.3 gives the average and median one year employment growth rates 
for the period 1982-89. It shows that unionised firms grew less than non-unionised 
firms in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector. Of course, these are 
just raw correlations and could reflect for instance the fact that large firms tend to 
grow slower and that exactly large firms are the ones which are unionised.
Table VI.3: Summary statistics on 1-year growth rates
union summary statistic manufacturing non-manufacturing
yes median 0 . 0 1 0 0.019
yes mean 0 . 0 1 2 0.027
yes standard deviation 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 1
no median 0.063 0.073
no mean 0.097 0.099
no standard deviation 0.23 0.27
Table VI.4 gives the average and median growth rates (1985-89) for the sub­
sample of firms which de-recognised unions versus did not de-recognise and for those 
firms de-recognising unions versus not de-recognising conditional on positive growth. 
The latter is done to account for the potential endogeneity of union de-recognition and 
(negative) firm growth. I computed the 4-year growth rate in 1989, thus the growth 
rate reflects the difference in employment between 1985 and 1989. The reason for this 
is that the union de-recognition variable refers to this time period. Table VI.4 shows 
that firms which de-recognised unions have on average lower growth rates, 0.035, than
those which did not de-recognise, 0.18. This remains the case when I compare median 
growth rates, 0.084 vs. 0.099. When I compare growth rates, conditional on positive 
growth, firms which de-recognised unions have still lower growth rates on average 
than those which did not de-recognise (0.19 vs. 0.37). Figure VI.la plots the growth 
rate distribution for firms which de-recognised unions, while figure VI.lb shows the 
growth rate distribution for firms which did not de-recognise. Interestingly, figure
VI.la shows that the majority of firms which de-recognised unions had positive 
growth rates. Thus de-recognition did not occur at shrinking firms only, which then 
would explain the de-recognition. All this suggests that because union de-recognition 
is correlated with lower growth rates unions have a positive effect on employment 
levels. Of course I need to test this hypothesis more rigorously in the regression 
analysis.
Table VI.4: employment growth rates, 1985-89
type of action mean median standard
deviation
derecognition 0.035 0.084 0.30
no derecognition 0.18 0.099 0.41
derecognition and 
positive growth
0.19 0.23 0 . 1 1
no derecognition 
and positive 
growth
0.37 0.28 0.34
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Growth rate distribution for firms which did de-recognise unions
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Figure VI.lb
Growth rate distribution for firms which did not de-recognise unions
I next turn to estimating the employment equation. Estimating (VI. 1’) by OLS 
would lead to inconsistent estimators because w and q are endogenous. Thus I need 
to instrument w and q. In panel data, valid instruments are the levels of the 
endogenous variables dated t-2 and before, as shown by Aralleno and Bond (1991). 
Thus the estimation will take place from 1984 instead of from 1982.1 shall use, like 
in the last chapter, the General Methods of Moments estimator and use the Dynamic 
Panel Data package developed by Aralleno and Bond (1988). I briefly repeat the main 
advantages of it here. The advantage of using the GMM estimator over other 
commonly used estimation techniques in panel data exists in its optimal use of 
instruments. As the panel progresses more instruments become available. For instance, 
in 1984 instruments dated 1982 can be used, in 1985, instruments dated 1982 and 
1983 can be used, etc.. In order to test the validity of the instruments, a Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions is produced and is asymptotically %2 distributed. First 
differencing equation (VI. 1) generates first order serial correlation, but second order 
serial correlation should be absent if the error term in the levels is white noise. 
Therefore, a test of second-order serial correlation is computed and is asymptotically 
N(0,1).
When estimating (VI. 1*) I shall also control for possible industry effects on 
employment growth, via the industry wage3. I will further include time dummies to 
control for common aggregate shocks.
3The industry wage can also be thought of an outside option variable. A significant 
effect would support the efficient contract model.
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Table V1.5 reports the results of estimating equation (VI. 1 ’) using the EXSTAT 
panel of company accounts. The wage, output and industry wage refer to real 
variables. The first column simply regresses employment growth on the union 
variables, without adding any extra controls, except time dummies. Unionised firms 
have a 6.4% lower growth rate than non-unionised firms. The union de-recognition 
variable has a negative effect of -4.4% and is significant at the 10% critical level. This 
means that unions have positive effects on employment levels, A possible 
interpretation for this is that the impact effect of unions on employment is positive. 
In other words, as a firm becomes unionised (de-unionised), increased (reduced) 
employment will result. But because the firm moves away from its optimal level of 
employment (or scale), it will subsequently grow less.
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Note 9: Chapter VI, p  192
In this note I report some further robustness checks of the results in table VI.5. In 
particular, since the industry wage never enters significantly I drop it and instead 
include industry dummies. Table VI.5b shows the results. First, the wage elasticity 
is slightly higher, between -0.75 and -0.82. Secondly, from column 1, the union 
effects are weaker, but still significant and have still the same sign. In column 2, 
however, the union effects are no longer significant at conventional critical levels, 
although the sign of the union effects are still the same as in the case where there are 
no industry controls. The results of column 3 are consistent with those in table VI.5. 
It is in booms that unions have larger effects on employment growth. Finally, in 
column 4 the results are comparable to those from table VI.5. Again, the union effect 
is stronger the weaker the competition is firms face. The union derecognition effect 
is -0.039 if firms face a few rivals. This indicates that unions affect employment 
levels positively in the sub-sample of firms facing weak competition. In sum, the 
results from table VI.5 are robust to the inclusion of industry dummies.
Table VI.5: Unions and Employment Growth 
Dependent Variable: Aemployment
independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Awage - -0.57*
(0.29)
-0.56’
(0.29)
-0.59*
(0.29)
Aoutput - 0.77*
(0.12)
0.77*
(0.12)
0.78*
(0.12)
Aindustry wage - 0.31
(0.47)
0.27
(0.48)
0.32
(0.48)
union derecognition -0.044**
(0.026)
-0.006
(0.014)
- -
union recognition -0.064*
(0.014)
-0.019*
(0.011)
- -
union derecognition, - - -0.01
(0.02)
-
union recognition, - - -0.015
(0.015)
-
union derecognition, - - -0.005
(0.03)
-
union recognition, - - -0.034*
(0.012)
-
union recognitionxcomp - - - -0.041**
(0.028)
union recognitionx(l-comp) - - - -0.019**
(0.011)
union derecognitionxcomp - - - -0.021*’
(0.014)
union derecognitionx(l-comp) - - - -0.005
(0.019)
comp - - - 0.018
(0.028)
time dummies yes yes yes yes
Sargan test - 44.43
(df=33)
41.69
(df=33)
44.11
(df=33)
Second order serial correlation test 
N(0,1)
0.978 -0.257 -0.230 -0.185
Number of firms 361 361 361 361
Notes:(i)Instruments used are all available moment restrictions on wage from t-2 back and on output 
from t-3 back, (ii) one step robust standard errors in parentheses, except with Sargan test and Wald test, 
they refer to degrees o f freedom .(iii) (*)/(**) denotes significant at 5%/10% Employm ent, wage, output 
and industry wage are in logarithms.
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Table VI.5b
independent
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Awage — -0.77*
(0.3)
-0.75*
(0.3)
-0.82*
(0.3)
Aoutput
-
0.80*
(0.11)
0.80*
(0.11)
0.82*
0 .11)
union
derecognition
-0.037**
(0.02)
-0.015 (0.01) - -
union recognition -0.039*
(0.01)
-0.013 (0.01)
- -
union
derecognition^^
— - -0.015
(0.02)
-
union
derecognition88_89
- - -0.015
(0.03)
-
union
reco g n itio n ^
— -
-0.004*
(0.015)
-
union
recognition88.89
- - -0.025*
(0.013)
—
recognition x  
comp
- - - -0.039*
(0.013)
recognition x 
(1-comp)
— - - -0.008
(0.006)
derecognition x 
comp
- - - -0.039*
(0.02)
derecognition x 
(1-comp)
- - - -0.009
(0.009)
Sargan test
—
42.5
(df=33)
40.0
(df=33)
42.1
(df=33)
2nd Order Serial 
Correlation
-0.318 -0.843 -0.817 -0.849
Notes: as in table VI .5
All specifications include industry and year dummies
The de-recognition effect becomes insignificant when the full model is 
estimated in column 2, although the point estimate is still negative. Of course, the 
union de-recognition variable does not capture perfectly the year to year changes in 
unionism, it is merely a dummy indicating whether there was de-recognition or 
abolishment of closed shop arrangements in the period 1984-89. I therefore 
experimented with regressing the difference between employment in 1989 and 1985 
on the union de-recognition variable, referring to union de-recognition between 1985 
and 1989. This would capture in a more exact way the union de-recognition effect. I 
only did a similar regression as in column 1, using OLS with heteroscedastic 
consistent standard errors. The union de-recognition effect is estimated to be -14% and 
significant at the 10% critical level, while the union recognition effect is estimated to 
be equal to -17% and is also significant at the 5% critical level4. When the sample 
is restricted to firms which experienced only positive growth the union de-recognition 
effect is -17% and is significant at the 5% critical level, the union recognition effect 
is -19%. Thus, although I cannot find statistically significant evidence of a union de­
recognition effect in column 2 of table VI.5, I clearly cannot reject the hypothesis of 
no union de-recognition effect on employment growth. If any, there is likely going to 
be a negative union de-recognition effect, indicating a positive impact effect of unions 
on employment levels.
4It should be noted that the union recognition effect should be divided by 4 to 
obtain the one-year effect of union recognition.
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Column 2 of table V1.5 also shows that unionised firms grow by 2.3% less 
than non-unionised firms. Related studies have found similar results. For the U.S., 
Leonard (1991) concludes that employment in unionised plants grows 2 to 4% lower 
than in non-unionised plants. For the U.K., Blanchflower et.al.(1991) have estimated 
a union growth differential of 2.5 to 4%.
I shall investigate the robustness of the estimated union effects by testing 
several hypothesis. First, the union effect could be correlated with the business cycle 
as suggested by Second, the effect of unions might be different when firms face a lot 
of competitors viz. a few competitors. Third, the union effect might be different in the 
manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector. I shall test these hypothesis 
in turn.
a. business cycle effect
Column 3 investigates whether unions have different effects in ’slump’ years 
than in ’boom’ years. Of course, the time dimension I work with is relatively small, 
so that the conclusions I draw from this are rather suggestive. Both the union 
recognition variable and the union de-recognition variable are interacted with a 
dummy for the period is between 1984-87, the ’slump’ years and a dummy for the 
period between 1988-89, the ’boom’ years. These time periods are generally viewed 
as slump viz. boom years in the U.K. (see Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1990, p9). 
It is only in the ’boom’ years that unionised firms have significant lower growth rates 
than non-unionised firms. In the ’slump’ years the union effect is not statistically
significant and the point estimate is also lower. Of course, this could also reflect 
changes in managerial behaviour during these years, rather than a reflection of the 
business cycle, given that I only observe one ’slump’ and one ’boom’. The key finding 
of this is that the union effect on employment is not the same over time. This finding 
is consistent with Machin and Wadhwani (1991) and Gregg, Machin and Metcalf 
(1993). The latter paper investigates the effect of unions on productivity growth. Using 
the same dataset, they find a positive union effect on productivity growth for the boom 
years. They argue "if unionised companies were able to respond more quickly to any 
aggregate stimulus without taking on extra labour, then they could have experienced 
a boost to productivity (viz. non-union companies)." This thus implies that unionised 
firms have less employment growth in the boom years.
This business cycle effect is also consistent with an ’insider-outsider’ 
interpretation (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989). When an adverse shock hits the firm 
some of the incumbent workers will loose their insider status because they are laid off. 
New employment is now at a lower level. If the economy picks up again, then the 
remaining insiders will bargain for higher wages, without taking into account the 
outsiders. Thus employment will stay at the lower level. Assuming two different types 
of firms, unionised viz. non-unionized, the unionised firm will have lower growth in 
booms than the non-unionised firm, because the non-unionised firm will simply hire 
extra workers if the economy picks up again.
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b. competition effects
Stewart (1990) investigates the effect of product markets on union wage differentials 
and finds evidence that there exists only a union wage differential in establishments 
with some degree of product market power, as measured by the number of rivals a 
firm faces. The economic intuition for this is that union wage differentials are created 
by the capturing of rents. In a perfectly competitive market, there are no rents to 
capture, hence there will exist no union wage differential. This is consistent with the 
model of last chapter in which the union had no effect in the extreme case of tough 
price competition. Here, I use the number of competitors a firm faces to test whether 
unions have different effects in firms facing tough competition versus weak.
I test this hypothesis in column 4 of table VI.5. I have interacted the union 
variables with a dummy (comp) equal to 1 if the firm faces less than or equal to 5 
competitors5. I also interacted the union variables with (1-comp) to capture those 
firms facing many rivals. Obviously I need to include comp separately to control for 
spurious correlation in the interaction terms. As expected, I find a stronger union 
effect when firms face only a few rivals. Unionised firms grow 4.1% slower in ’non­
competitive’ markets, while only 1.9% in ’competitive’ markets. Moreover, the union 
de-recognition effect becomes now significant at the 10% critical level for those firms 
facing a few competitors and is -2.1%. It is -0.5% and insignificant for those firms 
facing many competitors. Thus when firms have some market power, as measured by
5The managers were asked whether they were the dominant firm in the market, 
whether they faced less than or equal to 5 competitors or whether they faced more 
than 5 competitors.
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the number of rivals they face, unions do have stronger effects: Unions decrease 
employment growth more and increase employment levels.
c. manufacturing viz. non-manufacturing
The above results refer to both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector. Some 
authors suggest however that there could well be different union effects in the 
manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector. Bronars and Deere (1993) 
report an average employment growth rate for firms with a successful union election 
of 0.81% and of 2.21% for firms without a union win in the manufacturing sector, 
in the non-manufacturing sector, however, the employment growth rate is 
approximately the same for both type of firms, 3.42% viz. 3.04%.
I therefore split up the sample and estimate (VI. 1’) on the subsample including 
only manufacturing firms and on the subsample including only non-manufacturing 
firms. This is another way to test for the robustness of the negative union effect on 
employment growth as found in column 2 of table VI.5. Table VI.6 reports the 
results. Column (1) shows that unionised manufacturing firms grow 3.3% slower than 
non-unionised manufacturing firms. Column (2) reports the same regression for the 
non-manufacturing sector. There is no significant difference in growth rates between 
unionised and non-unionised firms. Note further that in the non-manufacturing 
subsample the only significant explanatory variable is the output of the firm. The wage 
does not attract a significant coefficient. This suggests that in the non-manufacturing 
sector labour market variables are not that important in employment determination.
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Table VI.6: Unions and Employment Growth, Manufacturing viz. Non-Manufacturing
Dependent Variable: Aemployment
independent variables manufacturing non-manufacturing
Awage -0.76* -0.19
(0.31) (0.31)
Aoutput 0.79* 0.73*
(0.10) (0.14)
Aindustry wage -0.28 0.29
(0.42) (0.64)
union derecognition -0.003 -0.01
(0.019) (0.027)
union recognition -0.033* -0.004
(0.011) (0.018)
time dummies yes yes
Sargan test 37.4 (df=38) 47.8 (df=38)
Second order serial 1.8 1.8
correlation N(0,1)
Number of firms 187 174
Motes: As in table V1.3
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VI.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter I addressed the question of what unions do to employment 
behaviour. Do unions affect the level of employment and do unions affect the growth 
of employment? I have used a unique panel data set of large U.K. manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms to investigate this question. This is important to control for 
unobservable fixed effects. Moreover it allows to exploit both the cross-section and 
time-series dimension and hence to test the robustness of the estimated union effects 
on employment behaviour at the firm level.
As to the question that unions affect the growth of employment, I found no 
robust evidence that unionised firms have lower growth rates than non-unionised 
firms. The evidence I report indicates that there exists a negative effect of unions on 
employment growth, but this is not systematic over time. Moreover, the effect is 
weaker as firms face more competitors. Finally, I found a significant negative union 
effect only in the manufacturing sector, but not in the non-manufacturing sector.
As to the question whether unions affect the level of employment, I conclude with a 
quotation of a recent article in the Financial Times (May 27,1993), ’Shell is to 
derecognise unions at refinery...and intends to cut the Haven workforce by 100 posts 
to 350 by the end of 1994’. The evidence presented here is in line with this quotation. 
It suggests that unions have a positive impact effect on employment levels. I found 
that there is a significant effect of union de-recognition on employment growth when 
firms face only a few competitors. The reason why in the other specifications the 
union de-recognition effect comes through only weakly and not significant at
conventional levels is most likely due to the construction of the union de-recognition 
variable and the limited number of observations on this variable.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
This thesis documented a number of important new facts and approaches in 
labour economics. In particular, the flow approach, the efficiency wage hypothesis and 
the role o f trade unions in the employment behaviour o f firms have been analyzed in 
depth. I believe that the results reported here are not final, but merit further 
investigation and thus this thesis is a starting point of a larger research agenda. I first 
summarize the main findings of the thesis and then conclude with suggestions and 
directions for future research.
A. The Main Findings and Some Lessons
In part I of the thesis I focused on the flow approach in labour economics. 
Central to the flow approach is the matching function, which summarizes how jobs 
and job seekers are matched together. Crucial to the analysis is the opening up of 
vacancies or job creations on the one hand and the dying of unproductive matches or 
job destructions on the other hand. I investigated empirically this process of job 
creation and destruction based on U.K. firm and plant level data.
In chapter I I I  report that on average U.K. manufacturing firms created 1.6% 
new jobs and destroyed 5.6% existing ones between 1973-86. Even within narrowly 
defined sectors there is simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs at all phases of 
the business cycle. Job creation is procyclical and job destruction countercyclical and
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they are inversely related with the latter being more variable over the cycle. The sum 
of the two, gross job reallocation, is therefore countercyclical. The idiosyncratic 
component of job creation, destruction and reallocation is substantial. Idiosyncratic 
shocks explain most of the time variation in the overall job creation and destruction 
rate, while aggregate and sectoral shocks explain most of the time variation in the 
gross job reallocation rate. The idiosyncratic shocks counteract the procyclical 
movement in job creation, while they only weakly reinforce the countercyclical 
movements in job destruction. It is in booms that jobs move between firms within the 
same sector, while in recessions jobs move between firms in different sectors. Both 
job creation and destruction are highly persistent: on average 62% of the new jobs still 
exist after one year, while 81% of the destroyed jobs are still destroyed after one year.
There has been an increasing interest in the role of small firms in the job 
generation process. In chapter ID I investigated a relationship between gross job flows 
and the size of businesses using both U.K. firm and plant level data. I found that there 
is a positive relationship between the gross job creation rate and firm or plant size, 
this relationship reverses for the job destruction rate. In contrast, the smallest firms 
and plants have the lowest job destruction rate while the largest firms and plants the 
highest, indicating that the least stable jobs are concentrated in the largest firms. 
However, when I focus on the absolute amount of job creation and destruction, then 
the majority of jobs are created and destroyed in the largest firms, however, their 
employment share is also largest. The job destruction share is relatively stable over 
time, while the job creation share varied a lot from the late 70’s onwards. I
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investigated the evolution of the cross-section size distribution of plants and firms by 
computing Markov transition matrices. There is substantial intra-distribution mobility, 
with higher persistency in the smallest and in the largest size classes. Most movements 
occur in the middle size classes. Firms converge in the long run towards the mean 
employment in the sample, while plants do not converge.
In chapter IV I compared the U.K. results with those of other studies and 
argued why at this stage it is difficult to make consistent cross-country comparisons 
of gross job flows. I attempted to make a consistent comparison of manufacturing 
gross job flows across nine countries. There are remarkable differences in gross job 
reallocation rates across countries, with the U.S. having the highest gross job 
reallocation rate. There could be several reasons why there exist differences in gross 
job flow rates. I focused on the role of employment protection legislation, the degree 
of centralisation in bargaining and industrial policy as factors influencing differences 
in gross job flows across countries and I found preliminary evidence they do. I further 
pointed out the similarities and the differences in the cyclical properties of job creation 
and destruction for the U.S. and the U.K..
In part II of the thesis I introduced explicitly spillovers from the product 
market to the labour market and vice versa to develop a test of the efficiency wage 
hypothesis. While it has been very hard to provide direct evidence of the efficiency 
wage hypothesis, I develop an alternative approach by building a general efficiency 
wage oligopoly model yielding an exact prediction. The intuition is very simple: Firms 
only have an incentive to pay efficiency wages if and only if it induces better product
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market performance. This leads to a positive relationship between the wage paid by 
the firm and its market share performance. It is only under the hypothesis of efficiency 
wage payments that this positive relationship between the wage and market share is 
possible. I tested the propositions using U.K. firm level panel data and constrain the 
data by the theory to a sample of low unionised firms on the one hand and one of 
high unionised firms on the other. In the former I found a positive effect of the firm’s 
unit wage cost on its market share performance, while in the latter I find a negative 
effect, confirming the theoretical predictions.
In chapter VI I analyzed the effect unions have on employment behaviour in 
U.K. firms. While there exists a vast literature on the effect of trade unions on wages, 
only a few papers exist on the subject treated in chapter VI. Using a unique panel 
dataset of large U.K. firms, including firm level data on unionisation and union de­
recognition, I found that there exists a negative relationship between unionised firms 
and their employment growth and a positive effect of unions on employment levels. 
However, this negative union-growth effect is not robust with respect to the business 
cycle, it is only in booms that unionised firms have significant lower growth rates than 
non-unionised firms. Moreover, there is a stronger union effect (both on the growth 
rate and the employment levels) when firms face only a few rivals.
Again the product market seems to matter.
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B. A Research Agenda
The results of this thesis lead to both a theoretical and an empirical research 
agenda. At the theoretical level there are several possible routes one could follow. A 
model of job creation and destruction can either be developed from the matching 
approach with endogenous job separations as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1993a,b) 
or from the industrial organisation’s literature on firm evolution as in Jovanovic 
(1982). It would be interesting to see what the theoretical implications are from 
innovation and technological progress on the process of job creation and destruction 
and firm entry and exit Empirically, further research is needed to investigate the 
impact of entry and exit on the size distribution of firms and hence on the process of 
job creation and job destruction. It would be interesting to determine the evolution of 
the size distribution in narrowly defined sectors and to investigate whether there is 
convergence towards a common size or not in those sectors. Factors influencing the 
size distribution of firms are most likely the same as those influencing the process of 
job creation and destruction. From chapter IV it is clear that more and better 
international comparisons on gross job flows should highlight a number of stylized 
facts. I suggested three possible (policy) sources which could lead to differences in 
gross job flows across countries. The robustness of these results should of course be 
tested when there are more data on more countries available.
The approach I followed in chapter V could be applied to test the efficiency 
wage hypothesis in other countries. The product market approach could also be 
applied to other labour problems, like the research in the cyclicallity of real wages,
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the inflow and outflow analysis, etc.. Modelling spillovers from the labour market to 
the product market and vice versa can lead to a number of interesting new 
implications for certain beliefs in labour economics. For instance, it would be 
interesting to investigate correlations between the degree of competition and 
unionization, as well as to what extent do unions cause firm entry and exit.
I only gave a few areas of new and further research which list high on my 
research agenda. Surely, the list could go on much further. I believe by tackling the 
issues mentioned here, a better picture might be obtained of how labour markets work 
and of how unemployment comes about.
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